Diesel futures are 16.4% below their close before Washington allowed Russian diesel imports
Washington eased sanctions on Russian diesel and asked Kyiv to spare Russia's refineries. Moscow kept striking Ukraine's grid, and Kyiv resumed refinery strikes on 15 October.Is the refinery war still tightening diesel, and who runs out of runway first?
Diesel futures are 16.4% below their close before Washington allowed Russian diesel imports
Is the refinery war still tightening diesel, and who runs out of runway first?- The refinery, not the licence, caps Russian diesel, and Kyiv's strike pause is the variable: tested (said 14 Oct 2026).→ Exhibit 2
- Diesel futures closed 16.4% below their 8 Oct level on 16 Nov, while Brent futures fell 11.4%.→ Exhibit 6
- US distillate stocks fell to 103.3 mb in the week to 6 Nov, the lowest for the week since records began in 1982.→ Exhibit 7
- Kyiv struck the Ryazan refinery on 15 Oct after pausing refinery strikes, and Russia had struck Ukraine's grid throughout the pause.→ Exhibit 12
- Traders price a ceasefire agreement by 31 Dec at 11.5%, down from 17.5% at the 14 Oct close.→ Exhibit 14
| What would change this view | Trigger | Today | Decided by |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kyiv breaks the truce | a Ukrainian strike on a Russian refinery or terminal after 11 Oct | Kyiv struck the Ryazan refinery on 15 Oct after its pause; Zelensky: “The block is out. We're done.”crossed | the Ukrainian General Staff's strike claims; Ryazan, 15 Oct 2026 |
| The market leaves its slow hazard | a ceasefire agreement by 31 Dec priced above 35% or below 10% | 11.5% (15 Nov 2026); 17.5% at the 14 Oct 2026 close | the venue's daily close; the contract resolves on 31 Dec 2026 |
| Washington acts on the Graham Act | Graham Act duties imposed, or a waiver signed | Waived: Executive Order 14436 of 16 Oct sets out the section 112 and 113 duties and waives them under section 115, two days before the deadline. No Graham Act duty applies.crossed | the Graham Act deadline, about 18 Oct 2026 |
| Russia decides its export ban | a decree lifting the export ban beyond 0.5 Mt, or extending it | Extended: on 31 Oct Russia's government extended the ban on diesel exports by producers to 31 Jan 2027, with exemptions for some suppliers. The ban was not lifted beyond 0.5 Mt.crossed | Russia's export-ban review, 31 Oct 2026 |
The reasoning behind each point
- VerdictThe refinery, not the licence, caps Russian diesel, and Kyiv's strike pause is the variable: tested (said 14 Oct 2026).
The claim was written on 14 Oct 2026 and is quoted in full in the thesis card. The verdict is “tested”: a test of the falsifier table has crossed. The scorecard sets what the log said against what has happened since.
- LicenceDiesel futures closed 16.4% below their 8 Oct level on 16 Nov, while Brent futures fell 11.4%.
ULSD futures fell 3.0% on the day the licence was issued and has not recovered. The crack between diesel and Brent narrowed from $100.8 to $79.0 a barrel.
- StocksUS distillate stocks fell to 103.3 mb in the week to 6 Nov, the lowest for the week since records began in 1982.
The 2021–25 range for the same week runs from 106.6 to 123.7 mb. Days of supply, stocks over four weeks of US use, are 26.2, against a range of 26.4 to 30.6.
- TruceKyiv struck the Ryazan refinery on 15 Oct after pausing refinery strikes, and Russia had struck Ukraine's grid throughout the pause.
The energy ceasefire of 11 Oct was a US declaration that neither government confirmed. Russia hit six energy sites on 11–12 Oct and all three Kyiv heat-and-power plants on the night of 13–14 Oct.
- OddsTraders price a ceasefire agreement by 31 Dec at 11.5%, down from 17.5% at the 14 Oct close.
The baseline quoted 20.5% on 14 Oct, an intraday price. The 30 Jun 2027 contract stands at 53.5%, so the market prices a ceasefire for 2027 rather than this year.
Next: Oil and diesel reserves — the diesel stocks it is draining
Exhibit 2 · Each path and test of the diesel-war call, with its verdict
The view is tested: the word follows a rule set out in the Appendix, from the log and the tests above, never by hand.
About this exhibit
Exhibit 3 · The diesel-war call as written
The refinery, not the licence, caps Russian diesel, and Kyiv's strike pause is the variable — tested
The refinery, not the licence, caps Russian diesel: Kyiv's strike pause is the variable that moves it. Energy targets are a monitored repeated game inside a two-level game with a US diesel clock. Ukraine's runway is the shortest, Russia's fiscal clock is slow, and America's flips on 3 November.
General License 135 (9 Oct) sets no volume and runs to 7 April 2027; Russia freed 500 kt from its diesel export ban on 10 Oct. The energy ceasefire of 11 Oct was a US declaration that neither government confirmed: Kyiv paused refinery strikes under US pressure while Russia kept striking Ukraine's grid. Diesel futures gave back the licence's dip within two sessions. The tests are events on the record and the market's ceasefire term structure, never the diesel price alone.
