Ships through Hormuz average 3.9 a day, against 92 in 2023
The Strait of Hormuz has been closed or restricted since 28 Feb. Since 20 Jul the Houthis have also blockaded Saudi shipping in the Red Sea, the route around it.Who concedes first in the Gulf, and does the Red Sea bypass hold?
The view is holding: 0 of 4 tests have crossed since 13 Sep
Who concedes first in the Gulf, and does the Red Sea bypass hold?- Two stable endings — a Gulf-brokered reopening without Washington, or attrition to the 3 November election: holding (said 13 Sep 2026).→ Exhibit 2
- Ships through Hormuz average 3.9 a day to 8 Nov, against 92.3 a day in 2023.→ Exhibit 1
- Tankers through Bab el-Mandeb average 6.9 a day, 55% fewer than the week before the 20 Jul blockade.→ Exhibit 13
- A US strike on Iran landed by 3 Nov, as Polymarket resolved; on 31 Oct it was priced at 72% by 31 Dec.→ Exhibit 16
- Regular gasoline is $3.995 on 9 Nov, under the $4.50 line Washington settled after.→ Exhibit 10
| What would change this view | Trigger | Today | Decided by |
|---|---|---|---|
| Washington's clock: the pump price holds above $4.50 | above $4.50 for three weeks into early voting, with no US move | 3.995 $/gal (9 Nov 2026); 0 consecutive above 4.500 $/galnot crossed | Gasoline and Diesel Fuel Update, 24 Nov 2026 |
| Hormuz reopens on the contracts' measure | ships through Hormuz at or above 60 a day on the 7-day average | 3.9 ships a day (8 Nov 2026); on 11 Sep 5.0 ships a day (11 Sep 2026)not crossed | IMF PortWatch's daily count, published about a week behind |
| Saudi tankers return to the Red Sea | tankers through Bab el-Mandeb above 12 a day on the 7-day average | 6.9 tankers a day (8 Nov 2026); on 11 Sep 7.3 tankers a day (11 Sep 2026)not crossed | IMF PortWatch's daily count, published about a week behind |
| The reserve reaches the line of its limited-drawdown authority | SPR at or below 252.4 , a rather than a stop | 279.5 mb (6 Nov 2026); on 11 Sep 285.4 mb (4 Sep 2026)not crossed | Weekly Petroleum Status Report, 18 Nov 2026 |
The reasoning behind each point
- VerdictTwo stable endings — a Gulf-brokered reopening without Washington, or attrition to the 3 November election: holding (said 13 Sep 2026).
On 13 Sep 2026 the log said the two stable endings are a hollow deal and attrition. It said Iran's clock is physical and shorter, and America's political and reversible after 3 November. The verdict is “holding” because no test of the falsifier table has crossed. The scorecard sets what the log said against what has happened since.
- HormuzShips through Hormuz average 3.9 a day to 8 Nov, against 92.3 a day in 2023.
The traded contracts call the strait normal when this 7-day average reaches 60. The satellite count misses ships with transponders off, so paid trackers that add them count more. Their figures are quoted beside the chart.
- Red SeaTankers through Bab el-Mandeb average 6.9 a day, 55% fewer than the week before the 20 Jul blockade.
The Houthis declared a blockade of Saudi shipping on 20 Jul. Suez carries 44.4 ships a day against 73.7 in 2023. The Cape carries 77.9 against 49.1, because ships go around Africa instead.
- PricedA US strike on Iran landed by 3 Nov, as Polymarket resolved; on 31 Oct it was priced at 72% by 31 Dec.
The venue resolved its 3 Nov no-strike contract No on 3 Nov, and the later ones with it. The chart is the term structure on 31 Oct, the last day it traded before the strike. Then the average daily risk was 0.84% in late October and 5.40% from 31 Oct to 15 Nov. Contracts with less than $100k traded are left out.
- PumpRegular gasoline is $3.995 on 9 Nov, under the $4.50 line Washington settled after.
Diesel is $6.127, against its record of $6.529 on 21 Sep. The $4.50 line is the survey's own peak of 11 May, before the June memorandum, so every test compares EIA with EIA. Weeks above $4.50 on the survey: 0.
Next: Russia–Ukraine diesel war — the second shock, to diesel
Exhibit 2 · Each path and test of the Hormuz call, with its verdict
The view is holding: the word follows a rule set out in the Appendix, from the log and the tests above, never by hand.
About this exhibit
Exhibit 3 · Iran's and America's limits on one calendar
About this exhibit
Exhibit 4 · The Brent–Dubai spread and the Strait, a sketch without data
About this exhibit
Exhibit 5 · Iran's oil revenue and its attacks on shipping, as quoted
| What | As quoted | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Iranian crude loadingssubscription data | None in September, the first such month since 1979 (Kpler, Vortexa and Bloomberg, via Fortune, 3 Oct); Iranian crude afloat off Malaysia 'likely not more than 10 million barrels' (UANI, 7 Oct). | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §1 key takeaways; §2 claims in the logged view · 14 Oct 2026 |
| The rial and pricessubscription data | About 2.72 million rials to the dollar on the open market on 4 Oct, from 2.2 million on 2 Sep (Reuters, via SSBCrack); consumer prices up 89.8% over the year to September (Statistical Center of Iran). | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §1 what changed since the lock; §2 claims in the logged view · 14 Oct 2026 |
| Attacks on shippingsubscription data | At least 12 attacks on tankers and gas carriers a week from 28 Sep, the most of the war (maritime-security sources, via Reuters and gCaptain, 7 Oct); six ships struck on 11 Oct alone (gCaptain, 12 Oct); 95 tanker attacks since the war began (Gibson Shipbrokers, 9 Oct). | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §1 what changed since the lock; §5b tonne-mile mechanics · 14 Oct 2026 |
| Tehran's stated aimsubscription data | Two senior officials told Reuters the new tactics were 'decided at the highest levels' to keep oil high before the US vote, and that 'it will be complete closure soon' (Reuters, via TBS, 14 Oct). | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §1 key takeaways; §3a timeline · 14 Oct 2026 |
About this exhibit
Exhibit 6 · The Hormuz call as written, with its revision
Two stable endings — a Gulf-brokered reopening without Washington, or attrition to the 3 November election — holding
Hormuz is an endgame, not an outlook: the two stable outcomes are a hollow deal — a corridor recognised by regional consent, without the United States — and attrition; Iran's clock is physical and shorter, America's political and reversible after 3 November.
Iran's binding constraints are storage (about 29 mb in early September, exhausted around mid-October), payments (drying up by mid-December) and a rial down 60% since March; America's are the pump price into early voting, with Washington's two settlements made at $4.12 and rising and just after the $4.50 peak. The blockade has been engineered around rather than defeated: about 3.1 mb/d leaves the Gulf by ship-to-ship transfer. Triggers are physical flows, never the price.
Revised on 14 September after the Salalah postponement: the cheapest route to a hollow deal — Gulf-wide ratification of the Iran–Oman corridor — failed for want of consensus with no new date; hollow deal 40 → 33, attrition 35 → 42.
Argued in the : 6 dated documents, listed with their sections under Sources in the Appendix.
About this exhibit
Hormuz carries 3.9 ships a day and Bab el-Mandeb 26.3
What do the straits, the reserve and the pump say today?Exhibit 1 · Ships a day through each chokepoint, against the contracts' settlement lines
About this exhibit
Exhibit 7 · Gulf crude and fuel flows and Hormuz ship counts, as quoted
| What | As quoted | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Gulf crude and product exportssubscription data | Gulf crude exports 13.9 mb/d in September, more than three-quarters of pre-war; Middle East refined product exports 1.9 mb/d against 4.7 before the war; exports by bypass routes 5.6 mb/d (IEA Oil Market Report, 14 Oct). | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a physical flows; §1 four things the consensus may have wrong · 14 Oct 2026 |
| Hormuz crude flowsubscription data | At least 10.1 mb/d in the week to about 5 Oct, down 27% on the week and 74% of pre-war (Kpler, via The National and Reuters, 8 Oct). On 5 Oct no diesel, gasoline or other finished fuel is known to have transited (Washington Post, 8 Oct). | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a key takeaways; physical flows · 14 Oct 2026 |
| Middle East crude shut inpublished data | 4.8 mb/d in September, against a peak of 10.9 mb/d in May; 4.5 mb/d assumed for the fourth quarter (EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, 6 Oct). | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a physical flows (EIA STEO) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| Three counters, one straitsubscription data | IMF PortWatch's satellite count 2.7 ships a day over 28 Sep–4 Oct; Lloyd's List Intelligence 143 non-Iranian transits over 28 Sep–7 Oct, about 14 a day, adding confirmed dark ships; the US Navy's NCAGS count about 29 a day over the 72 hours to 11 Oct. The shuttle runs dark, so the counts differ by up to ten times. | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a three counters; §2 test S2 · 14 Oct 2026 |
About this exhibit
Exhibit 8 · Strategic Petroleum Reserve stocks against the reporting line
About this exhibit
Exhibit 9 · US petroleum stocks and flows in the latest week
| Stocks (mb) | Week | Change | Year ago |
|---|---|---|---|
| Crude Oil | 694.0 | +2.0 | 838.0 |
| Commercial (Excluding SPR) | 414.4 | +4.7 | 427.6 |
| Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) | 279.5 | −2.6 | 410.4 |
| Total Motor Gasoline | 210.8 | +1.8 | 205.1 |
| Kerosene-Type Jet Fuel | 42.0 | +0.2 | 42.8 |
| Distillate Fuel Oil | 103.3 | +4.1 | 110.9 |
| Propane/Propylene | 104.2 | +0.1 | 105.4 |
| Total Stocks (Including SPR) | 1,495.3 | +8.7 | 1,682.3 |
| Flows (kb/d) | Week | Change | Year ago |
| Domestic Production | 14,013 | +10 | 13,862 |
| Net Imports (Including SPR) | 3,243 | +545 | 2,406 |
| Imports | 6,698 | +325 | 5,222 |
| Exports | 3,455 | −220 | 2,816 |
| Commercial Stock Change | 665 | +789 | 916 |
| SPR Stock Change | -378 | −321 | 114 |
| Crude Oil Input to Refineries | 17,047 | +322 | 15,973 |
About this exhibit
Exhibit 10 · Weekly retail gasoline and diesel prices against the gasoline test lines
About this exhibit
Exhibit 11 · Retail fuel, latest and changes
| Fuel | Level | 1w | 4w | 13w | 1y | Pct |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regular gasoline, retail (all formulations)9 Nov 2026 | $3.995 | −15.8¢ | −33.6¢ | −1.1¢ | +93.9¢ | 96 |
| No. 2 diesel, retail9 Nov 2026 | $6.127 | −16.5¢ | −5.2¢ | +87.0¢ | +229.0¢ | 99 |
Both settlement lines are EIA's own survey readings — the $4.50 peak before the June settlement and the ceasefire week's $4.12 — so every test here compares EIA with EIA. Diesel's record on the survey is $6.529.
