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Thematic · Gulf chokepoints

Ships through Hormuz average 3.9 a day, against 92 in 2023

The Strait of Hormuz has been closed or restricted since 28 Feb. Since 20 Jul the Houthis have also blockaded Saudi shipping in the Red Sea, the route around it.Who concedes first in the Gulf, and does the Red Sea bypass hold?

Said 13 Sept 2026 · revised 14 Sept 2026Data to 9 Nov 2026 · ships to 8 Nov · pump to 9 Nov · stocks to 6 Nov · markets to 16 Nov · contracts 17 Nov 2026 · updated 17 Nov 2026
Ships through Hormuz, 7-day average3.9 a dayto 8 Nov 2026 · 92.3 a day in 2023 · contracts call 60 normal
Tankers through Bab el-Mandeb, 7-day average6.9 a dayto 8 Nov 2026 · 15.1 the week before the 20 Jul blockade · test line above 12
US strike on Iran, as resolvedby 3 NovPolymarket resolved it 3 Nov · 72% priced by 31 Dec on 31 Oct
Regular gasoline, retail$3.9959 Nov 2026 · EIA survey · 50.5¢ below its $4.500 peak of 11 May · 0 weeks above $4.50
Diesel, retail$6.1279 Nov 2026 · +$2.290 on the year · record $6.529 on 21 Sep
Strategic Petroleum Reserve279.5 mbweek to 6 Nov 2026 · −2.6 on the week · −130.9 on the year · 27.1 mb above 252.4

The view is holding: 0 of 4 tests have crossed since 13 Sep

Who concedes first in the Gulf, and does the Red Sea bypass hold?
  • Two stable endings — a Gulf-brokered reopening without Washington, or attrition to the 3 November election: holding (said 13 Sep 2026).→ Exhibit 2
  • Ships through Hormuz average 3.9 a day to 8 Nov, against 92.3 a day in 2023.→ Exhibit 1
  • Tankers through Bab el-Mandeb average 6.9 a day, 55% fewer than the week before the 20 Jul blockade.→ Exhibit 13
  • A US strike on Iran landed by 3 Nov, as Polymarket resolved; on 31 Oct it was priced at 72% by 31 Dec.→ Exhibit 16
  • Regular gasoline is $3.995 on 9 Nov, under the $4.50 line Washington settled after.→ Exhibit 10
What would change this view
What would change this viewTriggerTodayDecided by
Washington's clock: the pump price holds above $4.50above $4.50 for three weeks into early voting, with no US move3.995 $/gal (9 Nov 2026); 0 consecutive above 4.500 $/galnot crossedGasoline and Diesel Fuel Update, 24 Nov 2026
Hormuz reopens on the contracts' measureships through Hormuz at or above 60 a day on the 7-day average3.9 ships a day (8 Nov 2026); on 11 Sep 5.0 ships a day (11 Sep 2026)not crossedIMF PortWatch's daily count, published about a week behind
Saudi tankers return to the Red Seatankers through Bab el-Mandeb above 12 a day on the 7-day average6.9 tankers a day (8 Nov 2026); on 11 Sep 7.3 tankers a day (11 Sep 2026)not crossedIMF PortWatch's daily count, published about a week behind
The reserve reaches the line of its limited-drawdown authoritySPR at or below 252.4 , a rather than a stop279.5 mb (6 Nov 2026); on 11 Sep 285.4 mb (4 Sep 2026)not crossedWeekly Petroleum Status Report, 18 Nov 2026
The reasoning behind each point
  • Verdict
    Two stable endings — a Gulf-brokered reopening without Washington, or attrition to the 3 November election: holding (said 13 Sep 2026).

    On 13 Sep 2026 the log said the two stable endings are a hollow deal and attrition. It said Iran's clock is physical and shorter, and America's political and reversible after 3 November. The verdict is “holding” because no test of the falsifier table has crossed. The scorecard sets what the log said against what has happened since.

  • Hormuz
    Ships through Hormuz average 3.9 a day to 8 Nov, against 92.3 a day in 2023.

    The traded contracts call the strait normal when this 7-day average reaches 60. The satellite count misses ships with transponders off, so paid trackers that add them count more. Their figures are quoted beside the chart.

  • Red Sea
    Tankers through Bab el-Mandeb average 6.9 a day, 55% fewer than the week before the 20 Jul blockade.

    The Houthis declared a blockade of Saudi shipping on 20 Jul. Suez carries 44.4 ships a day against 73.7 in 2023. The Cape carries 77.9 against 49.1, because ships go around Africa instead.

  • Priced
    A US strike on Iran landed by 3 Nov, as Polymarket resolved; on 31 Oct it was priced at 72% by 31 Dec.

    The venue resolved its 3 Nov no-strike contract No on 3 Nov, and the later ones with it. The chart is the term structure on 31 Oct, the last day it traded before the strike. Then the average daily risk was 0.84% in late October and 5.40% from 31 Oct to 15 Nov. Contracts with less than $100k traded are left out.

  • Pump
    Regular gasoline is $3.995 on 9 Nov, under the $4.50 line Washington settled after.

    Diesel is $6.127, against its record of $6.529 on 21 Sep. The $4.50 line is the survey's own peak of 11 May, before the June memorandum, so every test compares EIA with EIA. Weeks above $4.50 on the survey: 0.

Next: Russia–Ukraine diesel war — the second shock, to diesel

Source: IMF PortWatch; Polymarket; EIA weekly petroleum data; Yahoo Finance; BLS CPI; the September 2026 report · data to the dates shownthemes.hormuz-read

Exhibit 2 · Each path and test of the Hormuz call, with its verdict

Each named test and path set: what the dated record said on 13 Sep 2026, what has happened since, and the verdict
WhatSaidHappenedVerdict
PathsOil path to 31 December 2026Said · 13 Sept 2026the log's base case: AttritionHappenednot yet decided — the window to 31 December 2026Verdictopen
PathsHormuz traffic normal by 31 December — the prediction marketSaid · 24 Oct 2026Normal by 31 December 11.5% · Not normal by 31 December 88.5% (quoted)Happenednot yet decided — Polymarket contract to 31 December 2026, as priced on 24 October 2026Verdictopen
PathsWhen a first US strike on Iran lands — the prediction marketSaid · 24 Oct 2026By 31 October 21.5% · In November 43.0% · In December 7.0% · Not in 2026 28.5% (quoted)Happened · 3 Nov 2026Polymarket resolved 'US x Iran ceasefire continues through November 30?' No on 3 Nov 2026: by its rule, a qualifying US air or missile strike on Iran after 31 October.Verdictresolved: In November — as the base case said
PathsBab el-Mandeb effectively closed by 31 December — the prediction marketSaid · 24 Oct 2026Closed by 31 December 17.0% · Not closed by 31 December 83.0% (quoted)Happenednot yet decided — Polymarket contract to 31 December 2026, as priced on 24 October 2026Verdictopen
TestWashington's clock: the pump price holds above $4.50Said · 13 Sept 2026above $4.50 for three weeks into early voting, with no US moveHappened · 9 Nov 20263.995 $/gal (9 Nov 2026); 0 consecutive above 4.500 $/galVerdictnot crossed
TestHormuz reopens on the contracts' measureSaid · 14 Oct 2026ships through Hormuz at or above 60 a day on the 7-day averageHappened · 8 Nov 20263.9 ships a day (8 Nov 2026); on 11 Sep 5.0 ships a day (11 Sep 2026)Verdictnot crossed
TestSaudi tankers return to the Red SeaSaid · 14 Oct 2026tankers through Bab el-Mandeb above 12 a day on the 7-day averageHappened · 8 Nov 20266.9 tankers a day (8 Nov 2026); on 11 Sep 7.3 tankers a day (11 Sep 2026)Verdictnot crossed
TestThe reserve reaches the line of its limited-drawdown authoritySaid · 14 Sept 2026SPR at or below 252.4 mb, a reporting line rather than a stopHappened · 6 Nov 2026279.5 mb (6 Nov 2026); on 11 Sep 285.4 mb (4 Sep 2026)Verdictnot crossed

The view is holding: the word follows a rule set out in the Appendix, from the log and the tests above, never by hand.

About this exhibit
A scorecard of the logged path sets (the oil paths and three Polymarket contracts) and the view's tests, each with what the dated log said, what has happened and the verdict
What was said on 13 Sept 2026, and what has happened since
Each set of paths and each test of the view: what the dated log said, what has happened, and the verdict
Source: the theme's dated log (said 13 Sept 2026); IMF PortWatch; Polymarket; EIA; the September 2026 report · data to 9 Nov 2026themes.hormuz-16

Exhibit 3 · Iran's and America's limits on one calendar

The named limits the September report's research put on each side, to the end of the year, with the latest pump price in dollars
OctNovDec13 Sep31 DecIranphysical clockstorage fillsmid-Oct: storage fullwells shut inmid-Decpayments dry upAmericapolitical clockearly voting, with the pump price as the gauge3 Nov: election, clock resetstoday: $3.995 a gallon (9 Nov 2026) · the line is $4.50
Iran's clock is physical and runs out first: onshore storage around mid-October, payments by mid-December. America's is political and resets after the 3 November election; its gauge is the pump price against the $4.50 line Washington settled at before.
About this exhibit
A timeline diagram: Iran's limits (onshore storage full, payments drying up) above America's (early voting gauged by the pump price, reset at the 3 November election), with the latest gasoline price marked
Iran's clock runs out first; America's resets on 3 November
The dates the September report's research put on each side's limit, 13 September to 31 December 2026, with today's pump price
Source: the September 2026 report's research notes (13 Sep 2026); EIA retail gasoline · data to 9 Nov 2026themes.hormuz-17