- the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c what was published, announced and implemented; §5a diesel · 14 Oct 2026
- the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6c the monitored repeated game; §6e calendar; §6f market-implied odds · 14 Oct 2026
- the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §8.3 the Russia–Ukraine page; §8.5 tests RU-1 to RU-8; §9 source conflicts · 14 Oct 2026
- the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary (RU-1 crossed on 15 Oct); §1 pages · 17 Oct 2026
- the site's specification for this page · §3 Russia–Ukraine: the diesel war · 17 Oct 2026
About this exhibit
Crude and European gas rose more than diesel after the licence
Did the licence move diesel?Exhibit 1 · Diesel futures' premium over Brent futures, with key events shaded
About this exhibit
Exhibit 4 · Weekly retail diesel and gasoline prices against diesel's record
About this exhibit
Exhibit 6 · Changes in energy futures and equity funds after the licence
About this exhibit
Exhibit 5 · The diesel licence as published, as announced and as implemented
| What | Published · OFAC General License 135, 9 Oct (signed 2:43 pm EDT) | Announced · Trump, Truth Social | Implemented · Russia, to 14 Oct |
|---|---|---|---|
| Product | Diesel of Russian origin, including importation into the United States | Diesel | Diesel |
| Volume | None stated | Over 300 kt immediately, 500 kt in November, 1 Mt after, about 3 Mt later, depending on refinery condition | Export ban lifted for 500 kt on 10 Oct; about 3 Mt a month possible only after December (Novak) |
| Term | To 12:01 am EDT, 7 Apr 2027; no loading-date cut-off | Six months | Russia's own export-ban extension expires on 31 Oct |
| Carve-outs | No debits to US-bank accounts of Russia's central bank, wealth fund or finance ministry | – | – |
| Not covered | Sanctioned vessels, bunkering, the price cap and the 2022 Russian oil import ban; EU and UK bans unaffected | – | No cargo, buyer, vessel or port identified |
| Legal basis | OFAC licensing under the Russia sanctions regulations, not a Graham Act waiver | A big deal | Peskov (13 Oct): mutually beneficial and unrelated to Ukraine |
The physical limit. Russian refinery capacity, not the licence, sets the limit (IEA, 14 Oct). Russian diesel and gasoil exports were just under 0.6 Mt in September, a ten-year low (Atlantic Council, 13 Oct).
About this exhibit
US distillate stocks are the lowest for the week in records since 1982
How tight is the US diesel barrel, and how much of it leaves?Exhibit 7 · US distillate stocks against the same week's 2021–25 range
About this exhibit
Exhibit 8 · Days of US distillate supply against the same week's 2021–25 range
About this exhibit
Exhibit 9 · Latest week's US distillate output, use and trade
| Flow | Week | 4-week | Year ago |
|---|---|---|---|
| Distillate production, refiners and blenders | 5.09 | 5.16 | 4.72 |
| Distillate product supplied (US use) | 3.41 | 3.95 | 3.79 |
| Distillate exports | 1.20 | 1.31 | 1.26 |
| Distillate imports | 0.10 | 0.12 | 0.11 |
Over 4 weeks exports take 25% of US output and equal 33% of US use. Refineries ran at 95.2% of capacity in the week to 6 Nov 2026.
About this exhibit
Exhibit 10 · Four-week averages of US distillate output and use, exports and imports
About this exhibit
Exhibit 11 · Russia's refineries, exports and budget, as quoted
| What | As quoted | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Russian refinery runssubscription data | The IEA puts Russian June throughput at 3.8 mb/d against about 6.5 mb/d installed, the lowest in over 20 years, with diesel output down nearly 30%; EA Analytics has September processing at 3.98 mb/d (via Barchart, 13 Oct). | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c Ukraine's refinery campaign (IEA, 17 Sep) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| Refining capacity disabled, as claimedpublished data | Ukraine's defence ministry over 51% (4–5 Oct); its General Staff 45% (21 Sep); CFR up to 40%; the Dallas Fed as much as 60% over the summer. These measure damaged capacity, not lost throughput, and are not independently checked. | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §9 conflict 21 · 14 Oct 2026 |
| Russian diesel exportssubscription data | Diesel and gasoil exports just under 0.6 Mt in September, a ten-year low (Atlantic Council, 13 Oct); of the six main diesel-export refineries one is out of service and two run at a quarter of capacity (Maritime Executive via Atlantic Council). The deal could add $4.7bn of export income by year-end at current prices; the federal deficit is $62bn so far this year (Atlantic Council). | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2, exhibit 5 (Atlantic Council, 13 Oct) · 17 Oct 2026 |
| The licence's scalepublished data | At 7.45 barrels a tonne, 300 kt is about 2.24 mb, some 0.6 days of US distillate use; the announced 4.8 Mt is about 36 mb, or 200 kb/d to 7 April. Russia's 2025 diesel exports of 28.6 Mt were about 584 kb/d. | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c scale (derived at 7.45 bbl/t; TE via TradingView, 12 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| The world gasoil balancepublished data | Middle East and Russian gasoil net exports were 820 kb/d in September, down 1.3 mb/d and more than 60% on the year. The IEA: easing Russia's export restrictions “is unlikely to materially alter the global gasoil market balance”. | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a diesel (IEA OMR, 14 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| ICE gasoil futuressubscription data | A record settle of $1,568.25/t on 15 Sep, $1,329.50 on 6 Oct, $1,483.00 on 9 Oct and $1,451.50 on 13 Oct; the front-month spread halved from $90/t (15 Sep) to $44.25/t (14 Oct). | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a prices and cracks; other gauges (TradingView settlements) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| Urals and Russia's export revenuepublished data | August export revenue $13.9bn with Urals about $66 a barrel FOB, a discount of about 27% to Dated Brent; KSE's 2026 base case is $193bn. | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c Russian fiscal and FX clock (KSE, 5 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| Russia's budgetpublished data | BOFIT expects a 2026 deficit of RUB 8.6trn (4% of GDP); liquid wealth-fund assets about RUB 4trn at end-August; the central bank holds at 14%; USD/RUB 83.66 at the 13 Oct close. | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c Russian fiscal and FX clock (BOFIT 41/2026, 9 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| Markets on the deal, 8–13 Octsubscription data | NYMEX ULSD −3.0% on 9 Oct and ICE gasoil −5.0% on 12 Oct, both reversed on 13 Oct; IMOEX +3.9% on 9 Oct and the rouble +1.6%; Rheinmetall +2.0% and Leonardo +2.6%, so investors did not price a peace. | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c market reaction, 8–13 October (TradingView settlements) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| What analysts said of the licencesubscription data | Ritterbusch: “probably limited”, a slower pace of US distillate exports at most. ING: “strength has returned”. Goldman: Russian supply is “unlikely to significantly ease” fuel prices. | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a the GL 135 effect (DJ via TradingView, 12–13 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| EIA's diesel pathpublished data | EIA's October outlook has retail diesel at $5.81 in 4Q26, $4.92 in 1Q27 and $4.18 in 4Q27, on product flows that normalise. | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a other gauges (EIA STEO Table 2) · 14 Oct 2026 |