Exhibit 12 · Latest readings of tests on the reserve, pump prices and ship counts
| Status | Test | Latest reading | Threshold | If crossed | Threshold source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| not crossed | SPR at or below the 252.4 mb statutory line | 279.5 mb (6 Nov 2026); on 11 Sep 285.4 mb (4 Sep 2026)an earlier page of this site | ≤ 252.4 mb | The reserve is below the 42 U.S.C. §6241(h) line and the engineers' 250 mb floor for reliable high-rate draws; any further release draws into the floor. Completing the existing 172 mb exchange alone lands it near 243 mb.The 252.4 mb line is the floor of the limited-drawdown authority (EPCA §161(h), 42 U.S.C. §6241(h)). Exchanges and sales under a presidential finding (§161(d)) are not bound by it (Atlantic Council, 2 Oct), so it is a reporting line, not a stop. | research note: Oman postponement spr (14 Sep 2026) · §B2a authorities; §B3 how much is left · 14 Sept 2026 |
| not crossed | Regular gasoline above $4.50 for three weeks into early voting, with no US move toward a partial reopening | 3.995 $/gal (9 Nov 2026); 0 consecutive above 4.500 $/galan earlier page of this site | > 4.500 $/gal3 in a row | The revealed American settlement threshold is wrong — if Washington has also made no move toward a partial reopening (that leg is read from the record, not tracked here).On EIA's weekly survey, the page's one basis: the $4.50 line is the survey's own peak before the June settlement, so the run counts survey weeks above it. | the September 2026 report · §3.1.5 falsifier; the Iran runway note §14c · 13 Sept 2026 |
| crossed | Regular gasoline back under $4.00 — the US banks its gain | 3.995 $/gal (9 Nov 2026); on 11 Sep 4.157 $/gal (7 Sep 2026)an earlier page of this site | < 4.000 $/gal | The pump-price objective of a partial reopening is met (EIA's 4Q26 path is $3.95); the US political clock stops pressing.On EIA's weekly survey, the page's one basis for the pump price. | research note: Iran runway (13 Sep 2026) · §15 what securing gains looks like · 13 Sept 2026 |
| not crossed | Retail diesel at or above its $6.53 record for two survey weeks, with no new US supply action | 6.127 $/gal (9 Nov 2026); 0 consecutive at or above 6.530 $/galan earlier page of this site | ≥ 6.530 $/gal2 in a row | Washington answers diesel stress with relief rather than a settlement; the view is wrong if the price holds at its record and no new supply action follows (that leg is read from the record, not tracked here).ME-1d. The record is EIA's weekly survey high of $6.529 on 21 Sep 2026. | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §8.5 ME-1d; §2 the 11 tests, the pump-price test · 14 Oct 2026 |
| not crossed | Ships through Hormuz at or above 60 a day on the 7-day average, the line at which the traded contracts call traffic normal | 3.9 ships a day (8 Nov 2026); on 11 Sep 5.0 ships a day (11 Sep 2026)an earlier page of this site | ≥ 60.0 ships a day | The strait is open again by the measure the contracts settle on: a hollow or a genuine deal is under way and attrition has ended.ME-4 on IMF PortWatch's satellite count, the contracts' own source and line; the count misses ships with transponders off. | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §8.5 ME-4, its threshold set to the traded contracts' line (prototype of 17 Oct, §0) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| not crossed | Tankers through Bab el-Mandeb above 12 a day on the 7-day average, a sign that Saudi tankers are back in the Red Sea | 6.9 tankers a day (8 Nov 2026); on 11 Sep 7.3 tankers a day (11 Sep 2026)an earlier page of this site | > 12.0 tankers a day | The Houthi blockade of Saudi shipping no longer binds Saudi energy: tanker traffic is heading back toward its level before 20 July.ME-9 on IMF PortWatch's satellite count of tankers. | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §8.5 ME-9; §6b branch C · 14 Oct 2026 |
About this exhibit
Tankers through Bab el-Mandeb fell 55% after the blockade of Saudi shipping
Does the Red Sea bypass hold, and does Washington join the Yemen war?Exhibit 13 · Tankers a day through Bab el-Mandeb, with the Red Sea's dated events
About this exhibit
Exhibit 14 · Ships a day through Suez and around the Cape, against 2023
About this exhibit
Exhibit 15 · The Red Sea war's dated events by side
| Date | Who | What happened | Logged from |
|---|---|---|---|
| 13 Jul 2026 | Houthis | The first Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia since 2023, as part of the Iran war (Wikipedia, Red Sea crisis). | research note: the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype (17 Oct 2026) · the Gulf tab, Exhibit 8: the Houthi strike log · 17 Oct 2026 |
| 20 Jul 2026 | Houthis | The Houthis declare a sea and air blockade of Saudi Arabia (the UK Parliament's Commons Library, 5 Oct); one Saudi-linked tanker has used Bab el-Mandeb since (Lloyd's List Intelligence, 18 Sep). | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b key takeaways (declared 19 or 20 July) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| 24 Jul 2026 | Saudi Arabia | The first Saudi air strikes in Yemen since 2022 (the UK Parliament's Commons Library, 5 Oct). | research note: the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype (17 Oct 2026) · the Gulf tab, Exhibit 8: the Houthi strike log · 17 Oct 2026 |
| 7 Sept 2026 | Houthis | Saudi Arabia's Jizan refinery is hit (Reuters). | research note: the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype (17 Oct 2026) · the Gulf tab, Exhibit 8: the Houthi strike log · 17 Oct 2026 |
| 10 Sept 2026 | Houthis | The Houthis take Mokha, Perim and the Hanish islands at the mouth of the Red Sea (Long War Journal, 14 Sep). | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026 |
| 28 Sept 2026 | Saudi Arabia | The East–West pipeline is exporting again at about 3.5 mb/d after repairs (Dow Jones, 28 Sep). | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026 |
| 4 Oct 2026 | Saudi Arabia | A Saudi-led ground and air offensive, 'Yemen Dawn', moves to retake the Red Sea coast (AP, 5–7 Oct). | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026 |
| 8 Oct 2026 | Houthis | A Houthi strike on Riyadh's King Khalid airport kills three; at least 124 flights are suspended (CTP-ISW, 9 Oct). | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026 |
| 10 Oct 2026 | Houthis | King Khalid airport's terminals are hit: 12 killed, one of them American; Trump says 'We may' join the strikes (Times of Israel; NPR). | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026 |
| 11 Oct 2026 | Houthis | Riyadh's airport is hit again and Dammam's attacked; the Houthis declare Saudi airspace a 'theater of operations' (Dawn; Al Arabiya). | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026 |
| 13 Oct 2026 | Houthis | An Aramco administrative building in Dhahran is hit, a 'limited fire' with no injuries (Argaam; Khaleej Times, 14 Oct). | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026 |
| 13 Oct 2026 | United States | Trump says Iran is behind the attacks on Saudi Arabia; the US has not struck the Houthis (Iran International; Soufan Center). | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline; external positions · 14 Oct 2026 |
About this exhibit
A US strike on Iran landed by 3 Nov, as the venue resolved it
What do traded contracts say about each ending?Exhibit 16 · Daily chance of a first US strike on Iran, by contract window
The curve starts at 24 Oct 2026, the latest contract that resolved with no strike, and reaches 28.5% for no strike by 31 Dec 2026: a 72% chance of one. The venue resolved its 3 Nov 2026 contract No on 3 Nov 2026: a strike had landed by then, so the curve drawn is the last one traded before it, on 31 Oct 2026.