Exhibit 4 · The Brent–Dubai spread and the Strait, a sketch without data

A sketch with no data or scale: why Brent less Dubai, in dollars a barrel, widens while the Strait is shut (since February)
Inside the Gulfpriced off Dubaibarrels that cannot leaveOutsidepriced off Brentbarrels that can be deliveredthe Straita trickle leavesBrent − Dubai = the premium on a barrel that can leaveclosure: the spread widens · reopening: it narrows
Inside the Gulf, barrels priced off Dubai wait behind the Strait; outside, barrels priced off Brent can be delivered. The spread is the premium on a barrel that can leave: the closure widens it, and a narrowing spread is the report's sign that Gulf barrels are moving again.
About this exhibit
A schematic with no data or scale: Dubai-priced barrels waiting inside the Gulf against Brent-priced barrels outside, and why the spread between them widens while the Strait is shut
The Brent–Dubai spread: the price of a barrel that can leave
A sketch of why the spread between the two crude benchmarks reads the Strait: no data, no scale
Source: the September 2026 report (the spread as a reopening signal); Macro Reviewthemes.hormuz-18

Exhibit 5 · Iran's oil revenue and its attacks on shipping, as quoted

Named sources' figures on Iran's crude loadings, the rial and prices, attacks on shipping and Tehran's aim, as quoted on 14 Oct 2026
WhatAs quotedSource
Iranian crude loadingssubscription dataNone in September, the first such month since 1979 (Kpler, Vortexa and Bloomberg, via Fortune, 3 Oct); Iranian crude afloat off Malaysia 'likely not more than 10 million barrels' (UANI, 7 Oct).research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §1 key takeaways; §2 claims in the logged view · 14 Oct 2026
The rial and pricessubscription dataAbout 2.72 million rials to the dollar on the open market on 4 Oct, from 2.2 million on 2 Sep (Reuters, via SSBCrack); consumer prices up 89.8% over the year to September (Statistical Center of Iran).research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §1 what changed since the lock; §2 claims in the logged view · 14 Oct 2026
Attacks on shippingsubscription dataAt least 12 attacks on tankers and gas carriers a week from 28 Sep, the most of the war (maritime-security sources, via Reuters and gCaptain, 7 Oct); six ships struck on 11 Oct alone (gCaptain, 12 Oct); 95 tanker attacks since the war began (Gibson Shipbrokers, 9 Oct).research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §1 what changed since the lock; §5b tonne-mile mechanics · 14 Oct 2026
Tehran's stated aimsubscription dataTwo senior officials told Reuters the new tactics were 'decided at the highest levels' to keep oil high before the US vote, and that 'it will be complete closure soon' (Reuters, via TBS, 14 Oct).research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §1 key takeaways; §3a timeline · 14 Oct 2026
About this exhibit
A table of quoted figures on Iran: crude loadings, the rial and consumer prices, attacks on shipping and Tehran's stated aim, each with source and date
Iran stopped loading crude in September and raised its attacks
Iran's revenue and its campaign against shipping, quoted with source and date; paid tracker figures as the press gave them
Source: Kpler, Vortexa, UANI, Reuters, gCaptain and Gibson, as quoted on 14 Oct 2026themes.hormuz-30

Exhibit 6 · The Hormuz call as written, with its revision

The one-line call and the author's claim as logged on 13 Sep 2026, kept as written, with its named status and revision

Two stable endings — a Gulf-brokered reopening without Washington, or attrition to the 3 November election — holding

As written on 13 Sept 2026

Hormuz is an endgame, not an outlook: the two stable outcomes are a hollow deal — a corridor recognised by regional consent, without the United States — and attrition; Iran's clock is physical and shorter, America's political and reversible after 3 November.

Iran's binding constraints are storage (about 29 mb in early September, exhausted around mid-October), payments (drying up by mid-December) and a rial down 60% since March; America's are the pump price into early voting, with Washington's two settlements made at $4.12 and rising and just after the $4.50 peak. The blockade has been engineered around rather than defeated: about 3.1 mb/d leaves the Gulf by ship-to-ship transfer. Triggers are physical flows, never the price.

Revised on 14 September after the Salalah postponement: the cheapest route to a hollow deal — Gulf-wide ratification of the Iran–Oman corridor — failed for want of consensus with no new date; hollow deal 40 → 33, attrition 35 → 42.

StatusactiveSaid13 Sept 2026Revised14 Sept 2026

Argued in the : 6 dated documents, listed with their sections under Sources in the Appendix.

About this exhibit
A text card: the one-line call, the author's claim as written, its supporting detail, and the revision of the oil-path odds
The view, and the claim as written
The author's claim on 13 Sept 2026, kept as written; a figure revised since is marked where it stands
Source: the September 2026 report and its research notes (6 documents, listed in the Appendix)themes.hormuz-1

Hormuz carries 3.9 ships a day and Bab el-Mandeb 26.3

What do the straits, the reserve and the pump say today?

Exhibit 1 · Ships a day through each chokepoint, against the contracts' settlement lines

Satellite count of ships a day, 7-day average, 1 Jan 2023 to 8 Nov 2026; dashed: contract lines, Hormuz 'normal' 60, Bab el-Mandeb 'closed' 10
About this exhibit
Ships a day through Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, Suez and around the Cape of Good Hope, the 7-day average of IMF PortWatch's satellite count, daily since 2023, with the Polymarket contracts' lines for Hormuz 'normal' and Bab el-Mandeb 'closed'; a toggle shows tankers only
Ships through the four chokepoints against the contracts' lines
Ships a day, 7-day average of the satellite count, to 8 Nov 2026; dashed lines are the contracts' lines
IMF PortWatch counts the ships that cross each chokepoint every day from their AIS position signals. Ships that switch their transponders off are missed, so the count reads below paid trackers that add confirmed dark transits. The Polymarket contracts settle on this count: Hormuz is "normal" at a 7-day average of 60 or more, and Bab el-Mandeb "closed" at 10 or fewer, as their rules state.
Source: IMF PortWatch, daily transit calls from AIS ship positions, 7-day average. (data to 8 Nov 2026); Polymarket contract rules (17 Nov 2026)themes.hormuz-20

Exhibit 7 · Gulf crude and fuel flows and Hormuz ship counts, as quoted

Named reports' and paid trackers' figures on Gulf flows and ship counts, with source, as quoted on 14 Oct 2026; not a data feed
WhatAs quotedSource
Gulf crude and product exportssubscription dataGulf crude exports 13.9 mb/d in September, more than three-quarters of pre-war; Middle East refined product exports 1.9 mb/d against 4.7 before the war; exports by bypass routes 5.6 mb/d (IEA Oil Market Report, 14 Oct).research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a physical flows; §1 four things the consensus may have wrong · 14 Oct 2026
Hormuz crude flowsubscription dataAt least 10.1 mb/d in the week to about 5 Oct, down 27% on the week and 74% of pre-war (Kpler, via The National and Reuters, 8 Oct). On 5 Oct no diesel, gasoline or other finished fuel is known to have transited (Washington Post, 8 Oct).research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a key takeaways; physical flows · 14 Oct 2026
Middle East crude shut inpublished data4.8 mb/d in September, against a peak of 10.9 mb/d in May; 4.5 mb/d assumed for the fourth quarter (EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, 6 Oct).research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a physical flows (EIA STEO) · 14 Oct 2026
Three counters, one straitsubscription dataIMF PortWatch's satellite count 2.7 ships a day over 28 Sep–4 Oct; Lloyd's List Intelligence 143 non-Iranian transits over 28 Sep–7 Oct, about 14 a day, adding confirmed dark ships; the US Navy's NCAGS count about 29 a day over the 72 hours to 11 Oct. The shuttle runs dark, so the counts differ by up to ten times.research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a three counters; §2 test S2 · 14 Oct 2026
About this exhibit
A table of quoted figures: Gulf crude and product exports (IEA), Hormuz crude flow (Kpler), Middle East crude shut in (EIA), and three counts of Hormuz transits that differ widely
Gulf crude came back by workaround while products stayed short
Flows and ship counts as published reports and paid trackers gave them, with source and date; not a data feed
Source: IEA, EIA, Kpler, Lloyd's List Intelligence and the US Navy, as quoted on 14 Oct 2026themes.hormuz-21

Exhibit 8 · Strategic Petroleum Reserve stocks against the reporting line

Million barrels, weekly, to 6 Nov 2026; lines: 252.4 mb, the floor of the limited-drawdown authority, and near 243 mb once the exchange is delivered
About
About this exhibit
Strategic Petroleum Reserve stocks, million barrels, weekly, with the line of the limited-drawdown authority and the level the report put on delivering the exchange backlog
The Strategic Petroleum Reserve against its reporting line
Million barrels, weekly, to 6 Nov 2026; the 252.4 mb line of the limited-drawdown authority and the landing the report put on delivering the exchange backlog
The 252.4 mb line is the floor of the limited-drawdown authority (EPCA §161(h)). Exchanges and sales under a presidential finding (§161(d)) are not bound by it, so the page reads it as a reporting line, not a stop.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, weekly Strategic Petroleum Reserve stocks. (data to 6 Nov 2026)themes.hormuz-2

Exhibit 9 · US petroleum stocks and flows in the latest week

Week to 6 Nov 2026: stocks in million barrels against 30 Oct 2026 and 7 Nov 2025; flows in thousand barrels a day, as published
Stocks (mb)WeekChangeYear ago
Crude Oil694.0+2.0838.0
Commercial (Excluding SPR)414.4+4.7427.6
Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)279.5−2.6410.4
Total Motor Gasoline210.8+1.8205.1
Kerosene-Type Jet Fuel42.0+0.242.8
Distillate Fuel Oil103.3+4.1110.9
Propane/Propylene104.2+0.1105.4
Total Stocks (Including SPR)1,495.3+8.71,682.3
Flows (kb/d)WeekChangeYear ago
Domestic Production14,013+1013,862
Net Imports (Including SPR)3,243+5452,406
Imports6,698+3255,222
Exports3,455−2202,816
Commercial Stock Change665+789916
SPR Stock Change-378−321114
Crude Oil Input to Refineries17,047+32215,973
About this exhibit
EIA's US petroleum balance for the latest report week: stocks of crude, SPR, gasoline, jet fuel, distillate and propane against the prior week and a year ago, and production, imports, exports and refinery input in thousand barrels a day
This week's balance, week to 6 Nov 2026
Stocks in million barrels against 30 Oct 2026 and 7 Nov 2025; flows in thousand barrels a day, as published
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Weekly Petroleum Status Report, Table 1themes.hormuz-3