Kyiv's pause ended on 15 Oct, and Russia struck the grid throughout it
Who kept the , and who broke it?Exhibit 12 · Energy strikes and political moves by side
| Date | Side | What happened | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8 Jul 2026 | Russia | Russia bans diesel exports after Ukrainian strikes on its refineries | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §9 conflict 4 (IEA; ISW) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| 9 Oct 2026 | United States | Trump announces a diesel deal with Putin; OFAC issues General License 135, to 7 Apr 2027 | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (OFAC; ISW, 9 Oct) · 17 Oct 2026 |
| 9 Oct 2026 | Ukraine | Ukraine strikes a Yandex data centre in Kaluga and oil sites overnight | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (ISW, 9 Oct) · 17 Oct 2026 |
| 10 Oct 2026 | Russia | Russia permits 500,000 t of diesel exports, effective immediately | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (TASS via Kyiv Independent) · 17 Oct 2026 |
| 11 Oct 2026 | United States | Trump announces an energy ceasefire; neither government confirms it | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (ISW, 11 Oct; NPR via CFR) · 17 Oct 2026 |
| 11 Oct 2026 | Russia | Russia strikes six Ukrainian energy facilities on 11–12 Oct; 33 injured | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (Guardian via CFR, 12 Oct) · 17 Oct 2026 |
| 12 Oct 2026 | Ukraine | Kyiv pauses refinery strikes at Washington's request and offers a 60-day ceasefire, which the Kremlin rejects | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (Politico via Atlantic Council) · 17 Oct 2026 |
| 13 Oct 2026 | United States | Twelve senators call the deal a gift to our adversary and ask for the licence to be rescinded | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (Senate letter, 13 Oct) · 17 Oct 2026 |
| 14 Oct 2026 | Russia | Missile and drone strike on Kyiv on the night of 13–14 Oct: all three of its heat-and-power plants hit, 600,000 without power | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (Kyiv Independent; Meduza) · 17 Oct 2026 |
| 15 Oct 2026 | Ukraine | Zelensky: “The block is out. We're done.” Ukraine strikes the Ryazan refinery | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (FT via Meduza; AP) · 17 Oct 2026 |
| 15 Oct 2026 | Russia | The Kremlin says Ukraine's strikes never stopped and contradict US peace efforts | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (Meduza; ROIC) · 17 Oct 2026 |
| 15 Oct 2026 | Allies | IEA board: about 100 mb of the March action still to deliver, over 20 mb of it diesel, as soon as possible | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (IEA, via Political.org) · 17 Oct 2026 |
| 16 Oct 2026 | United States | A bill to block the diesel deal is introduced in Congress | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (Kyiv Independent, 16 Oct) · 17 Oct 2026 |
About this exhibit
Exhibit 13 · The tests of the diesel-war call that have a current reading
| Status | Test | Latest reading | Threshold or date | If crossed | Test source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| crossed | Kyiv breaks the truce: a Ukrainian strike on a Russian refinery or terminal after 11 October | Kyiv struck the Ryazan refinery on 15 Oct after its pause; Zelensky: “The block is out. We're done.”the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary; tab 2 strike log (FT via Meduza; AP) · 17 Oct 2026 | the event | The one-sided truce has ended: Kyiv's punishment is back, and the refinery war resumes. | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §8.5 RU-1 (observable: Ukrainian General Staff strike claims) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| crossed | The Graham Act: section 112 or 113 duties imposed, or a section 115 waiver | Waived: Executive Order 14436 of 16 Oct sets out the section 112 and 113 duties and waives them under section 115, two days before the deadline. No Graham Act duty applies.The White House, Executive Order 14436, 'Implementing the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026', 16 Oct 2026 (whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/10/implementing-the-lindsey-o-graham-sanctioning-russia-and-iran-act-of-2026/) · preamble and section 4: the duties set out and waived under section 115 · 17 Nov 2026 | Waived: Executive Order 14436 of 16 Oct sets out the section 112 and 113 duties and waives them under section 115, two days before the deadline. No Graham Act duty applies. | Duties imposed open the sanctions-escalation path; a waiver compounds the easing. | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §8.5 RU-4; §6e (about 18 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| crossed | Russia's decree at the 31 October export-ban expiry: the ban lifted beyond 0.5 Mt, or extended | Extended: on 31 Oct Russia's government extended the ban on diesel exports by producers to 31 Jan 2027, with exemptions for some suppliers. The ban was not lifted beyond 0.5 Mt.Government of the Russian Federation, statement of 31 Oct 2026 on the extension of the temporary ban on fuel exports by producers (as reported by Izvestia, Xinhua and Bloomberg, 31 Oct 2026; the decree itself not yet published that day) · the ban on diesel, marine fuel and gas oil exports by producers extended to 31 Jan 2027, with exemptions for some suppliers · 17 Nov 2026 | Extended: on 31 Oct Russia's government extended the ban on diesel exports by producers to 31 Jan 2027, with exemptions for some suppliers. The ban was not lifted beyond 0.5 Mt. | Tests the IEA's reading that capacity, not policy, binds Russian diesel. | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §8.5 RU-5; §6e (31 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| closing | A ceasefire agreement by 31 December priced above 35% or below 10% (Polymarket) | 11.5% (15 Nov 2026); 17.5% at the 14 Oct 2026 close | > 35.0% or < 10.0% | The market's slow, roughly constant monthly hazard has broken: above, a ceasefire is being priced for this year; below, it is not. | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §8.5 RU-7; §6f the slow-hazard reading · 14 Oct 2026 |