About this exhibit
Exhibit 17 · Each Gulf and Red Sea contract's price, spread and volume
| Contract | Yes | Bid–ask | Traded | Liquidity | Ends |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hormuz | |||||
| Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by November 30?long shot | 1.0% | 0.9–1.1 | $2.1m | $194k | 1 Dec 2026 |
| Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by December 15?thin | 50.0% | 0.0–100.0 | $0k | $0k | 31 Dec 2026 |
| Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by December 31?long shot | 4.5% | 4.0–5.0 | $18.0m | $260k | 1 Jan 2027 |
| US-Iran Hormuz Agreement by November 30?long shot | 4.3% | 4.1–4.4 | $969k | $132k | 1 Dec 2026 |
| US-Iran Hormuz Agreement by December 31? | 14.5% | 14.0–15.0 | $816k | $119k | 1 Jan 2027 |
| Iran-Oman Hormuz Agreement by November 30?long shot | 8.5% | 8.0–9.0 | $413k | $40k | 1 Dec 2026 |
| Iran-Oman Hormuz Agreement by December 31? | 19.5% | 19.0–20.0 | $394k | $16k | 1 Jan 2027 |
| US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal by November 30, 2026?long shot | 1.1% | 0.9–1.2 | $732k | $64k | 1 Dec 2026 |
| US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal by December 31, 2026?long shot | 5.5% | 5.0–6.0 | $4.7m | $186k | 1 Jan 2027 |
| Will the U.S. invade Iran before 2027?long shot | 7.5% | 7.0–8.0 | $80.4m | $351k | 1 Jan 2027 |
| Red Sea | |||||
| Bab el-Mandeb Strait effectively closed by November 30?long shot | 2.1% | 2.0–2.1 | $231k | $109k | 1 Dec 2026 |
| Bab el-Mandeb Strait effectively closed by December 31?long shot | 6.5% | 6.0–7.0 | $2.2m | $140k | 1 Jan 2027 |
| Saudi-Houthi ceasefire agreement announced by December 31? | 12.5% | 12.0–13.0 | $429k | $46k | 1 Jan 2027 |
| Military action against Saudi Oil Pipeline (East-West) by December 31?thin | 72.0% | 49.0–95.0 | $0k | $0k | 31 Dec 2026 |
About this exhibit
The log names four oil paths and quotes three traded contracts
What endings does the log name, and which can be priced?Exhibit 18 · The oil paths to 31 December 2026, with Brent ranges
- Hollow dealWashington blesses the Iran–Oman corridor and keeps the blockade; a reopening by regional consent without a US–Iran agreement (Brent $80–95 in the grid).
- AttritionBoth sides hold to 3 November: transits 5–20 a day, shut-ins of 5.7 mb/d through 4Q (Brent $100–115).
- EscalationA mistake path — a Pickaxe strike on IAEA-verified movement, Gulf energy infrastructure, or an Iranian missile that hits a US ship (Brent above $120).
- Genuine dealA sequencing device is found — an escrow or custodian for the HEU that makes Iran's irreversible concession simultaneous with America's reversible one.
What the market and others said, as quoted
- Polymarket 'traffic normal by 31 December' 20% (by 31 October 7.5%; by 15 September 0.15%); Kalshi PortWatch transits above 60: 2% by 1 October, 15% by 1 January, 42% by 1 July 2027. (the September 2026 report · §3.1.6 probabilities, anchored · 13 Sept 2026)
- EIA: constraints through 4Q26, pre-conflict output only by 2Q27; Kpler: 'gradual reopening only in late Q4'. CSIS: the clean deal 'the least likely option'; Crisis Group: escalation 'the more likely course'; CTP/ISW: the hardline IRGC faction believes it can outlast Washington. (the September 2026 report · §3.1.6 probabilities, anchored · 13 Sept 2026)
The record: the author's assessment on 13 Sep 2026, revised 14 Sep 2026
A dated judgement, kept as written and never revised here; it is not a market price or a model's output.
- 14 Sept 2026Hollow deal 33%Attrition 42%Escalation 15%Genuine deal 10%
Seven points from the hollow deal to attrition. The cheapest route to a hollow deal was a Gulf-wide ratification of a corridor whose bilateral text was already written; that ratification failed on 13 September for want of consensus, with no new date. Nothing about the branch itself changed — only the evidence on how quickly it can be reached.
research note: Discussions and decisions (13 Sep 2026) · §5a the probability revision (also STATUS round 5; report as published §3.1.7) · 14 Sept 2026
- 13 Sept 2026Hollow deal 40%Attrition 35%Escalation 15%Genuine deal 10%
This review's assessment for the window to 31 December: a stated judgement anchored to the market, official and analyst sources printed beside it; the hollow-deal share to rise on 14 September if four or more GCC states signed.
the September 2026 report · §3.1.6 · 13 Sept 2026
About this exhibit
Exhibit 20 · Hormuz traffic normal by 31 December — the prediction market
Quoted 24 Oct 2026: a traded price, not a forecast.
Exhibit 19 · When a first US strike on Iran lands — the prediction market
Quoted 24 Oct 2026: a traded price, not a forecast.
Exhibit 21 · Bab el-Mandeb effectively closed by 31 December — the prediction market
Quoted 24 Oct 2026: a traded price, not a forecast.
The two legs are never multiplied together: both load on the 3 November vote, so an escalation on one makes escalation on the other likelier.
Crude tanker owners rose 15–55% since 27 Feb
Who is pricing the war, and where is the gap to the damage?Exhibit 22 · Total return of Gulf and regional country funds
For context, Brent front-month futures moved +27.5% since the war began and −11.4% since the 28 Sep shift. EIA's Brent and WTI spot prices are not shown.
About this exhibit
Exhibit 23 · Total return of crude and product tanker owners
The tanker freight futures fund (BWET) moved +1,014.2% since the war began and −2.9% since the 28 Sep shift; it is left off the bars so the owners stay readable.
About this exhibit
Exhibit 24 · Quoted tanker freight and war-risk cover, credit spreads and Gulf budgets
| What | As quoted | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Tanker rates by routesubscription data | Arabian Gulf to China, VLCC (TD3C): WS1,319, about $1.48 million a day, from WS821 on 10 Sep. West Africa to Europe, Suezmax: $590,250 a day. US Gulf to Europe, Aframax: $325,000 a day. Arabian Gulf to Japan, clean LR2: $282,000 a day (Gibson Shipbrokers, 8 Oct). | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §5b tanker freight and war risk · 14 Oct 2026 |
| Freight in the cost of crudesubscription data | VLCC freight about $33 a barrel, 27% of the delivered cost of crude against 3% in January (Poten & Partners, via Benzinga); Clarksons' all-ship earnings index a record $84,951 a day on 12 Oct (via Splash247). | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §5b key takeaways · 14 Oct 2026 |
| War-risk coversubscription data | Hormuz 7.5–12.5% of hull value per transit (Breakwave, 8 Sep) or 6–9% (Reuters, via OilPrice, 25 Sep); Saudi-linked tankers at Yanbu about 3%, from under 1% in early July (Reuters, 25 Sep). No print dated after 25 Sep is sourced. | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §5b war-risk insurance · 14 Oct 2026 |
| Emerging-market creditsubscription data | The ICE BofA emerging-market corporate spread 155bp on 12 Oct, 3bp tighter than before the war; its Europe, Middle East and Africa bucket 167bp, 22bp wider since 27 Feb (ICE BofA indices, via FRED). | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §5c what credit has and has not priced · 14 Oct 2026 |
| Sovereign risk and Gulf budgetssubscription data | Five-year CDS: Türkiye 244bp, Egypt 312bp, Israel 58bp (worldgovernmentbonds.com, source undisclosed); no Gulf sovereign CDS is openly available. The World Bank puts 2026 budget balances at −6.6% of GDP for Saudi Arabia and −18.0% for Kuwait (6 Oct). | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §5c damage ranking · 14 Oct 2026 |
About this exhibit
Exhibit 25 · US oil stocks by product: levels, changes and percentiles
| Series | Level | 1w | 4w | 13w | 1y | Pct since 2000 | Level, recent | As of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strategic reserve | ||||||||
| Strategic Petroleum Reserve | 279.5 mb | −2.6 mb | −3.4 mb | −19.2 mb | −130.9 mb | 0 | 6 Nov 2026 | |
| Commercial stocks | ||||||||
| Commercial crude oil (excluding SPR) | 414.4 mb | +4.7 mb | −1.2 mb | −10.0 mb | −13.2 mb | 60 | 6 Nov 2026 | |
| Total motor gasoline | 210.8 mb | +1.8 mb | +2.5 mb | +2.1 mb | +5.7 mb | 33 | 6 Nov 2026 | |
| Distillate fuel oil | 103.3 mb | +4.1 mb | +0.7 mb | −3.8 mb | −7.6 mb | 4 | 6 Nov 2026 | |
About this exhibit
Exhibit 26 · US stocks of the selected oil product, weekly
About this exhibit
Exhibit 27 · Twelve-month inflation in CPI gasoline, energy and all items
About this exhibit
No oil path is projected on the Scenarios set, only the pump-to-CPI channel
: what would each oil path move?Exhibit 28 · The one oil channel the site estimates: pump price to CPI
Nothing is projected here. Hollow deal, Attrition, Escalation and Genuine deal: oil is not modelled through the identity — no elasticity of index earnings or of the premium to it exists among the site's estimates, and none is invented here.