Exhibit 10 · Weekly retail gasoline and diesel prices against the gasoline test lines

Dollars per gallon, weekly, to 9 Nov 2026; lines: $4.50, the survey's 11 May 2026 peak, and $4.00, the level the US gain needs
About this exhibit
Retail regular gasoline and diesel, dollars per gallon, EIA's weekly survey, with lines at the survey's peak before Washington settled and at the level the US gain needs
The pump price — America's clock
Dollars per gallon, EIA's weekly survey, to 9 Nov 2026; the $4.50 line (the survey's peak of 11 May, before Washington settled) and the $4.00 the US gain needs
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, weekly retail prices of regular gasoline and No. 2 diesel. (data to 9 Nov 2026)themes.hormuz-6

Exhibit 11 · Retail fuel, latest and changes

Dollars per gallon; changes in cents over one, four and thirteen weeks and a year; percentile of the level since 2000
FuelLevel1w4w13w1yPct
Regular gasoline, retail (all formulations)9 Nov 2026$3.995−15.8¢−33.6¢−1.1¢+93.9¢96
No. 2 diesel, retail9 Nov 2026$6.127−16.5¢−5.2¢+87.0¢+229.0¢99

Both settlement lines are EIA's own survey readings — the $4.50 peak before the June settlement and the ceasefire week's $4.12 — so every test here compares EIA with EIA. Diesel's record on the survey is $6.529.

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, weekly retail prices of regular gasoline and No. 2 diesel. (data to 9 Nov 2026)themes.hormuz-14

Exhibit 12 · Latest readings of tests on the reserve, pump prices and ship counts

Tests on data the site tracks: threshold from the September report, latest reading, state; tests waiting on a date or paid data sit in Detail
About
StatusTestLatest readingThresholdIf crossedThreshold source
not crossedSPR at or below the 252.4 mb statutory line279.5 mb (6 Nov 2026); on 11 Sep 285.4 mb (4 Sep 2026)an earlier page of this site≤ 252.4 mbThe reserve is below the 42 U.S.C. §6241(h) line and the engineers' 250 mb floor for reliable high-rate draws; any further release draws into the floor. Completing the existing 172 mb exchange alone lands it near 243 mb.The 252.4 mb line is the floor of the limited-drawdown authority (EPCA §161(h), 42 U.S.C. §6241(h)). Exchanges and sales under a presidential finding (§161(d)) are not bound by it (Atlantic Council, 2 Oct), so it is a reporting line, not a stop.research note: Oman postponement spr (14 Sep 2026) · §B2a authorities; §B3 how much is left · 14 Sept 2026
not crossedRegular gasoline above $4.50 for three weeks into early voting, with no US move toward a partial reopening3.995 $/gal (9 Nov 2026); 0 consecutive above 4.500 $/galan earlier page of this site> 4.500 $/gal3 in a rowThe revealed American settlement threshold is wrong — if Washington has also made no move toward a partial reopening (that leg is read from the record, not tracked here).On EIA's weekly survey, the page's one basis: the $4.50 line is the survey's own peak before the June settlement, so the run counts survey weeks above it.the September 2026 report · §3.1.5 falsifier; the Iran runway note §14c · 13 Sept 2026
crossedRegular gasoline back under $4.00 — the US banks its gain3.995 $/gal (9 Nov 2026); on 11 Sep 4.157 $/gal (7 Sep 2026)an earlier page of this site< 4.000 $/galThe pump-price objective of a partial reopening is met (EIA's 4Q26 path is $3.95); the US political clock stops pressing.On EIA's weekly survey, the page's one basis for the pump price.research note: Iran runway (13 Sep 2026) · §15 what securing gains looks like · 13 Sept 2026
not crossedRetail diesel at or above its $6.53 record for two survey weeks, with no new US supply action6.127 $/gal (9 Nov 2026); 0 consecutive at or above 6.530 $/galan earlier page of this site≥ 6.530 $/gal2 in a rowWashington answers diesel stress with relief rather than a settlement; the view is wrong if the price holds at its record and no new supply action follows (that leg is read from the record, not tracked here).ME-1d. The record is EIA's weekly survey high of $6.529 on 21 Sep 2026.research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §8.5 ME-1d; §2 the 11 tests, the pump-price test · 14 Oct 2026
not crossedShips through Hormuz at or above 60 a day on the 7-day average, the line at which the traded contracts call traffic normal3.9 ships a day (8 Nov 2026); on 11 Sep 5.0 ships a day (11 Sep 2026)an earlier page of this site≥ 60.0 ships a dayThe strait is open again by the measure the contracts settle on: a hollow or a genuine deal is under way and attrition has ended.ME-4 on IMF PortWatch's satellite count, the contracts' own source and line; the count misses ships with transponders off.research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §8.5 ME-4, its threshold set to the traded contracts' line (prototype of 17 Oct, §0) · 14 Oct 2026
not crossedTankers through Bab el-Mandeb above 12 a day on the 7-day average, a sign that Saudi tankers are back in the Red Sea6.9 tankers a day (8 Nov 2026); on 11 Sep 7.3 tankers a day (11 Sep 2026)an earlier page of this site> 12.0 tankers a dayThe Houthi blockade of Saudi shipping no longer binds Saudi energy: tanker traffic is heading back toward its level before 20 July.ME-9 on IMF PortWatch's satellite count of tankers.research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §8.5 ME-9; §6b branch C · 14 Oct 2026
About this exhibit
A table of the tests read on data the page tracks (the reserve line, the gasoline and diesel tests, Hormuz transits, Bab el-Mandeb tankers), each with latest reading, threshold, meaning if crossed and source
The tests these series decide, with today's reading
Thresholds from the September report; status from the latest data. 1 crossed · 0 closing · 5 not crossed · 1 pending · 12 not tracked here.
Source: the September 2026 report (thresholds); the pages named in each row (readings)themes.hormuz-9

Tankers through Bab el-Mandeb fell 55% after the blockade of Saudi shipping

Does the Red Sea bypass hold, and does Washington join the Yemen war?

Exhibit 13 · Tankers a day through Bab el-Mandeb, with the Red Sea's dated events

Tankers a day, 7-day average of the satellite count, 1 Jan 2025 to 8 Nov 2026; dotted lines mark events from the dated record
About this exhibit
Tankers a day through Bab el-Mandeb, 7-day average of the satellite count, since the start of 2025, with dotted lines at the log's dated events (Houthi attacks resume, the blockade, Mokha and Perim taken, the Saudi-led offensive)
Tankers through Bab el-Mandeb, with the Red Sea's dated events
Tankers a day, 7-day average of the satellite count, 1 Jan 2025 to 8 Nov 2026; dotted lines mark events from the log
Source: IMF PortWatch, daily transit calls from AIS ship positions, 7-day average. (data to 8 Nov 2026); events from the theme's dated logthemes.hormuz-22

Exhibit 14 · Ships a day through Suez and around the Cape, against 2023

Ships a day, 7-day average of the satellite count, to 8 Nov 2026; dashed lines are each route's 2023 average
About this exhibit
Ships a day through Suez and around the Cape of Good Hope, 7-day average of the satellite count, each against its 2023 average (dashed)
Ships through Suez and around the Cape of Good Hope
Ships a day, 7-day average of the satellite count, to 8 Nov 2026; dashed lines are each route's 2023 average
Source: IMF PortWatch, daily transit calls from AIS ship positions, 7-day average. (data to 8 Nov 2026)themes.hormuz-23

Exhibit 15 · The Red Sea war's dated events by side

The Red Sea war's dated events by named side since 13 Jul 2026; casualty counts as first reported
DateWhoWhat happenedLogged from
13 Jul 2026HouthisThe first Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia since 2023, as part of the Iran war (Wikipedia, Red Sea crisis).research note: the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype (17 Oct 2026) · the Gulf tab, Exhibit 8: the Houthi strike log · 17 Oct 2026
20 Jul 2026HouthisThe Houthis declare a sea and air blockade of Saudi Arabia (the UK Parliament's Commons Library, 5 Oct); one Saudi-linked tanker has used Bab el-Mandeb since (Lloyd's List Intelligence, 18 Sep).research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b key takeaways (declared 19 or 20 July) · 14 Oct 2026
24 Jul 2026Saudi ArabiaThe first Saudi air strikes in Yemen since 2022 (the UK Parliament's Commons Library, 5 Oct).research note: the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype (17 Oct 2026) · the Gulf tab, Exhibit 8: the Houthi strike log · 17 Oct 2026
7 Sept 2026HouthisSaudi Arabia's Jizan refinery is hit (Reuters).research note: the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype (17 Oct 2026) · the Gulf tab, Exhibit 8: the Houthi strike log · 17 Oct 2026
10 Sept 2026HouthisThe Houthis take Mokha, Perim and the Hanish islands at the mouth of the Red Sea (Long War Journal, 14 Sep).research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
28 Sept 2026Saudi ArabiaThe East–West pipeline is exporting again at about 3.5 mb/d after repairs (Dow Jones, 28 Sep).research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
4 Oct 2026Saudi ArabiaA Saudi-led ground and air offensive, 'Yemen Dawn', moves to retake the Red Sea coast (AP, 5–7 Oct).research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
8 Oct 2026HouthisA Houthi strike on Riyadh's King Khalid airport kills three; at least 124 flights are suspended (CTP-ISW, 9 Oct).research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
10 Oct 2026HouthisKing Khalid airport's terminals are hit: 12 killed, one of them American; Trump says 'We may' join the strikes (Times of Israel; NPR).research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
11 Oct 2026HouthisRiyadh's airport is hit again and Dammam's attacked; the Houthis declare Saudi airspace a 'theater of operations' (Dawn; Al Arabiya).research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
13 Oct 2026HouthisAn Aramco administrative building in Dhahran is hit, a 'limited fire' with no injuries (Argaam; Khaleej Times, 14 Oct).research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026
13 Oct 2026United StatesTrump says Iran is behind the attacks on Saudi Arabia; the US has not struck the Houthis (Iran International; Soufan Center).research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline; external positions · 14 Oct 2026
About this exhibit
A dated table of the Red Sea war's events by actor (Houthis, Saudi Arabia, United States), with casualty counts as first reported and the source of each row
Houthi strikes moved from the border to Riyadh and the Gulf coast
The Red Sea leg's dated events, July to October 2026; casualty counts as first reported
Source: as cited in each row, from the theme's dated logthemes.hormuz-24

A US strike on Iran landed by 3 Nov, as the venue resolved it

What do traded contracts say about each ending?