About this exhibit
Traders price a ceasefire agreement by 31 December at 11.5%
What do the ceasefire contracts price, and how deep are they?Exhibit 14 · Ceasefire-agreement prices by contract date, at the baseline and latest closes
About this exhibit
Exhibit 16 · Daily prices of the tracked ceasefire contracts, against the test band
About this exhibit
Exhibit 15 · Every open ceasefire contract's price and quote, volume traded and depth
| Contract | By | Close | Bid–ask | Traded | Depth | Flags |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ceasefire agreement | 30 Nov 2026 | 3.8% | 3.8–3.9% | $305k | $29k | long shot |
| Ceasefire agreement | 31 Dec 2026 | 11.5% | 11.0–12.0% | $3.50m | $93k | |
| Ceasefire agreement | 31 Jan 2027 | 19.5% | 20.0–21.0% | $253k | $67k | |
| Ceasefire agreement | 28 Feb 2027 | 26.5% | 24.0–26.0% | $53k | $40k | thin |
| Ceasefire agreement | 31 Mar 2027 | 35.5% | 35.0–36.0% | $388k | $89k | |
| Ceasefire agreement | 30 Apr 2027 | 42.5% | 42.0–43.0% | $86k | $29k | thin |
| Ceasefire agreement | 31 May 2027 | 50.5% | 51.0–52.0% | $141k | $60k | |
| Ceasefire agreement | 30 Jun 2027 | 53.5% | 53.0–55.0% | $186k | $83k | |
| Ceasefire agreement | 31 Jul 2027 | 57.5% | 57.0–58.0% | $9k | $46k | thin |
| Ceasefire agreement | 31 Aug 2027 | 59.5% | 59.0–61.0% | $18k | $42k | thin |
| Ceasefire agreement | 30 Sept 2027 | 62.5% | 62.0–63.0% | $8k | $43k | thin |
| Ceasefire agreement | 31 Oct 2027 | 65.5% | 65.0–66.0% | $78k | $54k | thin |
| Ceasefire agreement | 30 Nov 2027 | 65.5% | 65.0–66.0% | $12k | $52k | thin |
| Ceasefire agreement | 31 Dec 2027 | 69.5% | 69.0–70.0% | $63k | $108k | thin |
| Ten-day ceasefire in effect | 31 Dec 2026 | 6.9% | 6.7–6.8% | $2.03m | $107k | long shot |
| Ten-day ceasefire in effect | 31 Mar 2027 | 22.5% | 22.0–23.0% | $358k | $88k | |
| Ten-day ceasefire in effect | 31 Dec 2027 | 48.5% | 47.0–48.0% | $171k | $101k |
The rule of “Russia x Ukraine ceasefire agreement by...?”, as the venue states it
This market will resolve to “Yes” if there is a ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A ceasefire agreement refers to any mutually-agreed suspension of direct military engagement between Russia and Ukraine, which is either officially announced by both countries or confirmed by a consensus of credible reporting to have been mutually agreed by both countries.
A broader peace deal, normalization agreement, political framework, truce, or humanitarian pause will qualify if it includes a mutually agreed suspension of direct military engagement, to be effective on a specified date. Agreements that outline future negotiations or de-escalation measures without an explicit, dated commitment to stop fighting will not qualify.
Any form of informal understanding, backchannel communication, de-escalation without an announced agreement, or unilateral pause in hostilities will not be considered a ceasefire agreement.
Only agreements which constitute a general pause in the conflict will qualify. Agreements which only apply to specific conflict categories (e.g. restrictions on certain target categories or certain locations) will not qualify.
If a qualifying agreement is officially reached before this market’s end date, this market will resolve to “Yes,” regardless of whether the ceasefire agreement officially takes effect after that date.
The primary resolution sources for this market will be official information from the governments of Russia and Ukraine and a consensus of credible reporting.
The rule of “Russia x Ukraine Ceasefire by...?”, as the venue states it
This market will resolve to "Yes" if a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine goes into effect by 11:59 PM Eastern European Time (EET) on the specified date and remains continuously in effect for at least 10 calendar days. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A ceasefire refers to any mutually agreed suspension of direct military engagement between Russia and Ukraine, which is officially announced by both countries or confirmed by a consensus of credible reporting to have been mutually agreed by both countries, and which constitutes a general suspension of direct kinetic military engagement across the primary theater of the overall conflict. A broader peace deal, normalization agreement, political framework, truce, or humanitarian pause (including holiday ceasefires) will count provided they otherwise qualify under this market’s rules.
Any form of informal understanding, backchannel communication, de-escalation without an announced agreement, or unilateral pause in hostilities will not be considered a ceasefire. Agreements which only apply to specific conflict categories (e.g. restrictions on certain target categories or certain locations) will not qualify.
Any calendar day (EET) during which the ceasefire is in effect (including the first day of the ceasefire) will count towards the 10-day total. The required 10 day period will end at 11:59 PM EET on the 10th day (inclusive). If a qualifying ceasefire goes into effect prior to this market’s end date, this market will remain open until the ceasefire is no longer in effect, or until the 10 calendar days have been reached.
A ceasefire is considered no longer in effect when a consensus of credible reporting indicates the general suspension of hostilities has substantively ended across the primary theater. Temporary or technical lapses or expiration of a formal ceasefire term, isolated incidents, localized violations, or accusations alone will not invalidate the ceasefire provided the general suspension of hostilities across the primary theater continues. Where official government statements conflict with a consensus of credible field reporting, the reporting will take precedence over the government statements.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible sources.
Examples of qualifying Ceasefires:
April 8, 2026 US–Iran ceasefire: The United States and Iran publicly announced and implemented a mutually agreed ceasefire framework intended to broadly halt direct military hostilities between the two countries. Despite subsequent maritime confrontations, alleged violations, isolated retaliatory strikes, and disputes regarding compliance, the broader ceasefire framework continued to function and widescale fighting across the primary theater did not resume.