The channel a path would run through · Pump price → CPI energy → headline CPI: +10% on the monthly average pump price → headline CPI +0.45% (energy +5.0%, gasoline +9.3%), the same month; +0.59% per 10% sustained at 3 months; 90% band 0.42 to 0.48%. Record: 1991–2008 +0.45%; 2009–2026 +0.43% (impact, per 10%). The transmission table carries it with its sample and its model.
What each path would do to core PCE, unemployment and real GDP is read on Thematic impact, under Outlook.
About this exhibit
The tests waiting on a date or an event, and the dated record
The tests waiting on a date or an event, the dated record and the report's grid
Exhibit 29 · The tests waiting on a date, an event or subscription data
| Status | Test | Latest reading | Threshold | If crossed | Threshold source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| not tracked here | Iranian crude loadings above 1 mb/d for two consecutive weeks without a lifting of the blockade | subscription data tanker tracking (Kpler, Vortexa) — quoted, not tracked; August loadings 220–260 kb/d (issue) | – | Iran's storage clock is wrong. | the September 2026 report · §3.1.5 falsifier · 13 Sept 2026 |
| not tracked here | Transits above 30 a day for five days — the hollow deal's leading indicator | subscription data trackers (Windward, Kpler) — quoted, not tracked; 5–18 a day at the lock | – | The hollow deal is under way; with P&I insurers returning and the Brent–Dubai spread narrowing.The 30 a day line was written on paid trackers' counts, which ran up to ten times IMF PortWatch's satellite count in early October; the page's own transit test is the contracts' 60 line on PortWatch's 7-day average. | the September 2026 report (as published on 15 Sep) · §3.1.8 plan of action, branch A · 15 Sept 2026 |
| not tracked here | Transits above 40 a day for ten days without a signed US–Iran document | subscription data trackers — quoted, not tracked | – | The hollow deal is the equilibrium, and framing the outcome as Washington's decision was wrong.The 40 a day line was written on paid trackers' counts, which ran up to ten times IMF PortWatch's satellite count in early October; the page's own transit test is the contracts' 60 line on PortWatch's 7-day average. | the September 2026 report (as published on 15 Sep) · §3.1.8 falsifier; §4.4 #17 · 15 Sept 2026 |
| not tracked here | Four or more GCC signatures at a rescheduled Salalah meeting | postponed by Oman on 13 Sep 'to a later date'; no new date in the record to 14 Sep | – | Raises the hollow deal. | the September 2026 report (as published on 15 Sep) · §4.4 #21; OMAN_POSTPONEMENT_SPR §A6 · 15 Sept 2026 |
| not tracked here | A US Navy ship is hit | event — read from the record, not a data series | – | Raises the escalation. | the September 2026 report (as published on 15 Sep) · §4.4 #21 · 15 Sept 2026 |
| not tracked here | A presidential finding under EPCA §161(d) with an SPR release above 50 mb | none on the record; the Energy Secretary's last statement (31 Jul): 'no thoughts whatsoever of needing any more' | – | The section's physical ceiling on a second release (33–35 mb before the statutory line) is wrong. | the September 2026 report (as published on 15 Sep) · §3.1.6 falsifier · 15 Sept 2026 |
| not tracked here | Brent falls more than $5 on a release announcement of 40 mb or less | crude prices are subscription data — not displayed | – | The September report’s $1–3/bbl estimate of a release's worth is wrong. | the September 2026 report (as published on 15 Sep) · §3.1.6 falsifier · 15 Sept 2026 |
| not tracked here | Iranian onshore crude storage exhausted — forced well shut-ins | projected around mid-October (Kpler, Vortexa, TankerTrackers via RFE/RL, 8 Sep) — quoted, not tracked | – | Iran's physical clock binds: shut-ins risk irreversible reservoir damage. | research note: Iran runway (13 Sep 2026) · §14b Iran's clock · 13 Sept 2026 |
| pending | Iran concedes by 30 November: it accepts nuclear-first sequencing or announces a reopening | dated 30 Nov 2026 | – | If Iran concedes, the clock thesis passes; if there is no concession and no US escalation by 30 November, the thesis is falsified. | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §8.5 ME-5; §2 why holding is the wrong headline · 14 Oct 2026 |
| not tracked here | The Houthis end their exemption: Suez container transits fall 30% in a week, or a confirmed Houthi strike on a non-Saudi ship | none on the record to 14 Oct: the Houthis exempt US and EU shipping | – | The Red Sea war is no longer two-sided: the route closes to every flag and the carriers' return to Suez reverses. | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §8.5 ME-10; §3b key takeaways · 14 Oct 2026 |
| not tracked here | A US strike on Houthi targets | none on the record to 14 Oct: the US gives intelligence, targeting and planning support only (AP, 5 Oct) | – | Washington joins the Yemen war: the Houthis' exemption of US ships ends and escalation runs on both legs at once. | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §8.5 ME-11; §3b external positions · 14 Oct 2026 |
| not tracked here | Saudi Arabia confirms damage at Yanbu, Abqaiq or Ras Tanura | none on the record to 14 Oct; the Dhahran office strike of 13 Oct was a 'limited fire' | – | Strikes on Saudi energy are no longer performative: the bypass's export capacity is hit. | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §8.5 ME-12 · 14 Oct 2026 |
| not tracked here | Traders stop pricing a higher strike risk after the vote: the daily risk for 1–15 November at or below late October's | cannot be read: the strike landed by 3 Nov (Polymarket), so no contract prices 1–15 Nov after the vote. On 31 Oct prices, the last before it, the daily risk was 5.40% for 1–15 Nov against 0.84% in late October | – | America's clock is not electoral: the market no longer expects the end of the pledge to raise the risk of a strike.ME-13, read from the no-strike term structure the page draws. | research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §8.5 ME-13; §6f the hazard reading · 14 Oct 2026 |
Exhibit 30 · Dated events of the Gulf war since it began, with sources
- 28 Feb 2026The Strait is closed or restricted (formal IRGC closure on 2 March).
the September 2026 report · §3.1 key points · 13 Sept 2026
- 11 Mar 2026IEA collective action: 400 mb announced (411.9 mb committed), the largest in history; the US share, 172 mb, structured as exchanges.
research note: Oman postponement spr (14 Sep 2026) · §B4a · 14 Sept 2026
- 8 Apr 2026Ceasefire, with US gasoline at $4.12 and rising ('due to rising gas prices', Axios); the Islamabad talks fail on 11–12 April.
the September 2026 report · §3.1.1; §3.1.5 · 13 Sept 2026
- 13 Apr 2026US blockade of Iranian ports (13–15 April).
the September 2026 report · §3.1.1 · 13 Sept 2026
- 17 Jun 2026Fourteen-point memorandum: blockade lifted, transit fees suspended for sixty days, a sixty-day nuclear window.
the September 2026 report · §3.1.1 · 13 Sept 2026
- 8 Jul 2026The memorandum collapses (8–9 July) after Iran strikes three commercial vessels; the blockade is reinstated on 14–15 July.
the September 2026 report · §3.1.1 · 13 Sept 2026
- 13 Jul 2026The first Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia since 2023, as part of the Iran war (Wikipedia, Red Sea crisis).
research note: the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype (17 Oct 2026) · the Gulf tab, Exhibit 8: the Houthi strike log · 17 Oct 2026
- 20 Jul 2026The Houthis declare a sea and air blockade of Saudi Arabia (the UK Parliament's Commons Library, 5 Oct); one Saudi-linked tanker has used Bab el-Mandeb since (Lloyd's List Intelligence, 18 Sep).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b key takeaways (declared 19 or 20 July) · 14 Oct 2026
- 24 Jul 2026The first Saudi air strikes in Yemen since 2022 (the UK Parliament's Commons Library, 5 Oct).
research note: the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype (17 Oct 2026) · the Gulf tab, Exhibit 8: the Houthi strike log · 17 Oct 2026
- 31 Jul 2026Energy Secretary Wright: 'There is certainly more oil in the SPR, but we have no thoughts whatsoever of needing any more.'
research note: Oman postponement spr (14 Sep 2026) · §B1 · 14 Sept 2026
- 17 Aug 2026The memorandum's window expires with crude clearance at 6.1 mb/d, 40% of the 2025 rate.
the September 2026 report · §3.1.1 · 13 Sept 2026
- 26 Aug 2026Iran and Oman agree a temporary seven-mile corridor through Iranian waters, to be notified to the IMO.
research note: Oman postponement spr (14 Sep 2026) · §A timeline · 14 Sept 2026
- 7 Sept 2026Saudi Arabia's Jizan refinery is hit (Reuters).
research note: the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype (17 Oct 2026) · the Gulf tab, Exhibit 8: the Houthi strike log · 17 Oct 2026
- 9 Sept 2026The IAEA Board refers Iran to the UN Security Council (23–3–8). EIA's September STEO keeps Hormuz constraints through 4Q26.
the September 2026 report · §3.1 key points; §1.2 Analysis 6 · 13 Sept 2026
- 10 Sept 2026Saudi East–West pipeline shut after drone strikes (10–11 Sep; attribution disputed); Iran suspends its 10% freight surcharge for foreign vessels carrying Iranian cargo.
research note: Oman postponement spr (14 Sep 2026) · §A timeline · 14 Sept 2026
- 10 Sept 2026The Houthis take Mokha, Perim and the Hanish islands at the mouth of the Red Sea (Long War Journal, 14 Sep).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
- 11 Sept 2026Bahrain declines to attend the Gulf–Iran meeting (11–12 Sep); the September report’s data lock.