Exhibit 16 · Daily chance of a first US strike on Iran, by contract window

Average daily chance, %, of a first US strike on Iran between contract dates, on 17 Nov 2026 prices

The curve starts at 24 Oct 2026, the latest contract that resolved with no strike, and reaches 28.5% for no strike by 31 Dec 2026: a 72% chance of one. The venue resolved its 3 Nov 2026 contract No on 3 Nov 2026: a strike had landed by then, so the curve drawn is the last one traded before it, on 31 Oct 2026.

About this exhibit
Bars of the average daily chance of a first US strike on Iran in each window between contract dates, to the end of the year, coloured before and after the 3 November vote
The daily risk of a first US strike, window by window
Average daily chance of a first US strike on Iran between two contract dates, % a day, on 31 Oct 2026 prices
Each contract pays if no US air or missile strike lands in Iran by its date, so its price is the market's chance of no strike by then. Between two dates, one minus the ratio of the two prices is the chance of a first strike in the window, and spread evenly it gives the daily rate. A window of one day is set by the spread between bid and ask more than by news.
Source: Polymarket, 'US x Iran ceasefire continues through…?' (31 Oct 2026); Macro Review calculationsthemes.hormuz-26

Exhibit 17 · Each Gulf and Red Sea contract's price, spread and volume

Polymarket's price of Yes, %, on 17 Nov 2026, with bid and ask, money traded and liquidity for 14 contracts; hover a contract for its rule
ContractYesBid–askTradedLiquidityEnds
Hormuz
Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by November 30?long shot1.0%0.9–1.1$2.1m$194k1 Dec 2026
Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by December 15?thin50.0%0.0–100.0$0k$0k31 Dec 2026
Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by December 31?long shot4.5%4.0–5.0$18.0m$260k1 Jan 2027
US-Iran Hormuz Agreement by November 30?long shot4.3%4.1–4.4$969k$132k1 Dec 2026
US-Iran Hormuz Agreement by December 31?14.5%14.0–15.0$816k$119k1 Jan 2027
Iran-Oman Hormuz Agreement by November 30?long shot8.5%8.0–9.0$413k$40k1 Dec 2026
Iran-Oman Hormuz Agreement by December 31?19.5%19.0–20.0$394k$16k1 Jan 2027
US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal by November 30, 2026?long shot1.1%0.9–1.2$732k$64k1 Dec 2026
US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal by December 31, 2026?long shot5.5%5.0–6.0$4.7m$186k1 Jan 2027
Will the U.S. invade Iran before 2027?long shot7.5%7.0–8.0$80.4m$351k1 Jan 2027
Red Sea
Bab el-Mandeb Strait effectively closed by November 30?long shot2.1%2.0–2.1$231k$109k1 Dec 2026
Bab el-Mandeb Strait effectively closed by December 31?long shot6.5%6.0–7.0$2.2m$140k1 Jan 2027
Saudi-Houthi ceasefire agreement announced by December 31?12.5%12.0–13.0$429k$46k1 Jan 2027
Military action against Saudi Oil Pipeline (East-West) by December 31?thin72.0%49.0–95.0$0k$0k31 Dec 2026
About this exhibit
A table of the Gulf and Red Sea Polymarket contracts: price of Yes, bid–ask, money traded, liquidity and end date, flagged thin or long shot
The contracts that settle each ending
Polymarket's price of Yes on 17 Nov 2026, with bid and ask, money traded and liquidity; hover a contract for its rule
A price is a traded chance, not a forecast. Thin marks a contract with less than $100k traded; long shot marks a price under 10% or over 90%, where traded odds are known to overstate the unlikely side. The no-strike contracts pay Yes while no US air or missile strike has landed in Iran.
Source: Polymarket, read 21:57–22:41 UTC on 17 Nov 2026themes.hormuz-25

The log names four oil paths and quotes three traded contracts

What endings does the log name, and which can be priced?

Exhibit 18 · The oil paths to 31 December 2026, with Brent ranges

Each path as the September report defined it, with its Brent range in dollars; the author's dated odds sit in the fold, not drawn
About
  1. Hollow dealWashington blesses the Iran–Oman corridor and keeps the blockade; a reopening by regional consent without a US–Iran agreement (Brent $80–95 in the grid).
  2. AttritionBoth sides hold to 3 November: transits 5–20 a day, shut-ins of 5.7 mb/d through 4Q (Brent $100–115).
  3. EscalationA mistake path — a Pickaxe strike on IAEA-verified movement, Gulf energy infrastructure, or an Iranian missile that hits a US ship (Brent above $120).
  4. Genuine dealA sequencing device is found — an escrow or custodian for the HEU that makes Iran's irreversible concession simultaneous with America's reversible one.
What the market and others said, as quoted
  • Polymarket 'traffic normal by 31 December' 20% (by 31 October 7.5%; by 15 September 0.15%); Kalshi PortWatch transits above 60: 2% by 1 October, 15% by 1 January, 42% by 1 July 2027. (the September 2026 report · §3.1.6 probabilities, anchored · 13 Sept 2026)
  • EIA: constraints through 4Q26, pre-conflict output only by 2Q27; Kpler: 'gradual reopening only in late Q4'. CSIS: the clean deal 'the least likely option'; Crisis Group: escalation 'the more likely course'; CTP/ISW: the hardline IRGC faction believes it can outlast Washington. (the September 2026 report · §3.1.6 probabilities, anchored · 13 Sept 2026)
The record: the author's assessment on 13 Sep 2026, revised 14 Sep 2026

A dated judgement, kept as written and never revised here; it is not a market price or a model's output.

  • 14 Sept 2026
    Hollow deal 33%Attrition 42%Escalation 15%Genuine deal 10%

    Seven points from the hollow deal to attrition. The cheapest route to a hollow deal was a Gulf-wide ratification of a corridor whose bilateral text was already written; that ratification failed on 13 September for want of consensus, with no new date. Nothing about the branch itself changed — only the evidence on how quickly it can be reached.

    research note: Discussions and decisions (13 Sep 2026) · §5a the probability revision (also STATUS round 5; report as published §3.1.7) · 14 Sept 2026

  • 13 Sept 2026
    Hollow deal 40%Attrition 35%Escalation 15%Genuine deal 10%

    This review's assessment for the window to 31 December: a stated judgement anchored to the market, official and analyst sources printed beside it; the hollow-deal share to rise on 14 September if four or more GCC states signed.

    the September 2026 report · §3.1.6 · 13 Sept 2026

About this exhibit
A card listing the logged oil paths (hollow deal, attrition, escalation, genuine deal) with each one's Brent range, plus folds with quoted market and analyst views and the author's dated odds
Oil path to 31 December 2026
The window to 31 December 2026
Source: the September 2026 report · §3.1.6 · 13 Sept 2026themes.hormuz-scenario-oil_paths

Exhibit 20 · Hormuz traffic normal by 31 December — the prediction market

Polymarket contract to 31 December 2026, as priced on 24 October 2026
About
Normal by 31 December market-implied
The contract's own definition of normal traffic by year-end.
11.5%
Not normal by 31 December market-implied
The complement of the traded probability.
88.5%

Quoted 24 Oct 2026: a traded price, not a forecast.

Source: Polymarket, event 'Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by December 31?', read from the Gamma API on 24 Oct 2026 · market 2176270, outcome price · 24 Oct 2026themes.hormuz-scenario-normal_traffic

Exhibit 19 · When a first US strike on Iran lands — the prediction market

Polymarket's no-strike contracts to 31 December 2026, as priced on 24 October 2026
About
By 31 October market-implied
A US air or missile strike lands in Iran by 31 October, before the vote: 'US x Iran ceasefire continues through October 31?' resolves No.
21.5%▲ +2 since 17 Oct 2026
In November market-implied
No strike by 31 October and a first strike by 30 November, the month the pledge of no attack before the vote lapses.
43%▲ +2 since 17 Oct 2026
In December market-implied
No strike by 30 November and a first strike by 31 December.
7%▼ −1 since 17 Oct 2026
Not in 2026 market-implied
No qualifying strike by 31 December: the 31 December contract resolves Yes.
28.5%▼ −4 since 17 Oct 2026

Quoted 24 Oct 2026: a traded price, not a forecast.