November 27, 2024 Israel–Hezbollah ceasefire: Israel and Hezbollah implemented a broadly operative ceasefire framework brokered through international mediators that substantially reduced hostilities across southern Lebanon and northern Israel, including the effective halt of Israel’s major ground offensive into Lebanon and a significant reduction in Hezbollah rocket fire. Although the ceasefire was not formally announced through a single joint declaration by both parties and public statements differed in framing and characterization, a consensus of credible reporting confirmed the arrangement had been mutually agreed and implemented in practice. Despite continued isolated strikes, alleged violations, and disputes regarding compliance, credible reporting broadly treated the ceasefire as remaining operational and widescale fighting across the primary theater of the conflict did not resume.
Examples of non qualifying Ceasefires:
November 24, 2023 Israel–Hamas humanitarian pause: Although it was a mutually agreed and publicly announced broad suspension of hostilities across Gaza, the ceasefire framework remained in effect for only approximately 7 days before wide-scale fighting resumed, failing the required 10-calendar-day duration requirement. Ceasefire violations prior to November 30, would not have invalidated the ceasefire.
July 22, 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative: Although Russia and Ukraine entered into internationally brokered agreements governing grain exports and reducing risks to commercial shipping in the Black Sea, the arrangement did not constitute a general suspension of direct military engagement across the primary theater of the war. Hostilities continued across Ukraine throughout the duration of the agreement and the arrangement applied only to specific categories of activity and geographic areas.
May 2023 Sudan ceasefires (SAF–RSF): Although the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) publicly agreed to multiple internationally brokered ceasefires, a consensus of credible reporting indicated that the general suspension of hostilities across the primary theater never substantively took effect and large-scale fighting broadly continued throughout the ceasefire periods. While some temporary reductions in violence and localized humanitarian access reportedly occurred in certain areas, artillery fire, airstrikes, urban combat, troop movements, and offensive operations continued across major parts of Sudan almost immediately after implementation. Credible reporting broadly treated the ceasefires as having failed or collapsed in practice despite technically remaining in force on paper.
About this exhibit
One path's trigger has fired: the refinery war resumes
Which path is under way, and what decides the next?Exhibit 17 · Five paths for the energy war
- One-sided truceUkraine pauses refinery strikes and Russia keeps striking the grid. A short dip in diesel; Russian export income rises.
- Mutual energy truceBoth sides stop striking energy targets. Diesel cracks ease as Russian refinery runs recover, and the licence's volumes become real.
- The refinery war resumes what happenedStrikes on refineries and power plants by both sides each week. Russian diesel exports stay near their low and Europe's diesel premium persists.
- Sanctions tightenWashington reverses the easing. Russian barrels are discounted further and shadow-fleet freight rises.
- General ceasefireA general stop to the fighting; an energy-only truce does not qualify. European defence shares fall, the rouble and central European assets rally, and diesel eases.
Each path is defined on an observable; no odds are logged for any of them. Only the general ceasefire has a traded contract, shown in the next set.
Exhibit 18 · A Russia–Ukraine ceasefire agreement by 31 December — the prediction market
Quoted 24 Oct 2026: a traded price, not a forecast.
Exhibit 19 · The site's scenario model prices none of the energy paths
Nothing is projected here. One-sided truce, Mutual energy truce, The refinery war resumes, Sanctions tighten and General ceasefire: no model on the site prices a diesel-supply path.
What each path would do to core PCE, unemployment and real GDP is read on Thematic impact, under Outlook.
About this exhibit
The tests waiting on a date, the dated record and the reconciliation
The tests that wait on a date or an event, the dated events, and the baseline's figures beside this page's
Exhibit 20 · The tests that wait on a date or an event
| Status | Test | Latest reading | Threshold or date | If crossed | Test source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| not tracked here | The truce becomes mutual: seven consecutive days with no Russian strike on Ukrainian energy | Russia struck Ukrainian energy sites on 11, 12 and 13–14 Oct (the dated log) | the event | Russia reciprocates: a mutual energy truce, and Russian refinery runs can recover. | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §8.5 RU-2 (observable: ISW, Ukrenergo) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| not tracked here | Washington withdraws the licence: OFAC revokes or amends General License 135 | in force to 7 Apr 2027; a bill to block the deal was introduced on 16 Oct | the event | The view that the licence survives to its sunset is wrong; sanctions tighten. | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §8.5 RU-3 · 14 Oct 2026 |
| pending | Diesel reaches the US: EIA's monthly distillate imports from Russia above zero | EIA's monthly imports by country are not read on this page; none from Russia since March 2022 (as quoted) | – | The view that the 2022 import ban blocks the US leg is wrong. | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §8.5 RU-6 · 14 Oct 2026 |
| not tracked here | Congress: the House discharge petition on the licence reaches 218 signatures | the petition's count is not read on this page | the event | The view that reversal risk is low before the vote is wrong. | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §8.5 RU-8 · 14 Oct 2026 |
Exhibit 21 · Dated events and scheduled decisions of the diesel war, with sources
- 8 Jul 2026Russia bans diesel exports after Ukrainian strikes on its refineries (the date the IEA and ISW give; another source has 31 January).
the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §9 conflict 4 · 14 Oct 2026
- 18 Sept 2026The Graham Act is signed: duties of up to 500% on Russian goods (section 112), up to 100% on the top buyers of Russian crude or gas (113), a presidential waiver (115).
the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c sanctions architecture; §1 table · 14 Oct 2026
- 5 Oct 2026Washington defers the federal diesel tax to 31 December.
the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §2 claims table (diesel-tax deferral, 5 Oct); §6e (31 Dec) · 14 Oct 2026
- 9 Oct 2026OFAC issues General License 135: Russian diesel, no volume stated, to 7 April 2027.
the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c GL 135 · 14 Oct 2026
- 10 Oct 2026Russia lifts its diesel export ban for 500 kt.