research note: Oman postponement spr (14 Sep 2026) · §A3 · 14 Sept 2026
- 13 Sept 2026Oman postpones the Salalah meeting 'in the interests of consensus', to a later date with none set; Trump: 'I don't care. That's up to them.'
research note: Oman postponement spr (14 Sep 2026) · §A1, §A4 · 14 Sept 2026
- 14 Sept 2026Oil-path probabilities revised: hollow deal 40 → 33, attrition 35 → 42.
research note: Discussions and decisions (13 Sep 2026) · §5a · 14 Sept 2026
- 14 Sept 2026An Iranian anti-ship missile hits the M/V St. Helena; eight US Marines aboard are injured, disclosed on 27–28 Sep (The War Zone).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
- 18 Sept 2026Early in-person voting begins (Idaho, Minnesota, South Dakota, Virginia); Iran's Tehran security drill.
research note: Iran runway (13 Sep 2026) · §15 dates that matter · 13 Sept 2026
- 26 Sept 2026Trump rejects Iran's plan to reopen the strait; the WSJ reports he told staff renewed bombing was likely after the midterms (NPR; The National).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
- 28 Sept 2026Iran's tactical shift: at least 12 attacks on tankers and gas carriers a week from 28 Sep, the most of the war (maritime-security sources, via Reuters and gCaptain, 7 Oct).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a dated timeline; §1 key takeaways · 14 Oct 2026
- 28 Sept 2026The East–West pipeline is exporting again at about 3.5 mb/d after repairs (Dow Jones, 28 Sep).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
- 29 Sept 2026The US offers a 40 mb exchange from the strategic reserve for November–December delivery (Oil & Gas Journal, 30 Sep).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
- 2 Oct 2026G7 leaders back a coordinated stock release with diesel front-loaded (IEA).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
- 4 Oct 2026OPEC+ eight-country meeting — 'very limited power over the physical oil market'.
research note: Iran runway (13 Sep 2026) · §15 dates that matter · 13 Sept 2026
- 4 Oct 2026A Saudi-led ground and air offensive, 'Yemen Dawn', moves to retake the Red Sea coast (AP, 5–7 Oct).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
- 7 Oct 2026Iran and Oman agree route coordinates for a corridor (Gulf News, 8 Oct); the Pentagon tells CENTCOM to complete preparations for major combat (Axios).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
- 8 Oct 2026Trump says he will not attack Iran before the 3 November election and that the blockade stays (Reuters, 9 Oct).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
- 8 Oct 2026A Houthi strike on Riyadh's King Khalid airport kills three; at least 124 flights are suspended (CTP-ISW, 9 Oct).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
- 10 Oct 2026King Khalid airport's terminals are hit: 12 killed, one of them American; Trump says 'We may' join the strikes (Times of Israel; NPR).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
- 11 Oct 2026Six vessels are struck in one day, one of them at Oman's Sohar anchorage (gCaptain, 12 Oct).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
- 11 Oct 2026Riyadh's airport is hit again and Dammam's attacked; the Houthis declare Saudi airspace a 'theater of operations' (Dawn; Al Arabiya).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
- 13 Oct 2026An Aramco administrative building in Dhahran is hit, a 'limited fire' with no injuries (Argaam; Khaleej Times, 14 Oct).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
- 13 Oct 2026Trump says Iran is behind the attacks on Saudi Arabia; the US has not struck the Houthis (Iran International; Soufan Center).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline; external positions · 14 Oct 2026
- 13 Oct 2026Two senior Iranian officials tell Reuters the new tactics aim to keep oil high before the US vote: 'it will be complete closure soon' (Reuters, via TBS, 14 Oct).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
- 14 Oct 2026A container ship is sunk south of the strait, on the IRGC's claim (Trading Economics, 15 Oct).
research note: the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype (17 Oct 2026) · §0; the Gulf tab, Exhibit 4 · 17 Oct 2026
- mid-Oct 2026Iranian onshore crude storage projected to run out around mid-October (Kpler, Vortexa, TankerTrackers via RFE/RL).
research note: Iran runway (13 Sep 2026) · §14b · 13 Sept 2026
- late Oct 2026The Theodore Roosevelt carrier group and the Makin Island amphibious group arrive, three carrier groups in the region (Iran International, 3 Oct).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §6e calendar · 14 Oct 2026
- 27 Oct 2026Israel votes; an Israeli official puts joint action against Iran 'significantly higher' after the election (Axios).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §6e calendar; §6a player table · 14 Oct 2026
- 31 Oct 2026The 31 October contracts settle: a US strike, Hormuz traffic normal, Bab el-Mandeb closed (Polymarket).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §6e calendar · 14 Oct 2026
- 3 Nov 2026Midterm elections: the US political clock resets.
research note: Iran runway (13 Sep 2026) · §15 dates that matter · 13 Sept 2026
- 3 Nov 2026The pledge of no attack on Iran before the vote lapses (Reuters, 9 Oct).
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §6e calendar · 14 Oct 2026
- 30 Nov 2026The concession test closes: Iran accepts nuclear-first sequencing or announces a reopening, or the clock view fails. scheduled
research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §8.5 ME-5 · 14 Oct 2026
- mid-Dec 2026Payments for Iranian oil already delivered 'may largely dry up by mid-December'. scheduled
research note: Iran runway (13 Sep 2026) · §0; §14b · 13 Sept 2026
About this exhibit
Exhibit 31 · The September report's Hormuz exhibits and the pages that now carry them
| No. | Stem | Exhibit | Live page |
|---|---|---|---|
| 130 | E-H17_spr_drawdown_ladder | The drawdown ladder: what is left, and where the statutory and engineering floors sit | Gulf chokepoints |
| 129 | E-H12_gasoline_settlements | US gasoline through the war with the two settlement dates and the revealed threshold | Gulf chokepoints |
| 40 | E9d_gasoline | Regular gasoline, weekly, 2024–2026 | Gulf chokepoints |
| 149 | E23_fomc_oil_grid | The 3×3 grid: FOMC decision × oil path, with cell probabilities and the book | Gulf chokepoints |
| 134 | E-H3_game_tree | The game tree after the postponement: who moves next, what it costs, where it goes | Gulf chokepoints |
| 13 | E2q_cpi_sources | Contributions to twelve-month CPI inflation by category, August 2026 and August 2019 | CPI |
| 131 | E-H19_spr_scale | Everything in one unit: what a release is worth against what the market has actually moved | quoted figures — no live page |
| 132 | E-H18_spr_second_release | A second strategic-reserve release: eight questions and what the record answers | quoted figures — no live page |
| 117 | E-H4_brent_with_events | Brent through the war, with the episode's dated events | quoted figures — no live page |
| 118 | E-H1_transits_by_tracker | Daily transits by tracker against the US claims and the pre-war baseline | quoted figures — no live page |
| 119 | E-H5_shutins_vs_bypass | Shut-in volumes against bypass capacity | quoted figures — no live page |
| 120 | E-H13_oil_workaround | The shuttle-and-transfer system: who runs it, what it moves, what it costs | quoted figures — no live page |
| 121 | E-H16_volume_claim_gap | Oil leaving the Gulf: the trackers against the official claims | quoted figures — no live page |
| 122 | E-H14_china_imports | China's crude imports by month, against the 2025 average | quoted figures — no live page |
| 123 | E-H15_china_sources | Where China's barrels come from, by origin and price paid | quoted figures — no live page |
| 124 | E-H7_player_table | The player table; every entry sourced to a dated statement in the research file | quoted figures — no live page |
| 125 | E-H8_iran_cost_of_waiting | Iran's cost of waiting, latest indicators | quoted figures — no live page |
| 126 | E-H9_runway_metrics | The two runways side by side | quoted figures — no live page |
| 127 | E-H10_two_clocks | The two clocks: constraint, reading, threshold and time to it, for each side | quoted figures — no live page |
| 128 | E-H11_two_clocks_calendar | Both clocks on one calendar, 13 September to 31 December | quoted figures — no live page |
| 133 | E-H2_decision_matrix | US options against Iran options: outcomes, oil ranges, ordinal payoffs | quoted figures — no live page |
| 135 | E-H6_reopening_odds | Prediction-market probabilities of normal traffic by date | quoted figures — no live page |
About this exhibit
Exhibit 32 · The author's odds for each pair of FOMC decision and oil path
| FOMC \ oil | Reopening / hollow deal ($80–95) 43% | Attrition ($100–115) 42% | Escalation (above $120) 15% |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hike, 'recalibration' dots 55% | 24% | 23% | 8% |
| Hike, hawkish dots — a cycle 31% | 13% | 13% | 5% |
| Hold 14% | 6% | 6% | 2% |
The author's assessment on 13 Sept 2026, revised 14 Sept 2026, kept as the report printed it; cells sum to 100% after rounding. The September report’s grid exhibit E23 (edition of 15 Sep) prints the 14 September column weights in its header but the 13 September cell values in its cells, and §4.2's prose still quotes 28% and 19%; the cells re-derived on 14 September are those in the price-target script and in the products shown here. The decision itself is scored on The decision vs the source, where it resolved on 16 September.