Source: Polymarket, event 'US x Iran ceasefire continues through…?', read from the Gamma API on 24 Oct 2026 · markets 4641065, 4713483 and 4713484, outcome prices · 24 Oct 2026themes.hormuz-scenario-us_strike

Exhibit 21 · Bab el-Mandeb effectively closed by 31 December — the prediction market

Polymarket contract to 31 December 2026, as priced on 24 October 2026
About
Closed by 31 December market-implied
IMF PortWatch publishes a 7-day average of transit calls through Bab el-Mandeb of 10 or fewer on any day to 31 December.
17%▲ +1 since 17 Oct 2026
Not closed by 31 December market-implied
The complement of the traded price.
83%▼ −1 since 17 Oct 2026

Quoted 24 Oct 2026: a traded price, not a forecast.

Source: Polymarket, event 'Bab el-Mandeb Strait effectively closed by…?', read from the Gamma API on 24 Oct 2026 · market 2853074, outcome price · 24 Oct 2026themes.hormuz-scenario-bab_closed

The two legs are never multiplied together: both load on the 3 November vote, so an escalation on one makes escalation on the other likelier.

Crude tanker owners rose 15–55% since 27 Feb

Who is pricing the war, and where is the gap to the damage?

Exhibit 22 · Total return of Gulf and regional country funds

Change with dividends reinvested, %, from the 27 Feb 2026 close by default, to 16 Nov 2026; grey bars are benchmarks

For context, Brent front-month futures moved +27.5% since the war began and −11.4% since the 28 Sep shift. EIA's Brent and WTI spot prices are not shown.

About this exhibit
Bars of the total-return change in US-listed Gulf and regional country funds (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Israel, Türkiye) and two benchmarks (emerging markets, world) since the last close before the war; a toggle shows the change since the 28 Sep shift
Gulf and regional country funds since the war began
Change in US-listed country funds with dividends reinvested, %, from the 27 Feb 2026 close to 16 Nov 2026; grey bars are benchmarks
Source: Yahoo Finance, adjusted closes to 16 Nov 2026; Macro Review calculationsthemes.hormuz-27

Exhibit 23 · Total return of crude and product tanker owners

Share-price change with dividends reinvested, %, from the 27 Feb 2026 close by default, to 16 Nov 2026; crude tanker owners dark, product owners light

The tanker freight futures fund (BWET) moved +1,014.2% since the war began and −2.9% since the 28 Sep shift; it is left off the bars so the owners stay readable.

About this exhibit
Bars of the total-return change in tanker owners' shares since the last close before the war, crude tanker owners dark and product tanker owners light; a toggle shows the change since the 28 Sep shift
Tanker owners since the war began
Change in share prices with dividends reinvested, %, from the 27 Feb 2026 close; crude tanker owners dark, product tanker owners light
Source: Yahoo Finance, adjusted closes to 16 Nov 2026; Macro Review calculationsthemes.hormuz-28

Exhibit 24 · Quoted tanker freight and war-risk cover, credit spreads and Gulf budgets

Named sources' figures on tanker rates, freight's share of crude's cost, war-risk cover, spreads and budgets, as quoted on 14 Oct 2026
WhatAs quotedSource
Tanker rates by routesubscription dataArabian Gulf to China, VLCC (TD3C): WS1,319, about $1.48 million a day, from WS821 on 10 Sep. West Africa to Europe, Suezmax: $590,250 a day. US Gulf to Europe, Aframax: $325,000 a day. Arabian Gulf to Japan, clean LR2: $282,000 a day (Gibson Shipbrokers, 8 Oct).research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §5b tanker freight and war risk · 14 Oct 2026
Freight in the cost of crudesubscription dataVLCC freight about $33 a barrel, 27% of the delivered cost of crude against 3% in January (Poten & Partners, via Benzinga); Clarksons' all-ship earnings index a record $84,951 a day on 12 Oct (via Splash247).research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §5b key takeaways · 14 Oct 2026
War-risk coversubscription dataHormuz 7.5–12.5% of hull value per transit (Breakwave, 8 Sep) or 6–9% (Reuters, via OilPrice, 25 Sep); Saudi-linked tankers at Yanbu about 3%, from under 1% in early July (Reuters, 25 Sep). No print dated after 25 Sep is sourced.research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §5b war-risk insurance · 14 Oct 2026
Emerging-market creditsubscription dataThe ICE BofA emerging-market corporate spread 155bp on 12 Oct, 3bp tighter than before the war; its Europe, Middle East and Africa bucket 167bp, 22bp wider since 27 Feb (ICE BofA indices, via FRED).research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §5c what credit has and has not priced · 14 Oct 2026
Sovereign risk and Gulf budgetssubscription dataFive-year CDS: Türkiye 244bp, Egypt 312bp, Israel 58bp (worldgovernmentbonds.com, source undisclosed); no Gulf sovereign CDS is openly available. The World Bank puts 2026 budget balances at −6.6% of GDP for Saudi Arabia and −18.0% for Kuwait (6 Oct).research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §5c damage ranking · 14 Oct 2026
About this exhibit
A table of quoted figures: tanker rates by route, freight's share of the delivered cost of crude, war-risk insurance, emerging-market credit spreads, sovereign CDS and Gulf budget balances, each with source and date
Freight and war-risk cover price the war, credit barely
Tanker rates, freight's share of the cost of crude, war-risk cover, spreads and budgets, quoted with source and date
Source: Gibson, Poten, Clarksons, Breakwave, Reuters, ICE BofA via FRED and the World Bank, as quoted on 14 Oct 2026themes.hormuz-29

Exhibit 25 · US oil stocks by product: levels, changes and percentiles

Million barrels, weekly, to 6 Nov 2026: change over 1w, 4w, 13w and 1y, shaded against 2015–19; percentile since 2000
SeriesLevel1w4w13w1yPct since 2000Level, recentAs of
Strategic reserve
Strategic Petroleum Reserve279.5 mb−2.6 mb−3.4 mb−19.2 mb−130.9 mb06 Nov 2026
Commercial stocks
Commercial crude oil (excluding SPR)414.4 mb+4.7 mb−1.2 mb−10.0 mb−13.2 mb606 Nov 2026
Total motor gasoline210.8 mb+1.8 mb+2.5 mb+2.1 mb+5.7 mb336 Nov 2026
Distillate fuel oil103.3 mb+4.1 mb+0.7 mb−3.8 mb−7.6 mb46 Nov 2026
About this exhibit
A table of four US stock series (SPR, commercial crude, motor gasoline, distillate): level, changes over one, four and thirteen weeks and a year shaded against 2015–19, and percentile since 2000; selecting a row charts it
US stocks: level and changes
Million barrels; changes over one, four and thirteen weeks and a year, shaded against 2015–19; percentile since 2000. Select a row to chart it.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, weekly ending stocks of commercial crude, motor gasoline and distillate. (data to 6 Nov 2026)themes.hormuz-4

Exhibit 26 · US stocks of the selected oil product, weekly

Million barrels, weekly, to 6 Nov 2026; the product selected in the stocks table, commercial crude by default
About this exhibit
US stocks of the product selected in the table above, million barrels, weekly; commercial crude oil excluding the strategic reserve until another row is chosen
Commercial crude oil (excluding SPR)
million barrels, 12 Nov 2021 to 6 Nov 2026
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, weekly ending stocks of commercial crude, motor gasoline and distillate. (data to 6 Nov 2026)themes.hormuz-5

Exhibit 27 · Twelve-month inflation in CPI gasoline, energy and all items

Twelve-month change, %, monthly, to Oct 2026; lines: CPI gasoline, CPI energy and headline CPI
About this exhibit
Twelve-month change in CPI gasoline, CPI energy and headline CPI, %, monthly
Where the barrel reaches the price level: CPI gasoline and energy
12-month change, %, Oct 2021 to Oct 2026
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI. From CPI (data to Oct 2026)themes.hormuz-7

No oil path is projected on the Scenarios set, only the pump-to-CPI channel

: what would each oil path move?

Exhibit 28 · The one oil channel the site estimates: pump price to CPI

No oil path is projected: headline CPI's latest response, %, to +10% on the monthly average pump price, with its band and record by sample period

Nothing is projected here. Hollow deal, Attrition, Escalation and Genuine deal: oil is not modelled through the identity — no elasticity of index earnings or of the premium to it exists among the site's estimates, and none is invented here.

The channel a path would run through · Pump price → CPI energy → headline CPI: +10% on the monthly average pump price → headline CPI +0.45% (energy +5.0%, gasoline +9.3%), the same month; +0.59% per 10% sustained at 3 months; 90% band 0.42 to 0.48%. Record: 1991–2008 +0.45%; 2009–2026 +0.43% (impact, per 10%). The transmission table carries it with its sample and its model.

What each path would do to core PCE, unemployment and real GDP is read on Thematic impact, under Outlook.