the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c GL 135, implemented column · 14 Oct 2026
- 11 Oct 2026Trump declares an energy ceasefire; Kyiv halts refinery strikes, and Russia hits Kharkiv's CHP-5 within hours.
the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c the 11 October energy ceasefire · 14 Oct 2026
- 12 Oct 2026The EU adds 1,569 sanctions listings; Germany says it remains committed to sanctions.
the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c sanctions architecture · 14 Oct 2026
- 13 Oct 2026Twelve senators of both parties ask for General License 135 to be rescinded.
the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c sanctions architecture (Axios, 13 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026
- 14 Oct 2026Russia hits all three Kyiv heat-and-power plants on the night of 13–14 October; 600,000 people lose power. The page's view is opened on the baseline.
the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c the 11 October energy ceasefire · 14 Oct 2026
- 15 Oct 2026Kyiv strikes the Ryazan refinery after its pause: the first test of the view is crossed.
the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary; tab 2 strike log (FT via Meduza; AP) · 17 Oct 2026
- 15 Oct 2026The IEA board says about 100 mb of the March collective action remains to deliver, over 20 mb of it diesel.
the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §4 finding 2 · 17 Oct 2026
- 16 Oct 2026A bill to block the diesel deal is introduced in Congress.
the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (Kyiv Independent, 16 Oct) · 17 Oct 2026
- 16 Oct 2026Executive Order 14436 sets out the Graham Act's duties and waives them under section 115, two days before the deadline.
The White House, Executive Order 14436, 'Implementing the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026', 16 Oct 2026 (whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/10/implementing-the-lindsey-o-graham-sanctioning-russia-and-iran-act-of-2026/) · preamble and section 4: the duties set out and waived under section 115 · 17 Nov 2026
- 18 Oct 2026The Graham Act's section 112 deadline: impose the duties or waive them.
the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6e calendar (Axios, 13 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026
- 24 Oct 2026A possible Witkoff–Kushner trip to Moscow, by about this date (unverified).
the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6e calendar (Moscow Times, 10 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026
- 31 Oct 2026Russia's diesel export-ban extension expires; the 31 October ceasefire contracts resolve.
the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6e calendar · 14 Oct 2026
- 31 Oct 2026Russia extends its ban on diesel exports by producers to 31 January 2027, with exemptions for some suppliers.
Government of the Russian Federation, statement of 31 Oct 2026 on the extension of the temporary ban on fuel exports by producers (as reported by Izvestia, Xinhua and Bloomberg, 31 Oct 2026; the decree itself not yet published that day) · the ban on diesel, marine fuel and gas oil exports by producers extended to 31 Jan 2027, with exemptions for some suppliers · 17 Nov 2026
- 3 Nov 2026US midterm elections: America's diesel clock flips, and Congress gains a vehicle.
the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6c runways; §6e calendar · 14 Oct 2026
- 6 Nov 2026Russia's finance ministry ends its foreign-currency purchase window, a fiscal gauge.
the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6e calendar (ISW, 6 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026
- 31 Dec 2026The year-end ceasefire contracts resolve; the federal diesel-tax deferral ends. scheduled
the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6e calendar · 14 Oct 2026
- 7 Apr 2027General License 135 expires. scheduled
the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6e calendar (OFAC) · 14 Oct 2026
About this exhibit
Exhibit 22 · Figures from the October research notes, checked against live data
| Figure | As printed | This page | Status | Note and source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Retail diesel's record, 21 Sep 2026 ($/gal) | 6.529 | 6.529 | reproduced | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §1 key takeaways (EIA) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| Retail diesel, 5 Oct 2026 ($/gal) | 6.199 | 6.199 | reproduced | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §1 what changed (EIA) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| Diesel less gasoline at retail, 5 Oct 2026 ($/gal) | 1.85 | 1.85 | reproduced | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a other gauges (derived) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| Diesel less gasoline at retail, 21 Sep 2026 ($/gal) | 2.05 | 2.05 | reproduced | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a other gauges (derived) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| US distillate stocks, week to 2 Oct 2026 (mb) | 105.1 mb | 105.1 mb | reproduced | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a why diesel is tight (EIA WPSR) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| US distillate stocks below a year earlier, week to 2 Oct 2026 (mb) | 16.4 mb | 16.4 mb | reproduced | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a why diesel is tight (EIA WPSR) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| US distillate exports, week to 2 Oct 2026 (mb/d) | 1.764 mb/d | 1.764 mb/d | reproduced | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a why diesel is tight (EIA) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| US distillate stocks against the five-year average, week to 2 Oct 2026 (%) | −12.0% | −11.3% | differs | EIA's own five-year average; on this page's same-ISO-week average of 2021–25 the gap is the figure shown. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a why diesel is tight (EIA WPSR summary) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| US distillate stocks, week to 9 Oct 2026 (mb) | 102.6 mb | 102.6 mb | reproduced | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary (EIA) · 17 Oct 2026 |
| US distillate stocks against the 2021–25 same-week average, week to 9 Oct 2026 (%) | −11% | −11% | reproduced | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary · 17 Oct 2026 |
| First year of EIA's weekly distillate record, the 'since' of the lowest-for-the-week claim | 1982 | 1982 | reproduced | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary ('lowest for the week since … 1982') · 17 Oct 2026 |
| Refinery utilisation, week to 9 Oct 2026 (%) | 93.5% | 93.5% | reproduced | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary (EIA) · 17 Oct 2026 |
| Distillate exports, 4-week average to 9 Oct 2026 (mb/d) | 1.5 mb/d | 1.5 mb/d | reproduced | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary (EIA) · 17 Oct 2026 |
| Exports' share of US distillate output, 4-week averages to 9 Oct 2026 (%) | 29% | 29% | reproduced | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary · 17 Oct 2026 |