About this exhibit
Exhibit 33 · What only subscription trackers saw in September, as the report quoted it
| What | As quoted | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Transits per daysubscription data | 5–18 a day against 100–130 before the war: Windward 10 in the 24 hours of 9–10 Sep; The National 18 on 8 Sep and 7 on 10 Sep; Kpler ten-day average 13; IMF PortWatch seven-day average 7. US claims of 30–40 a night are unreconciled with every tracker. | the September 2026 report · §3.1 key points · 13 Sept 2026 |
| Volumes leaving the Gulfsubscription data | Kpler: 2.3 mb/d before the memorandum, 6.1 mb/d during its window, 5–7 mb/d in August, against about 15 mb/d of crude in 2025. Trackers 6–8 mb/d against the administration's 11–17. | research note: Iran runway (13 Sep 2026) · §1 reconciliation item · 13 Sept 2026 |
| Ship-to-ship transferssubscription data | About 3.1 mb/d by ship-to-ship transfer in the Gulf of Oman since the memorandum collapsed — about 30% of the 5.6 mb/d leaving the Gulf; roughly 70% of observed transits run dark (Lloyd's List Intelligence). | the September 2026 report · §3.1.2 · 13 Sept 2026 |
| Iranian exportssubscription data | No Iranian crude cargo has crossed the US blockade since 14 July; August loadings inside the Gulf 220–260 kb/d against about 2 mb/d in February; deliveries to China 534 kb/d in August, from stocks afloat. | the September 2026 report · §3.1.5 key points · 13 Sept 2026 |
| War-risk coversubscription data | 7.5–12.5% of hull value per transit (Breakwave, 8 Sep) against about 0.25% before the war; no observable repricing after the Salalah postponement — underwriters had not priced the corridor in. | research note: Oman postponement spr (14 Sep 2026) · §A5 tanker war-risk and insurance · 14 Sept 2026 |
| Shut-in productionpublished data | EIA STEO (9 Sep): crude production shut in because it cannot be exported 6.7 mb/d in August and 5.7 mb/d in 4Q26; most flows back to pre-conflict averages only by 2Q27; retail gasoline $3.95 in 4Q26 and $3.35 for 2027. | research note: Hike or hold markets (13 Sep 2026) · §3.4 (EIA STEO, 9 Sep) · 13 Sept 2026 |
| Brent and WTIsubscription data | Not displayed. EIA attributes its spot series to Refinitiv (LSEG); display rights unresolved. The September report locked the price at the 11 September settle and did not re-lock to Monday's move: re-lock for a change in the mechanism, never for a change in the price. | research note: Status (14 Sep 2026) · round 5 — 'Decided: the 11 September data lock stands' · 14 Sept 2026 |
The Appendix
The model, the data, the checks and the sources115 checks, all pass
The September report framed Hormuz as an endgame with two stable outcomes — a hollow deal by regional consent, or attrition — decided on two clocks: Iran's physical one and America's political one. Since July the Houthis have also blockaded Saudi shipping in the Red Sea, the route around the strait. This page tracks what published data and traded contracts can see — ships through both straits, the strategic reserve, US stocks, the pump price, the contracts that settle each ending and the funds that price the war — quotes what only paid trackers see, and keeps the report's dated record.
Exhibit 34 · Definitions
- ThemeWhat the page reads.
The page reads EIA's weekly petroleum data, IMF PortWatch's daily transit calls, Polymarket's Gulf and Red Sea contracts and Yahoo Finance closes of the funds and shares that price the war. CPI gasoline and energy are copied from the CPI page. Paid transit counts, freight rates, war-risk cover and Brent and WTI spot appear only as dated quotations.
- TransitsThe satellite count and its 7-day average.
IMF PortWatch counts the ships of each type that cross a chokepoint each day, from AIS ship positions, and publishes about a week behind. The page draws the 7-day trailing mean of the daily count, the measure the Polymarket contracts settle on, from 1 Jan 2023 to 8 Nov 2026. The norm is the average daily count over 2023. Ships with transponders off are missed, so paid trackers that add confirmed dark transits count more.
- ContractsTraded prices, with venue and time.
Each price is Polymarket's outcome price when the event records were read (2026-11-16 21:57–22:41 UTC): the midpoint of the best bid and ask. A price is a traded chance, not a forecast. Thin marks a contract with less than $100k traded; long shot marks a price under 10% or over 90%, where traded odds are known to overstate long shots. The Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb lines (60 and 10) are read from the contracts' own rules.
- Strike riskFrom prices to a daily risk.
The contract 'US x Iran ceasefire continues through [date]?' pays if no US air or missile strike lands in Iran by that date, so its price S is the market's chance of no strike by then. For two dates, 1 − S₂/S₁ is the chance of a first strike between them given none before, and 1 − (S₂/S₁)^(1/days) its average daily rate. The curve starts at the latest contract that resolved Yes, and uses only contracts with at least $100k traded. The legs are never multiplied: both load on 3 November.
- FundsChanges since the war began.
Changes are on Yahoo Finance's adjusted closes (total return), from the last session before the war (27 Feb 2026) and before the 28 Sep shift (25 Sep 2026) to 16 Nov 2026. Brent front-month futures are shown for context; EIA's Brent and WTI spot are not displayed.
- ReserveA reporting line, not a stop.
The 252.4 mb line is the floor of the limited-drawdown authority (EPCA §161(h)). Exchanges and sales under a presidential finding (§161(d)) are not bound by it, so the page reads it as a reporting line, not a stop.
- CalendarTwo weekly anchors.
Stocks are Friday-ending report weeks; retail prices are Monday survey dates. Each is placed on a complete weekly calendar of its own anchor before any change is taken; a week EIA did not publish stays empty and is listed in the gaps.
- BasisOne basis: EIA's weekly survey.
The September report quoted pump prices from AAA's daily national average; this page tracks EIA's weekly survey and states every line on it. The $4.50 line is the survey's own peak between the April ceasefire and the June memorandum — $4.500 on 11 May 2026 — and the ceasefire's $4.12 is the survey's $4.120 of 6 Apr 2026; both equal the September report’s figures at the cent, so the tests compare EIA with EIA. The log's note that AAA ran about 15¢ above EIA compared AAA on 10 Sep with EIA on 7 Sep, three days apart in a week the survey rose, and is not used as a spread between the two.
- GridProducts of two judgements.
The cells assume the Committee's decision and the oil path are independent: each is the product of two of the author's judgements, and a decision that reacts to the oil path breaks the assumption. The joint cell is the product of the FOMC row and the oil column, rounded; the reopening column is the hollow deal plus the genuine deal. The September report’s grid exhibit E23 (edition of 15 Sep) prints the 14 September column weights in its header but the 13 September cell values in its cells, and §4.2's prose still quotes 28% and 19%; the cells re-derived on 14 September are those in the price-target script and in the products shown here.
- StatusHow tests are scored.
crossed — the threshold condition holds on the latest observation (for a run, on each of the last n); closing — not crossed, the series has printed since the September report's data date (11 September 2026), and the gap to the threshold is half or less of the gap on that date; not crossed — otherwise; pending — the observable is dated in the future or no page of this site carries it yet; not tracked here — an event, or subscription data this site does not display. Colours flag attention, not good or bad news for the book.
- VerdictHow the verdict word is set.
The verdict word is set by rule on every update: resolved — the log records the thesis as resolved; tested — a trigger of the falsifier table has crossed and the log has not yet closed the theme; under pressure — the log marks the theme closing, or a falsifier trigger is closing; holding — otherwise. The words of the verdict restate a passage of the logged claim, which this update checks is in the log.
- OddsLogged, not revised.
Odds come only from the September report's documents and are kept in a dated file, one row per revision with the reason and the source document; this site never revises them. Each path states its basis: market-implied (a quoted market price), model (a documented model of this site's own) or the author's judgement (a dated assessment anchored to the quoted evidence). Only market-implied and model odds are drawn as odds; the author's judgement is shown in the folded record of each set, labelled with the date it was made.
- TermsThe words of the view.
· · · · · · · · · · .
- LicencesWhat is not displayed.
Brent and WTI spot prices are not displayed: EIA attributes its spot series to Refinitiv (LSEG) and display rights are unresolved. Brent front-month futures are shown from Yahoo Finance, with attribution, under the site's decision of 21 Sep 2026. Transit counts from Windward, Kpler and Lloyd's List, ship-to-ship volumes, Iranian loadings, tanker rates and war-risk premiums are paid data; they appear only as dated quotations. IMF PortWatch's satellite count is shown under the IMF's data terms, with attribution. Polymarket's prices are traded prices, shown with the venue and the time they were read; they are not forecasts and this site does not revise them.
- DocumentsWhere the view was argued.