About this exhibit
A text card: no oil path is projected on the site's scenario model; the one estimated channel is the pump price to headline CPI, the transmission table's estimate with its band and its record by sample period
What would each path move?
Model-conditional: no branch of this page is projected on the Scenarios set, so no asset effect is printed for any of them; the channel beneath is the transmission table's estimate per unit of shock, not a projection of a branch.
Source: the Scenarios and Transmission pages; Macro Review calculations · data to 16 Nov 2026 and Oct 2026themes.hormuz-10

The tests waiting on a date or an event, and the dated record

The tests waiting on a date or an event, the dated record and the report's grid

Exhibit 29 · The tests waiting on a date, an event or subscription data

Thresholds from the September report; status from the latest data. 1 crossed · 0 closing · 5 not crossed · 1 pending · 12 not tracked here.
About
StatusTestLatest readingThresholdIf crossedThreshold source
not tracked hereIranian crude loadings above 1 mb/d for two consecutive weeks without a lifting of the blockadesubscription data tanker tracking (Kpler, Vortexa) — quoted, not tracked; August loadings 220–260 kb/d (issue)–Iran's storage clock is wrong.the September 2026 report · §3.1.5 falsifier · 13 Sept 2026
not tracked hereTransits above 30 a day for five days — the hollow deal's leading indicatorsubscription data trackers (Windward, Kpler) — quoted, not tracked; 5–18 a day at the lock–The hollow deal is under way; with P&I insurers returning and the Brent–Dubai spread narrowing.The 30 a day line was written on paid trackers' counts, which ran up to ten times IMF PortWatch's satellite count in early October; the page's own transit test is the contracts' 60 line on PortWatch's 7-day average.the September 2026 report (as published on 15 Sep) · §3.1.8 plan of action, branch A · 15 Sept 2026
not tracked hereTransits above 40 a day for ten days without a signed US–Iran documentsubscription data trackers — quoted, not tracked–The hollow deal is the equilibrium, and framing the outcome as Washington's decision was wrong.The 40 a day line was written on paid trackers' counts, which ran up to ten times IMF PortWatch's satellite count in early October; the page's own transit test is the contracts' 60 line on PortWatch's 7-day average.the September 2026 report (as published on 15 Sep) · §3.1.8 falsifier; §4.4 #17 · 15 Sept 2026
not tracked hereFour or more GCC signatures at a rescheduled Salalah meetingpostponed by Oman on 13 Sep 'to a later date'; no new date in the record to 14 Sep–Raises the hollow deal.the September 2026 report (as published on 15 Sep) · §4.4 #21; OMAN_POSTPONEMENT_SPR §A6 · 15 Sept 2026
not tracked hereA US Navy ship is hitevent — read from the record, not a data series–Raises the escalation.the September 2026 report (as published on 15 Sep) · §4.4 #21 · 15 Sept 2026
not tracked hereA presidential finding under EPCA §161(d) with an SPR release above 50 mbnone on the record; the Energy Secretary's last statement (31 Jul): 'no thoughts whatsoever of needing any more'–The section's physical ceiling on a second release (33–35 mb before the statutory line) is wrong.the September 2026 report (as published on 15 Sep) · §3.1.6 falsifier · 15 Sept 2026
not tracked hereBrent falls more than $5 on a release announcement of 40 mb or lesscrude prices are subscription data — not displayed–The September report’s $1–3/bbl estimate of a release's worth is wrong.the September 2026 report (as published on 15 Sep) · §3.1.6 falsifier · 15 Sept 2026
not tracked hereIranian onshore crude storage exhausted — forced well shut-insprojected around mid-October (Kpler, Vortexa, TankerTrackers via RFE/RL, 8 Sep) — quoted, not tracked–Iran's physical clock binds: shut-ins risk irreversible reservoir damage.research note: Iran runway (13 Sep 2026) · §14b Iran's clock · 13 Sept 2026
pendingIran concedes by 30 November: it accepts nuclear-first sequencing or announces a reopeningdated 30 Nov 2026–If Iran concedes, the clock thesis passes; if there is no concession and no US escalation by 30 November, the thesis is falsified.research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §8.5 ME-5; §2 why holding is the wrong headline · 14 Oct 2026
not tracked hereThe Houthis end their exemption: Suez container transits fall 30% in a week, or a confirmed Houthi strike on a non-Saudi shipnone on the record to 14 Oct: the Houthis exempt US and EU shipping–The Red Sea war is no longer two-sided: the route closes to every flag and the carriers' return to Suez reverses.research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §8.5 ME-10; §3b key takeaways · 14 Oct 2026
not tracked hereA US strike on Houthi targetsnone on the record to 14 Oct: the US gives intelligence, targeting and planning support only (AP, 5 Oct)–Washington joins the Yemen war: the Houthis' exemption of US ships ends and escalation runs on both legs at once.research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §8.5 ME-11; §3b external positions · 14 Oct 2026
not tracked hereSaudi Arabia confirms damage at Yanbu, Abqaiq or Ras Tanuranone on the record to 14 Oct; the Dhahran office strike of 13 Oct was a 'limited fire'–Strikes on Saudi energy are no longer performative: the bypass's export capacity is hit.research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §8.5 ME-12 · 14 Oct 2026
not tracked hereTraders stop pricing a higher strike risk after the vote: the daily risk for 1–15 November at or below late October'scannot be read: the strike landed by 3 Nov (Polymarket), so no contract prices 1–15 Nov after the vote. On 31 Oct prices, the last before it, the daily risk was 5.40% for 1–15 Nov against 0.84% in late October–America's clock is not electoral: the market no longer expects the end of the pledge to raise the risk of a strike.ME-13, read from the no-strike term structure the page draws.research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §8.5 ME-13; §6f the hazard reading · 14 Oct 2026
Source: the September 2026 report (thresholds); the pages named in each row (readings)themes.hormuz-19

Exhibit 30 · Dated events of the Gulf war since it began, with sources

Events from 28 Feb 2026 to Dec 2026 with named sources; scheduled dates are marked, and events read from a data series say so
  • 28 Feb 2026
    The Strait is closed or restricted (formal IRGC closure on 2 March).

    the September 2026 report · §3.1 key points · 13 Sept 2026

  • 11 Mar 2026
    IEA collective action: 400 mb announced (411.9 mb committed), the largest in history; the US share, 172 mb, structured as exchanges.

    research note: Oman postponement spr (14 Sep 2026) · §B4a · 14 Sept 2026

  • 8 Apr 2026
    Ceasefire, with US gasoline at $4.12 and rising ('due to rising gas prices', Axios); the Islamabad talks fail on 11–12 April.

    the September 2026 report · §3.1.1; §3.1.5 · 13 Sept 2026

  • 13 Apr 2026
    US blockade of Iranian ports (13–15 April).

    the September 2026 report · §3.1.1 · 13 Sept 2026

  • 17 Jun 2026
    Fourteen-point memorandum: blockade lifted, transit fees suspended for sixty days, a sixty-day nuclear window.

    the September 2026 report · §3.1.1 · 13 Sept 2026

  • 8 Jul 2026
    The memorandum collapses (8–9 July) after Iran strikes three commercial vessels; the blockade is reinstated on 14–15 July.

    the September 2026 report · §3.1.1 · 13 Sept 2026

  • 13 Jul 2026
    The first Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia since 2023, as part of the Iran war (Wikipedia, Red Sea crisis).

    research note: the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype (17 Oct 2026) · the Gulf tab, Exhibit 8: the Houthi strike log · 17 Oct 2026

  • 20 Jul 2026
    The Houthis declare a sea and air blockade of Saudi Arabia (the UK Parliament's Commons Library, 5 Oct); one Saudi-linked tanker has used Bab el-Mandeb since (Lloyd's List Intelligence, 18 Sep).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b key takeaways (declared 19 or 20 July) · 14 Oct 2026

  • 24 Jul 2026
    The first Saudi air strikes in Yemen since 2022 (the UK Parliament's Commons Library, 5 Oct).

    research note: the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype (17 Oct 2026) · the Gulf tab, Exhibit 8: the Houthi strike log · 17 Oct 2026

  • 31 Jul 2026
    Energy Secretary Wright: 'There is certainly more oil in the SPR, but we have no thoughts whatsoever of needing any more.'

    research note: Oman postponement spr (14 Sep 2026) · §B1 · 14 Sept 2026

  • 17 Aug 2026
    The memorandum's window expires with crude clearance at 6.1 mb/d, 40% of the 2025 rate.

    the September 2026 report · §3.1.1 · 13 Sept 2026

  • 26 Aug 2026
    Iran and Oman agree a temporary seven-mile corridor through Iranian waters, to be notified to the IMO.

    research note: Oman postponement spr (14 Sep 2026) · §A timeline · 14 Sept 2026

  • 7 Sept 2026
    Saudi Arabia's Jizan refinery is hit (Reuters).

    research note: the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype (17 Oct 2026) · the Gulf tab, Exhibit 8: the Houthi strike log · 17 Oct 2026

  • 9 Sept 2026
    The IAEA Board refers Iran to the UN Security Council (23–3–8). EIA's September STEO keeps Hormuz constraints through 4Q26.

    the September 2026 report · §3.1 key points; §1.2 Analysis 6 · 13 Sept 2026

  • 10 Sept 2026
    Saudi East–West pipeline shut after drone strikes (10–11 Sep; attribution disputed); Iran suspends its 10% freight surcharge for foreign vessels carrying Iranian cargo.

    research note: Oman postponement spr (14 Sep 2026) · §A timeline · 14 Sept 2026

  • 10 Sept 2026
    The Houthis take Mokha, Perim and the Hanish islands at the mouth of the Red Sea (Long War Journal, 14 Sep).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026

  • 11 Sept 2026
    Bahrain declines to attend the Gulf–Iran meeting (11–12 Sep); the September report’s data lock.

    research note: Oman postponement spr (14 Sep 2026) · §A3 · 14 Sept 2026

  • 13 Sept 2026
    Oman postpones the Salalah meeting 'in the interests of consensus', to a later date with none set; Trump: 'I don't care. That's up to them.'

    research note: Oman postponement spr (14 Sep 2026) · §A1, §A4 · 14 Sept 2026

  • 14 Sept 2026
    Oil-path probabilities revised: hollow deal 40 → 33, attrition 35 → 42.

    research note: Discussions and decisions (13 Sep 2026) · §5a · 14 Sept 2026

  • 14 Sept 2026
    An Iranian anti-ship missile hits the M/V St. Helena; eight US Marines aboard are injured, disclosed on 27–28 Sep (The War Zone).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026

  • 18 Sept 2026
    Early in-person voting begins (Idaho, Minnesota, South Dakota, Virginia); Iran's Tehran security drill.

    research note: Iran runway (13 Sep 2026) · §15 dates that matter · 13 Sept 2026

  • 26 Sept 2026
    Trump rejects Iran's plan to reopen the strait; the WSJ reports he told staff renewed bombing was likely after the midterms (NPR; The National).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026