| Exports' share of US distillate use, 4-week averages to 9 Oct 2026 (%) | 38% | 38% | reproduced | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary · 17 Oct 2026 |
| NY Harbor ULSD futures, 8 Oct to 16 Oct 2026 (%) | 0.3% | 0.3% | reproduced | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary (Yahoo Finance) · 17 Oct 2026 |
| Brent futures, 8 Oct to 16 Oct 2026 (%) | 5.4% | 5.4% | reproduced | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary (Yahoo Finance) · 17 Oct 2026 |
| WTI futures, 8 Oct to 16 Oct 2026 (%) | 10.8% | 10.8% | reproduced | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary (Yahoo Finance) · 17 Oct 2026 |
| TTF gas futures, 8 Oct to 16 Oct 2026 (%) | 11.0% | 11.0% | reproduced | the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary (Yahoo Finance) · 17 Oct 2026 |
| NYMEX ULSD futures on the day of the licence, 9 Oct 2026 (%) | −3.0% | −3.0% | reproduced | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c market reaction, 8–13 October (TradingView settlements) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| NYMEX ULSD futures over the two sessions after the licence, 8 to 12 Oct 2026 (%) | −3.3% | −3.3% | reproduced | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a the GL 135 effect (TradingView settlements) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| NYMEX ULSD futures on 13 Oct 2026, as the truce failed (%) | 4.5% | 4.5% | reproduced | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a the GL 135 effect (DJ via TradingView) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| ULSD and Brent futures settlements, 6 Oct 2026 | 4.569 | 4.569 | reproduced | Brent 100.58 as printed, 100.58 here. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a prices and cracks (TradingView) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| ULSD and Brent futures settlements, 8 Oct 2026 | 4.883 | 4.883 | reproduced | Brent 104.28 as printed, 104.28 here. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a prices and cracks (TradingView) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| ULSD and Brent futures settlements, 9 Oct 2026 | 4.738 | 4.738 | reproduced | Brent 104.72 as printed, 104.72 here. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a prices and cracks (TradingView) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| ULSD and Brent futures settlements, 12 Oct 2026 | 4.723 | 4.723 | reproduced | Brent 106.65 as printed, 106.65 here. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a prices and cracks (TradingView) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| ULSD and Brent futures settlements, 13 Oct 2026 | 4.934 | 4.934 | reproduced | Brent 105.69 as printed, 105.69 here. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a prices and cracks (TradingView) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| ULSD futures settlement, 15 Sep 2026 ($/gal) | 5.010 | 5.262 | differs | Brent's 108.75 matches; the ULSD figure the baseline printed is not the front month's close on Yahoo, so its crack (101.7) is not this page's. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a prices and cracks (TradingView) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| ULSD futures settlement, 23 Feb 2026 ($/gal) | 2.519 | 2.678 | differs | Brent's 71.76 of 20 Feb matches; the ULSD figure does not, so the pre-war crack (34.7) is not this page's. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a prices and cracks (TradingView; the pre-war row) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| The ULSD crack against Brent futures, 13 Oct 2026 ($/bbl) | 101.6 | 101.6 | reproduced | the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a prices and cracks (derived) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| Ceasefire agreement by 31 Oct 2026, as priced on 14 Oct 2026 (%) | 6.5% | – | differs | the baseline read an intraday price; this page reads the venue's close of the UTC day. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6f market-implied odds (Gamma API, time of day not recorded) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| Ceasefire agreement by 31 Dec 2026, as priced on 14 Oct 2026 (%) | 20.5% | 17.5% | differs | the baseline read an intraday price; this page reads the venue's close of the UTC day. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6f market-implied odds (Gamma API, time of day not recorded) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| Ceasefire agreement by 31 Mar 2027, as priced on 14 Oct 2026 (%) | 38.5% | 31.5% | differs | the baseline read an intraday price; this page reads the venue's close of the UTC day. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6f market-implied odds (Gamma API, time of day not recorded) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| Ceasefire agreement by 30 Jun 2027, as priced on 14 Oct 2026 (%) | 52.5% | 49.5% | differs | the baseline read an intraday price; this page reads the venue's close of the UTC day. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6f market-implied odds (Gamma API, time of day not recorded) · 14 Oct 2026 |
| Ceasefire agreement by 31 Dec 2026, as priced on 17 Oct (%) | 11.5% | 13.5% | differs | the prototype read the venue later on 17 Oct; at this page's read of that day, 15:49 UTC, the bid and ask were 12.0% and 13.0% with a last trade of 12.0%, and the close of 16 Oct 2026 is 13.5%. the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary · 17 Oct 2026 |
| The day Kyiv paused refinery strikes | – | – | sources differ | 11 Oct in the baseline; 12 Oct in the prototype's strike log (Politico via Atlantic Council). The page names neither length for the pause. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c implemented on one side only (Kyiv Independent, 13 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026 |
About this exhibit
The Appendix
The model, the data, the checks and the sources87 checks, all pass
The page reads EIA's weekly distillate balance and retail survey, Yahoo Finance's front-month futures and fund closes, and Polymarket's ceasefire contracts, and calculates the crack, the range for the week, days of supply and the changes since the licence. Paid data on Russia's refineries, exports and the gasoil market appear only as dated quotations with their sources.
Exhibit 23 · Definitions
- PageWhat the page reads.
The page reads EIA's weekly distillate balance and retail survey, Yahoo Finance's front-month futures and fund closes, and Polymarket's ceasefire contracts, and calculates the crack, the range for the week, days of supply and the changes since the licence. Paid data on Russia's refineries, exports and the gasoil market appear only as dated quotations with their sources.
- CalendarFour calendars.
Stocks and flows are Friday-ending report weeks; retail prices are Monday survey dates; futures and funds are completed sessions on their exchanges' calendars; the contracts are the last price of each completed UTC day. A week EIA did not publish stays empty.
- CrackDiesel against Brent, per barrel.