- the September 2026 report · §3.1 Hormuz — the endgame, laid out as a decision problem · 13 Sept 2026
- research note: Iran runway (13 Sep 2026) · §0, §14 the two clocks, §15 answer · 13 Sept 2026
- research note: Hormuz logistics (13 Sep 2026) · how the oil moves; China's supply order · 13 Sept 2026
- research note: Oman postponement spr (14 Sep 2026) · §A the Oman meeting; §B a second SPR release · 14 Sept 2026
- research note: Discussions and decisions (13 Sep 2026) · §5a round 5 — the probability revision · 14 Sept 2026
- the September 2026 report (as published on 15 Sep) · §3.1.6 the strategic reserve; §3.1.7 decision matrix; §3.1.8 plan by branch · 15 Sept 2026
Sources
- publicU.S. Energy Information Administration, Weekly Petroleum Status Report, Table 1 (U.S. petroleum balance sheet)
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration · https://ir.eia.gov/wpsr/table1.csv
- publicU.S. Energy Information Administration, petroleum weekly history: SPR, commercial crude, gasoline and distillate stocks; retail regular gasoline and diesel prices
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration · https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist_xls/
- publicIMF PortWatch, Daily Chokepoints Data: daily transit calls by vessel type through the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, the Suez Canal and the Cape of Good Hope
Source: IMF PortWatch (portwatch.imf.org), from UN Global Platform AIS data · https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/chokepoints
- publicPolymarket, Gamma API: the Gulf and Red Sea contracts by event (prices, best bid and ask, volume, liquidity, resolution rules) as read on the day of the update
Source: Polymarket · https://gamma-api.polymarket.com/events
- licensedYahoo Finance chart API: adjusted daily closes of the Gulf and regional country funds, tanker owners, freight futures fund, benchmarks and Brent front-month futures
Source: Yahoo Finance · https://query2.finance.yahoo.com/v8/finance/chart/
- computed hereSeptember 2026 Macro Review — issue documents (report of 13 Sep and its 15 Sep edition; research notes G, M, N, P; status and discussion logs)
The site's own research, Macro Review
- computed hereMiddle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline of 14 Oct 2026 and the prototype of 17 Oct 2026 (state of play, transmission, games, tests on observables; the quotations and dated events they cite)
The site's own research, Macro Review
Pages this one copies from
| Page | Title | Updated | Data to | Arrays | Values | Source checks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Range and scenarios | Projections | 2026-11-17 | 16 Nov 2026 | 0 | 14 | 80 pass |
| Transmission | Transmission | 2026-11-17 | Oct 2026 | 0 | 9 | 67 pass |
| CPI | CPI inflation by component | 2026-11-10 | Oct 2026 | 3 | 0 | 264 pass |
Reproduction checks
| Check | Published | Computed | Tolerance | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IMF PortWatch: the 4 chokepoints read run to the same last day (8 Nov 2026; chokepoints that differ) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| IMF PortWatch: the last day (8 Nov 2026) is at most 14 days before the fetch day (days beyond) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| IMF PortWatch: every chokepoint-day from six days before 1 Jan 2023 to 8 Nov 2026 is published, so every 7-day mean drawn has its seven days (days missing) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| IMF PortWatch: the Strait of Hormuz, all ships 7-day mean on 8 Nov 2026 equals the mean of its last seven daily counts (7 days; abs difference) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| IMF PortWatch: the Bab el-Mandeb, tankers 7-day mean on 8 Nov 2026 equals the mean of its last seven daily counts (7 days; abs difference) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| IMF PortWatch: each 2023 average is over all 365 days of the year (6 series; series short of a day) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The Houthi blockade of Saudi shipping (20 Jul 2026) is a row of the log's timeline (missing) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Polymarket: every event the spec names is in the fetched folder (15 events; missing: none) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Polymarket: the event records were read on the build day, on this machine's clock (2026-11-17; days apart) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Contracts: the 'hormuz normal' line read from the rules of 3 open markets is 60 in every one (rules that differ or name none) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Contracts: every 'hormuz normal' rule settles on IMF PortWatch's 7-day moving average for Strait of Hormuz (rules that do not) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Contracts: the 'bab closed' line read from the rules of 2 open markets is 10 in every one (rules that differ or name none) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Contracts: every 'bab closed' rule settles on IMF PortWatch's 7-day moving average for Bab el-Mandeb (rules that do not) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Contracts: every price in the table lies between its best bid and ask (14 markets with both; outside) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Contracts: the flags follow the rule — thin under $100k traded, long shot under 10% or over 90% (14 rows; misflagged) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| No-strike term structure: the price falls with each later date (1 contracts with at least $100k traded; rises) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| No-strike term structure: the windows' survival ratios chain back to the last contract's price (3 Nov 2026; abs difference, pp) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| No-strike term structure: the curve starts at the latest contract that resolved Yes (2 Nov 2026), at 100% (resolved contracts after it) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| On 31 Oct 2026, the last fetch before the strike: No-strike term structure: the price falls with each later date (9 contracts with at least $100k traded; rises) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| On 31 Oct 2026, the last fetch before the strike: No-strike term structure: the windows' survival ratios chain back to the last contract's price (31 Dec 2026; abs difference, pp) | 28.5 | 28.5 | 0 | pass |
| On 31 Oct 2026, the last fetch before the strike: No-strike term structure: the curve starts at the latest contract that resolved Yes (24 Oct 2026), at 100% (resolved contracts after it) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The strike: the first no-strike contract the venue resolved No is dated 3 Nov 2026 (US x Iran ceasefire continues through November 3?, status resolved), and the curve the page draws is the last fetch before it (31 Oct 2026; days from that fetch to the contract's date, at least one) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Retired row: the logged set 'normal_traffic', row of 13 Sep 2026, leaves the page, the Gulf chokepoints page stops printing the September issue's quote of the normal-traffic contract — desk decision of 2026-10-25 (D-2026-10-25-TH3); the log keeps it, unedited (rows of that date in the log) | 1 | 1 | 0 | pass |
| Logged set 'us_strike' (17 Oct 2026): its source names the fetch of its own date (data/raw/polymarket_geo/2026-10-17; source matches; rows that differ) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Logged set 'us_strike' (17 Oct 2026): each branch equals the difference of the no-strike prices at 31 Oct, 30 Nov, 31 Dec in the fetch of its own date, data/raw/polymarket_geo/2026-10-17 (4 branches; max abs difference, pp) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Logged set 'us_strike' (24 Oct 2026): its source names the fetch of its own date (data/raw/polymarket_geo/2026-10-24; source matches; rows that differ) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Logged set 'us_strike' (24 Oct 2026): each branch equals the difference of the no-strike prices at 31 Oct, 30 Nov, 31 Dec in the fetch of its own date, data/raw/polymarket_geo/2026-10-24 (4 branches; max abs difference, pp) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Logged set 'normal_traffic' (17 Oct 2026): its source names the fetch of its own date (data/raw/polymarket_geo/2026-10-17; source matches; rows that differ) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Logged set 'normal_traffic' (17 Oct 2026): the 'normal by 31 December' price equals market 2176270's in the fetch of its own date, data/raw/polymarket_geo/2026-10-17 (abs difference, pp) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Logged set 'normal_traffic' (24 Oct 2026): its source names the fetch of its own date (data/raw/polymarket_geo/2026-10-24; source matches; rows that differ) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Logged set 'normal_traffic' (24 Oct 2026): the 'normal by 31 December' price equals market 2176270's in the fetch of its own date, data/raw/polymarket_geo/2026-10-24 (abs difference, pp) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Logged set 'bab_closed' (17 Oct 2026): its source names the fetch of its own date (data/raw/polymarket_geo/2026-10-17; source matches; rows that differ) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Logged set 'bab_closed' (17 Oct 2026): the 'closed by 31 December' price equals market 2853074's in the fetch of its own date, data/raw/polymarket_geo/2026-10-17 (abs difference, pp) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Logged set 'bab_closed' (24 Oct 2026): its source names the fetch of its own date (data/raw/polymarket_geo/2026-10-24; source matches; rows that differ) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Logged set 'bab_closed' (24 Oct 2026): the 'closed by 31 December' price equals market 2853074's in the fetch of its own date, data/raw/polymarket_geo/2026-10-24 (abs difference, pp) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Resolved market 4641065 ('US x Iran ceasefire continues through October 31?', closed 7 Nov 2026, resolved Yes by the venue): the logged set 'us_strike' waits on its resolution entry in the log (a theme page's dated records are checked at their own date — desk decision of 2026-10-24 (D-2026-10-24-TH1); the entry of 7 Nov 2026 records Yes; entries missing or differing) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Resolved market 4713483 ('US x Iran ceasefire continues through November 30?', closed 3 Nov 2026, resolved No by the venue): the logged set 'us_strike' waits on its resolution entry in the log (a theme page's dated records are checked at their own date — desk decision of 2026-10-24 (D-2026-10-24-TH1); the entry of 3 Nov 2026 records No; entries missing or differing) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Resolved market 4713484 ('US x Iran ceasefire continues through December 31?', closed 3 Nov 2026, resolved No by the venue): the logged set 'us_strike' waits on its resolution entry in the log (a theme page's dated records are checked at their own date — desk decision of 2026-10-24 (D-2026-10-24-TH1); the entry of 3 Nov 2026 records No; entries missing or differing) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The base dates are rows of the log's timeline (28 Feb 2026, 28 Sep 2026; missing) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Yahoo Finance: every symbol's latest completed session is the same day (2026-11-16; extra days) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Yahoo Finance: every symbol's base session is the same for each event (prewar 2026-02-27; shift 2026-09-25; extra days) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| EIA Table 1 (week to 6 Nov 2026) equals the history workbooks for SPR, commercial crude, gasoline and distillate stocks — current, prior and year-ago weeks (12 values; mismatches) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Table 1: every weekly difference equals current less prior week (19 stock rows; violations) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Table 1: every weekly percent change equals the difference over the prior week (1 dp; violations) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Table 1: SPR stock change × 7 days equals the week's change in SPR stocks (thousand barrels) | -2649 | -2646 | 4 | pass |