  • 28 Sept 2026
    Iran's tactical shift: at least 12 attacks on tankers and gas carriers a week from 28 Sep, the most of the war (maritime-security sources, via Reuters and gCaptain, 7 Oct).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a dated timeline; §1 key takeaways · 14 Oct 2026

  • 28 Sept 2026
    The East–West pipeline is exporting again at about 3.5 mb/d after repairs (Dow Jones, 28 Sep).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026

  • 29 Sept 2026
    The US offers a 40 mb exchange from the strategic reserve for November–December delivery (Oil & Gas Journal, 30 Sep).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026

  • 2 Oct 2026
    G7 leaders back a coordinated stock release with diesel front-loaded (IEA).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026

  • 4 Oct 2026
    OPEC+ eight-country meeting — 'very limited power over the physical oil market'.

    research note: Iran runway (13 Sep 2026) · §15 dates that matter · 13 Sept 2026

  • 4 Oct 2026
    A Saudi-led ground and air offensive, 'Yemen Dawn', moves to retake the Red Sea coast (AP, 5–7 Oct).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026

  • 7 Oct 2026
    Iran and Oman agree route coordinates for a corridor (Gulf News, 8 Oct); the Pentagon tells CENTCOM to complete preparations for major combat (Axios).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026

  • 8 Oct 2026
    Trump says he will not attack Iran before the 3 November election and that the blockade stays (Reuters, 9 Oct).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026

  • 8 Oct 2026
    A Houthi strike on Riyadh's King Khalid airport kills three; at least 124 flights are suspended (CTP-ISW, 9 Oct).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026

  • 10 Oct 2026
    King Khalid airport's terminals are hit: 12 killed, one of them American; Trump says 'We may' join the strikes (Times of Israel; NPR).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026

  • 11 Oct 2026
    Six vessels are struck in one day, one of them at Oman's Sohar anchorage (gCaptain, 12 Oct).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026

  • 11 Oct 2026
    Riyadh's airport is hit again and Dammam's attacked; the Houthis declare Saudi airspace a 'theater of operations' (Dawn; Al Arabiya).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026

  • 13 Oct 2026
    An Aramco administrative building in Dhahran is hit, a 'limited fire' with no injuries (Argaam; Khaleej Times, 14 Oct).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026

  • 13 Oct 2026
    Trump says Iran is behind the attacks on Saudi Arabia; the US has not struck the Houthis (Iran International; Soufan Center).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3b dated timeline; external positions · 14 Oct 2026

  • 13 Oct 2026
    Two senior Iranian officials tell Reuters the new tactics aim to keep oil high before the US vote: 'it will be complete closure soon' (Reuters, via TBS, 14 Oct).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §3a dated timeline · 14 Oct 2026

  • 14 Oct 2026
    A container ship is sunk south of the strait, on the IRGC's claim (Trading Economics, 15 Oct).

    research note: the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype (17 Oct 2026) · §0; the Gulf tab, Exhibit 4 · 17 Oct 2026

  • mid-Oct 2026
    Iranian onshore crude storage projected to run out around mid-October (Kpler, Vortexa, TankerTrackers via RFE/RL).

    research note: Iran runway (13 Sep 2026) · §14b · 13 Sept 2026

  • late Oct 2026
    The Theodore Roosevelt carrier group and the Makin Island amphibious group arrive, three carrier groups in the region (Iran International, 3 Oct).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §6e calendar · 14 Oct 2026

  • 27 Oct 2026
    Israel votes; an Israeli official puts joint action against Iran 'significantly higher' after the election (Axios).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §6e calendar; §6a player table · 14 Oct 2026

  • 31 Oct 2026
    The 31 October contracts settle: a US strike, Hormuz traffic normal, Bab el-Mandeb closed (Polymarket).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §6e calendar · 14 Oct 2026

  • 3 Nov 2026
    Midterm elections: the US political clock resets.

    research note: Iran runway (13 Sep 2026) · §15 dates that matter · 13 Sept 2026

  • 3 Nov 2026
    The pledge of no attack on Iran before the vote lapses (Reuters, 9 Oct).

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §6e calendar · 14 Oct 2026

  • 30 Nov 2026
    The concession test closes: Iran accepts nuclear-first sequencing or announces a reopening, or the clock view fails. scheduled

    research note: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) · §8.5 ME-5 · 14 Oct 2026

  • mid-Dec 2026
    Payments for Iranian oil already delivered 'may largely dry up by mid-December'. scheduled

    research note: Iran runway (13 Sep 2026) · §0; §14b · 13 Sept 2026

About this exhibit
A dated list of the Gulf war's events since it began, each with its source, scheduled dates marked
The dated events behind the view
Events with their source; scheduled dates are marked, and events read from a data series say so
Source: the September 2026 report and the pages cited per rowthemes.hormuz-11

Exhibit 31 · The September report's Hormuz exhibits and the pages that now carry them

Each named exhibit as the September report printed it, fixed at its 11 Sep 2026 data date, with the page that now carries it live
No.StemExhibitLive page
130E-H17_spr_drawdown_ladderThe drawdown ladder: what is left, and where the statutory and engineering floors sitGulf chokepoints
129E-H12_gasoline_settlementsUS gasoline through the war with the two settlement dates and the revealed thresholdGulf chokepoints
40E9d_gasolineRegular gasoline, weekly, 2024–2026Gulf chokepoints
149E23_fomc_oil_gridThe 3×3 grid: FOMC decision × oil path, with cell probabilities and the bookGulf chokepoints
134E-H3_game_treeThe game tree after the postponement: who moves next, what it costs, where it goesGulf chokepoints
13E2q_cpi_sourcesContributions to twelve-month CPI inflation by category, August 2026 and August 2019CPI
131E-H19_spr_scaleEverything in one unit: what a release is worth against what the market has actually movedquoted figures — no live page
132E-H18_spr_second_releaseA second strategic-reserve release: eight questions and what the record answersquoted figures — no live page
117E-H4_brent_with_eventsBrent through the war, with the episode's dated eventsquoted figures — no live page
118E-H1_transits_by_trackerDaily transits by tracker against the US claims and the pre-war baselinequoted figures — no live page
119E-H5_shutins_vs_bypassShut-in volumes against bypass capacityquoted figures — no live page
120E-H13_oil_workaroundThe shuttle-and-transfer system: who runs it, what it moves, what it costsquoted figures — no live page
121E-H16_volume_claim_gapOil leaving the Gulf: the trackers against the official claimsquoted figures — no live page
122E-H14_china_importsChina's crude imports by month, against the 2025 averagequoted figures — no live page
123E-H15_china_sourcesWhere China's barrels come from, by origin and price paidquoted figures — no live page
124E-H7_player_tableThe player table; every entry sourced to a dated statement in the research filequoted figures — no live page
125E-H8_iran_cost_of_waitingIran's cost of waiting, latest indicatorsquoted figures — no live page
126E-H9_runway_metricsThe two runways side by sidequoted figures — no live page
127E-H10_two_clocksThe two clocks: constraint, reading, threshold and time to it, for each sidequoted figures — no live page
128E-H11_two_clocks_calendarBoth clocks on one calendar, 13 September to 31 Decemberquoted figures — no live page
133E-H2_decision_matrixUS options against Iran options: outcomes, oil ranges, ordinal payoffsquoted figures — no live page
135E-H6_reopening_oddsPrediction-market probabilities of normal traffic by datequoted figures — no live page
About this exhibit
A table mapping each Hormuz exhibit of the September report (number, title) to the live page that now carries it, or 'quoted figures — no live page'
The September report's exhibits, and where each lives now
Exhibit numbers as the report printed them on 15 September; each stays fixed at the 11 September data date and points to the page that carries it live
Source: the September 2026 report, exhibit listthemes.hormuz-12

Exhibit 32 · The author's odds for each pair of FOMC decision and oil path

Percent as printed; each cell is the FOMC row times the oil column, assumed independent; the weights of 13 Sep 2026 or 14 Sep 2026
About
FOMC \ oilReopening / hollow deal ($80–95)
43%
Attrition ($100–115)
42%
Escalation (above $120)
15%
Hike, 'recalibration' dots 55%24%23%8%
Hike, hawkish dots — a cycle 31%13%13%5%
Hold 14%6%6%2%

The author's assessment on 13 Sept 2026, revised 14 Sept 2026, kept as the report printed it; cells sum to 100% after rounding. The September report’s grid exhibit E23 (edition of 15 Sep) prints the 14 September column weights in its header but the 13 September cell values in its cells, and §4.2's prose still quotes 28% and 19%; the cells re-derived on 14 September are those in the price-target script and in the products shown here. The decision itself is scored on The decision vs the source, where it resolved on 16 September.