| Table 1: commercial crude stock change × 7 days equals the week's change in commercial stocks (thousand barrels) | 4657 | 4655 | 4 | pass |
| Table 1: total crude stock change equals commercial plus SPR stock change (kb/d) | 287 | 287 | 1 | pass |
| Weekly SPR change on the calendar equals Table 1's published difference (mb) | -2.649 | -2.649 | 0.002 | pass |
| Issue figure reproduced: SPR 285.4 mb for the week ending 4 Sep 2026 (EIA WPSR, 1 dp) | 285.4 | 285.36 | 0.051 | pass |
| Issue figure reproduced: commercial crude stocks 424.1 mb for the week ending 4 Sep 2026 (EIA WPSR, 1 dp) | 424.1 | 424.069 | 0.051 | pass |
| Issue figure reproduced: total gasoline stocks 206.9 mb for the week ending 4 Sep 2026 (EIA WPSR, 1 dp) | 206.9 | 206.938 | 0.051 | pass |
| Issue figure reproduced: distillate stocks 106.3 mb for the week ending 4 Sep 2026 (EIA WPSR, 1 dp) | 106.3 | 106.274 | 0.051 | pass |
| Issue figure reproduced: retail regular gasoline $4.157 on 7 Sep 2026 (EIA weekly) | 4.157 | 4.157 | 0.001 | pass |
| Issue figure reproduced: retail diesel $5.967 on 7 Sep 2026 (EIA weekly) | 5.967 | 5.967 | 0.001 | pass |
| Issue statement reproduced: 285.4 mb is the lowest since November 1982 (latest earlier week at or below it: 5 Nov 1982; month number) | 198211 | 198211 | 0 | pass |
| Issue figure reproduced: about 415 mb in the reserve at the start of the March action (week of 13 Mar 2026; ±1 mb) | 415 | 415.442 | 1 | pass |
| Issue arithmetic: 285.4 mb less the 42 mb exchange backlog lands near 243 mb | 243 | 243.4 | 0.5 | pass |
| Issue arithmetic: the room before the statutory line at 285.4 mb is the low end of '33–35 mb' (mb) | 33 | 33 | 0.05 | pass |
| Table 1 is for the latest completed report week (days from week end to fetch date, at most 13) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The $6.53 diesel line is EIA's weekly record ($6.529, 21 Sep 2026) at the cent ($) | 6.53 | 6.529 | 0.005 | pass |
| Log notes: each names a trigger of the log and carries a date, a statement and a source with its date (3 notes; violations) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Grid on the 13 Sep 2026 weights: the products of the logged FOMC rows and oil columns equal the cells the issue printed (9 cells; mismatches) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Grid on the 14 Sep 2026 weights: the products of the logged FOMC rows and oil columns equal the cells the issue printed (9 cells; mismatches) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Grid: the latest cells sum to 100% within rounding (percentage points) | 100 | 100 | 1 | pass |
| The two settlement dates the line is read between are rows of the log's timeline (2026-04-08, 2026-06-17; missing) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The $4.50 line on EIA's basis: the survey's peak between the ceasefire and the memorandum ($4.500, 11 May 2026) equals the log's threshold at the cent ($) | 4.5 | 4.5 | 0.005 | pass |
| The ceasefire's $4.12 on EIA's basis: the survey on the week of the ceasefire ($4.120, 6 Apr 2026) equals the log's figure at the cent ($) | 4.12 | 4.12 | 0.005 | pass |
| Pump-price tile: the distance to the $4.50 line equals the gas450 trigger's latest value less its threshold (cents; abs difference) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Transits tracker: every series' latest value equals PortWatch's 7-day mean at two decimals (6 series; max abs difference) | 0 | 0.004 | 0.005 | pass |
| Hormuz tile: the value equals the transits tracker's latest 7-day mean (abs difference) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Strike tile: the chance of a strike by 31 Dec equals 100 less the 31 Dec no-strike price (abs difference, pp) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The deck's two dates are the log's timeline rows for the closure and the Red Sea blockade (rows missing) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The Bab el-Mandeb chart's 4 marked events are rows of the log's timeline (missing) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| What each path would move: a branch Scenarios does not project, or a theme branch not on its set, carries no number here (numbers on such rows) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| What each path would move: every projected row copies the ten-year, the S&P 500 and the mortgage move of the one Scenarios branch it names (rows missing one) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Verdict: the passage the verdict restates is in the logged claim (thesis.claim; passages not found) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Verdict: the head is one takeaway under the grammar (≤ 25 words, ≤ 2 figures beside a date; faults: none) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scorecard: no judgement odds are printed — a set without a market-implied or model basis for every branch says its branches or its base case in words (rows printing a percentage) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Headline: one conclusion of at most 14 words, not a question, with one or two figures ('Ships through Hormuz average 3.9 a day, against 92 in 2023'; faults: none) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Thesis.status is one of active, closing, resolved (now 'active'; violations) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Active theme: no resolved block is carried before the status is resolved (fields present) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Active theme: no closing_tracker is named before the status is closing (violations) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scenario set 'oil_paths': probabilities cover every branch and sum to 100 at each of 2 dated revisions (revisions that do not) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scenario set 'oil_paths': every revision carries a date, a reason and a source document with its date (revisions missing one) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scenario set 'oil_paths': revisions are in date order (out of order) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scenario set 'oil_paths': every branch states its basis (market-implied, model or evidence log) (branches without) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scenario set 'normal_traffic': probabilities cover every branch and sum to 100 at each of 2 dated revisions (revisions that do not) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scenario set 'normal_traffic': every revision carries a date, a reason and a source document with its date (revisions missing one) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scenario set 'normal_traffic': revisions are in date order (out of order) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scenario set 'normal_traffic': every branch states its basis (market-implied, model or evidence log) (branches without) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scenario set 'us_strike': probabilities cover every branch and sum to 100 at each of 2 dated revisions (revisions that do not) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scenario set 'us_strike': every revision carries a date, a reason and a source document with its date (revisions missing one) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scenario set 'us_strike': revisions are in date order (out of order) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scenario set 'us_strike': every branch states its basis (market-implied, model or evidence log) (branches without) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scenario set 'bab_closed': probabilities cover every branch and sum to 100 at each of 2 dated revisions (revisions that do not) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scenario set 'bab_closed': every revision carries a date, a reason and a source document with its date (revisions missing one) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scenario set 'bab_closed': revisions are in date order (out of order) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scenario set 'bab_closed': every branch states its basis (market-implied, model or evidence log) (branches without) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| All 19 triggers cite the issue document, section and date their threshold comes from (triggers without) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Every data trigger has a numeric threshold (triggers without) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| All 46 timeline events carry a date, a statement and a source (events without) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| All 22 exhibit references map to a published panel, a panel declared pending, or none (unmapped) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The CPI page: every copied series' latest observation is the source series' own latest — same date, value within 10% of the source's (3 series in tracker 'cpi_energy'; series that differ) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The CPI page: the source page is published with all its checks passing (dated 10 Nov 2026, 264 checks) | 1 | 1 | 0 | pass |
| The CPI page: the site still serves the page this one copied (dated 10 Nov 2026) | 1 | 1 | 0 | pass |
| The Range and scenarios page: the source page is published with all its checks passing (dated 17 Nov 2026, 80 checks) | 1 | 1 | 0 | pass |
| The Range and scenarios page: the site still serves the page this one copied (dated 17 Nov 2026) | 1 | 1 | 0 | pass |
| The Transmission page: the source page is published with all its checks passing (dated 17 Nov 2026, 67 checks) | 1 | 1 | 0 | pass |
| The Transmission page: the site still serves the page this one copied (dated 17 Nov 2026) | 1 | 1 | 0 | pass |
| The CPI page: every copied observation equals the source page, matched by date (282 values in 3 arrays; mismatches) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The Range and scenarios page: every copied single value equals the source page (14 values; mismatches) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The Transmission page: every copied single value equals the source page (9 values; mismatches) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Every read point names the exhibit it is read from (`ex`; 5 points; without one: none) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Every read point's exhibit code names a card of this page (themes.hormuz-…; naming another page: none) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Decisions: every desk decision this page's specification names is in the decisions file (D-2026-10-24-TH1, D-2026-10-25-TH3; ids missing) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
- U.S. Energy Information Administration, Weekly Petroleum Status Report, Table 1 (U.S. petroleum balance sheet) — Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
- U.S. Energy Information Administration, petroleum weekly history: SPR, commercial crude, gasoline and distillate stocks; retail regular gasoline and diesel prices — Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
- IMF PortWatch, Daily Chokepoints Data: daily transit calls by vessel type through the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, the Suez Canal and the Cape of Good Hope — Source: IMF PortWatch (portwatch.imf.org), from UN Global Platform AIS data
- Polymarket, Gamma API: the Gulf and Red Sea contracts by event (prices, best bid and ask, volume, liquidity, resolution rules) as read on the day of the update — Source: Polymarket
- Yahoo Finance chart API: adjusted daily closes of the Gulf and regional country funds, tanker owners, freight futures fund, benchmarks and Brent front-month futures — Source: Yahoo Finance
- September 2026 Macro Review — issue documents (report of 13 Sep and its 15 Sep edition; research notes G, M, N, P; status and discussion logs) — The site's own research, Macro Review
- Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline of 14 Oct 2026 and the prototype of 17 Oct 2026 (state of play, transmission, games, tests on observables; the quotations and dated events they cite) — The site's own research, Macro Review