About this exhibit
A table of the author's joint odds for the FOMC outcomes (two kinds of hike, hold) against the oil paths, each cell the product of the row and column judgements, with a toggle between the two dates' weights
The report's 3×3 grid: FOMC decision × oil path
The cells assume the Committee's decision and the oil path are independent: each is the product of two of the author's judgements, and a decision that reacts to the oil path breaks the assumption. The joint cell is the product of the FOMC row and the oil column, rounded; the reopening column is the hollow deal plus the genuine deal.
Source: the author's assessment on The decision vs the source (rows) and this page (columns); cells as printed in the report's exhibit tables (as published) · PROB — re-derived on the 14 Sep oil-path weights · 14 Sept 2026themes.hormuz-15

Exhibit 33 · What only subscription trackers saw in September, as the report quoted it

Transits, volumes, Iranian loadings, war-risk cover and crude prices are paid data; shown as quoted, with date and source
WhatAs quotedSource
Transits per daysubscription data5–18 a day against 100–130 before the war: Windward 10 in the 24 hours of 9–10 Sep; The National 18 on 8 Sep and 7 on 10 Sep; Kpler ten-day average 13; IMF PortWatch seven-day average 7. US claims of 30–40 a night are unreconciled with every tracker.the September 2026 report · §3.1 key points · 13 Sept 2026
Volumes leaving the Gulfsubscription dataKpler: 2.3 mb/d before the memorandum, 6.1 mb/d during its window, 5–7 mb/d in August, against about 15 mb/d of crude in 2025. Trackers 6–8 mb/d against the administration's 11–17.research note: Iran runway (13 Sep 2026) · §1 reconciliation item · 13 Sept 2026
Ship-to-ship transferssubscription dataAbout 3.1 mb/d by ship-to-ship transfer in the Gulf of Oman since the memorandum collapsed — about 30% of the 5.6 mb/d leaving the Gulf; roughly 70% of observed transits run dark (Lloyd's List Intelligence).the September 2026 report · §3.1.2 · 13 Sept 2026
Iranian exportssubscription dataNo Iranian crude cargo has crossed the US blockade since 14 July; August loadings inside the Gulf 220–260 kb/d against about 2 mb/d in February; deliveries to China 534 kb/d in August, from stocks afloat.the September 2026 report · §3.1.5 key points · 13 Sept 2026
War-risk coversubscription data7.5–12.5% of hull value per transit (Breakwave, 8 Sep) against about 0.25% before the war; no observable repricing after the Salalah postponement — underwriters had not priced the corridor in.research note: Oman postponement spr (14 Sep 2026) · §A5 tanker war-risk and insurance · 14 Sept 2026
Shut-in productionpublished dataEIA STEO (9 Sep): crude production shut in because it cannot be exported 6.7 mb/d in August and 5.7 mb/d in 4Q26; most flows back to pre-conflict averages only by 2Q27; retail gasoline $3.95 in 4Q26 and $3.35 for 2027.research note: Hike or hold markets (13 Sep 2026) · §3.4 (EIA STEO, 9 Sep) · 13 Sept 2026
Brent and WTIsubscription dataNot displayed. EIA attributes its spot series to Refinitiv (LSEG); display rights unresolved. The September report locked the price at the 11 September settle and did not re-lock to Monday's move: re-lock for a change in the mechanism, never for a change in the price.research note: Status (14 Sep 2026) · round 5 — 'Decided: the 11 September data lock stands' · 14 Sept 2026
Source: the September 2026 report's documents, quoted with dates; not a data feedthemes.hormuz-8

The Appendix

The model, the data, the checks and the sources115 checks, all pass
About this page

The September report framed Hormuz as an endgame with two stable outcomes — a hollow deal by regional consent, or attrition — decided on two clocks: Iran's physical one and America's political one. Since July the Houthis have also blockaded Saudi shipping in the Red Sea, the route around the strait. This page tracks what published data and traded contracts can see — ships through both straits, the strategic reserve, US stocks, the pump price, the contracts that settle each ending and the funds that price the war — quotes what only paid trackers see, and keeps the report's dated record.

Exhibit 34 · Definitions

  • Theme
    What the page reads.

    The page reads EIA's weekly petroleum data, IMF PortWatch's daily transit calls, Polymarket's Gulf and Red Sea contracts and Yahoo Finance closes of the funds and shares that price the war. CPI gasoline and energy are copied from the CPI page. Paid transit counts, freight rates, war-risk cover and Brent and WTI spot appear only as dated quotations.

  • Transits
    The satellite count and its 7-day average.

    IMF PortWatch counts the ships of each type that cross a chokepoint each day, from AIS ship positions, and publishes about a week behind. The page draws the 7-day trailing mean of the daily count, the measure the Polymarket contracts settle on, from 1 Jan 2023 to 8 Nov 2026. The norm is the average daily count over 2023. Ships with transponders off are missed, so paid trackers that add confirmed dark transits count more.

  • Contracts
    Traded prices, with venue and time.

    Each price is Polymarket's outcome price when the event records were read (2026-11-16 21:57–22:41 UTC): the midpoint of the best bid and ask. A price is a traded chance, not a forecast. Thin marks a contract with less than $100k traded; long shot marks a price under 10% or over 90%, where traded odds are known to overstate long shots. The Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb lines (60 and 10) are read from the contracts' own rules.

  • Strike risk
    From prices to a daily risk.

    The contract 'US x Iran ceasefire continues through [date]?' pays if no US air or missile strike lands in Iran by that date, so its price S is the market's chance of no strike by then. For two dates, 1 − S₂/S₁ is the chance of a first strike between them given none before, and 1 − (S₂/S₁)^(1/days) its average daily rate. The curve starts at the latest contract that resolved Yes, and uses only contracts with at least $100k traded. The legs are never multiplied: both load on 3 November.

  • Funds
    Changes since the war began.

    Changes are on Yahoo Finance's adjusted closes (total return), from the last session before the war (27 Feb 2026) and before the 28 Sep shift (25 Sep 2026) to 16 Nov 2026. Brent front-month futures are shown for context; EIA's Brent and WTI spot are not displayed.

  • Reserve
    A reporting line, not a stop.

    The 252.4 mb line is the floor of the limited-drawdown authority (EPCA §161(h)). Exchanges and sales under a presidential finding (§161(d)) are not bound by it, so the page reads it as a reporting line, not a stop.

  • Calendar
    Two weekly anchors.

    Stocks are Friday-ending report weeks; retail prices are Monday survey dates. Each is placed on a complete weekly calendar of its own anchor before any change is taken; a week EIA did not publish stays empty and is listed in the gaps.

  • Basis
    One basis: EIA's weekly survey.

    The September report quoted pump prices from AAA's daily national average; this page tracks EIA's weekly survey and states every line on it. The $4.50 line is the survey's own peak between the April ceasefire and the June memorandum — $4.500 on 11 May 2026 — and the ceasefire's $4.12 is the survey's $4.120 of 6 Apr 2026; both equal the September report’s figures at the cent, so the tests compare EIA with EIA. The log's note that AAA ran about 15¢ above EIA compared AAA on 10 Sep with EIA on 7 Sep, three days apart in a week the survey rose, and is not used as a spread between the two.

  • Grid
    Products of two judgements.

    The cells assume the Committee's decision and the oil path are independent: each is the product of two of the author's judgements, and a decision that reacts to the oil path breaks the assumption. The joint cell is the product of the FOMC row and the oil column, rounded; the reopening column is the hollow deal plus the genuine deal. The September report’s grid exhibit E23 (edition of 15 Sep) prints the 14 September column weights in its header but the 13 September cell values in its cells, and §4.2's prose still quotes 28% and 19%; the cells re-derived on 14 September are those in the price-target script and in the products shown here.

  • Status
    How tests are scored.

    crossed — the threshold condition holds on the latest observation (for a run, on each of the last n); closing — not crossed, the series has printed since the September report's data date (11 September 2026), and the gap to the threshold is half or less of the gap on that date; not crossed — otherwise; pending — the observable is dated in the future or no page of this site carries it yet; not tracked here — an event, or subscription data this site does not display. Colours flag attention, not good or bad news for the book.

  • Verdict
    How the verdict word is set.

    The verdict word is set by rule on every update: resolved — the log records the thesis as resolved; tested — a trigger of the falsifier table has crossed and the log has not yet closed the theme; under pressure — the log marks the theme closing, or a falsifier trigger is closing; holding — otherwise. The words of the verdict restate a passage of the logged claim, which this update checks is in the log.

  • Odds
    Logged, not revised.

    Odds come only from the September report's documents and are kept in a dated file, one row per revision with the reason and the source document; this site never revises them. Each path states its basis: market-implied (a quoted market price), model (a documented model of this site's own) or the author's judgement (a dated assessment anchored to the quoted evidence). Only market-implied and model odds are drawn as odds; the author's judgement is shown in the folded record of each set, labelled with the date it was made.

  • Terms
    The words of the view.

    · · · · · · · · · · .

  • Licences
    What is not displayed.

    Brent and WTI spot prices are not displayed: EIA attributes its spot series to Refinitiv (LSEG) and display rights are unresolved. Brent front-month futures are shown from Yahoo Finance, with attribution, under the site's decision of 21 Sep 2026. Transit counts from Windward, Kpler and Lloyd's List, ship-to-ship volumes, Iranian loadings, tanker rates and war-risk premiums are paid data; they appear only as dated quotations. IMF PortWatch's satellite count is shown under the IMF's data terms, with attribution. Polymarket's prices are traded prices, shown with the venue and the time they were read; they are not forecasts and this site does not revise them.

  • Documents
    Where the view was argued.
    • the September 2026 report · §3.1 Hormuz — the endgame, laid out as a decision problem · 13 Sept 2026
    • research note: Iran runway (13 Sep 2026) · §0, §14 the two clocks, §15 answer · 13 Sept 2026
    • research note: Hormuz logistics (13 Sep 2026) · how the oil moves; China's supply order · 13 Sept 2026
    • research note: Oman postponement spr (14 Sep 2026) · §A the Oman meeting; §B a second SPR release · 14 Sept 2026
    • research note: Discussions and decisions (13 Sep 2026) · §5a round 5 — the probability revision · 14 Sept 2026
    • the September 2026 report (as published on 15 Sep) · §3.1.6 the strategic reserve; §3.1.7 decision matrix; §3.1.8 plan by branch · 15 Sept 2026
Source: Macro Review; EIA, IMF PortWatch, Polymarket, Yahoo Finance and BLS attributions as citedthemes.hormuz-13

Before you read

Macro Review is a personal research site, still being built.

Nothing on it is investment advice, a recommendation or a solicitation.

Check every figure for yourself. Each names its publisher — confirm it there before you rely on it.

Figures can be revised, delayed or wrong.

Cones, fans, scenarios, fair values and “what followed” tables are conditional on the model each page names: they describe, they do not predict.

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