The crack is calculated on this site from two displayed levels: NY Harbor ULSD futures in dollars a gallon times 42, less Brent futures in dollars a barrel, on every session both front months closed. Each futures line is Yahoo Finance's continuous front month, which moves to the next contract when the front one expires: NY Harbor ULSD on the last business day of the month before delivery, Brent on the last business day of the second month before it. The two legs therefore roll on different days and usually price different delivery months; the crack is not adjusted for the roll. Against Dated Brent, which trades above futures in this shock, the crack would be lower.
- RangeThe range for the week.
The 2021–25 range for the week is the lowest and highest value in the same ISO week of each of the five years; a week that some year lacks is left empty. 'Lowest for the week since' compares the latest week with the same ISO week of every earlier year in EIA's record, which begins in 1982. Days of supply are the week's stocks over the 4-week average of product supplied.
- ContractsThe ceasefire prices.
A contract's price is the last trade of each completed UTC day on Polymarket's price history; the day in progress when the history was read is left out. A contract with under $100k traded is flagged thin, and a price under 10% or over 90% a long shot, where the favourite–longshot bias is largest. The agreement contract settles on a general ceasefire agreed by both sides; an energy-only truce does not qualify.
- StatusHow a test is scored.
crossed — the threshold holds on the latest observation, or the dated log records the event with its source; closing — not crossed, and the gap to the threshold has halved since the day the view was opened (14 October 2026); not crossed — otherwise; pending — dated in the future, or read from a series this page does not take; not tracked here — an event the record does not yet show. Colours flag attention, not good or bad news.
- VerdictHow the verdict word is set.
The verdict word is set by rule on every update: resolved — the log records the thesis as resolved; tested — a trigger of the falsifier table has crossed and the log has not yet closed the theme; under pressure — the log marks the theme closing, or a falsifier trigger is closing; holding — otherwise. The words of the verdict restate a passage of the logged claim, which this update checks is in the log.
- OddsTraded prices only.
Odds come only from traded prices: the market-implied set carries the venue's price on each dated revision, with its source, and the log never revises a row. The five paths are defined on observables and carry no odds; none are the author's.
- CopiesNothing copied.
This page copies no other page of the site: every live number is calculated here from the publishers' files named under Data.
- TermsThe words of the view.
· · · · .
- LicencesWhat is not displayed.
Brent and WTI spot prices are not displayed: EIA attributes its spot series to Refinitiv (LSEG). The futures shown are Yahoo Finance's front-month closes. ICE gasoil, Urals, Russian refinery runs and export volumes are subscription or press data; they appear only as dated quotations.
How the numbers are made
eia_weekly ──▶ each series on a complete weekly calendar of its own anchor (Friday stocks and flows, Monday prices); Table 1 against the workbooks; the same ISO week of 2021–25 for the range; days of supply as stocks over the 4-week mean of US use; the lowest-for-the-week year from the whole history ──▶ the diesel balance yahoo_closes ──▶ the crack as ULSD × 42 less Brent on every session both front months closed; each futures and fund change since the eve of the licence and since the pre-war close ──▶ the futures and funds polymarket_history ──▶ each contract's last price of every completed UTC day; the term structure on 14 Oct and on the last completed day, flagged thin under $100k traded and a long shot under 10% or over 90% ──▶ the ceasefire contracts the diesel balance + the futures and funds + the ceasefire contracts + dated_file ──▶ the tests evaluated on the data and the dated record; tiles, takeaways, the falsifier, the verdict and the scorecard written from the numbers; the reproduction checks (validate, check, publish) ──▶ the data the page reads
Sources
- publicU.S. Energy Information Administration, Weekly Petroleum Status Report, Table 1 (U.S. petroleum balance sheet)
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration · https://ir.eia.gov/wpsr/table1.csv
- publicU.S. Energy Information Administration, petroleum weekly history: distillate stocks, production, product supplied, exports and imports, refinery utilisation; retail diesel and regular gasoline
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration · https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist_xls/
- licensedYahoo Finance chart API: NY Harbor ULSD, Brent, WTI and Dutch TTF front-month futures (closes); EZU, EWG, EPOL, EUAD and ITA (adjusted closes)
Source: Yahoo Finance · https://query2.finance.yahoo.com/v8/finance/chart/
- publicPolymarket, Gamma and CLOB APIs: the Russia x Ukraine ceasefire-agreement and ceasefire events, every open date contract with its daily price history
Source: Polymarket · https://gamma-api.polymarket.com/events
- computed hereMiddle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) and the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype (17 Oct 2026): the dated log's tests, events, the strike log and quotations of Kpler, LSEG, Argus, ICE, IEA, KSE, BOFIT and the press
The site's own research, Macro Review
Pages this one copies from
| Page | Title | Updated | Data to | Arrays | Values | Source checks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Range and scenarios | Projections | 2026-11-17 | 16 Nov 2026 | 0 | 2 | 80 pass |
| Transmission | Transmission | 2026-11-17 | Oct 2026 | 0 | 0 | 67 pass |
Reproduction checks
| Check | Published | Computed | Tolerance | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The crack equals ULSD × 42 less Brent on every session both front months closed (1478 sessions; max |Δ|, $/bbl) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The crack is computed only on sessions both legs closed: none on a session only one leg traded (0 such sessions on the chart; violations) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Every market in the table closed on the eve of the licence (8 Oct 2026; markets without that session) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Every market in the table runs to the same last session (16 Nov 2026; markets that stop earlier) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The odds are completed UTC days only: the last day on the chart (15 Nov 2026) is before the day the history was read (16 Nov 2026; days on or after it) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Each of the 6 drawn contracts is a market of its named event, with a daily history and the resolution day its label states (contracts that are not: none) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Every open date contract of the agreement event carries the same resolution rule, printed once (distinct rules beyond one) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Every open date contract of the ceasefire event carries the same resolution rule, printed once (distinct rules beyond one) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Each contract's flags follow the stated rules: thin below $100k traded, a long shot below 10% or above 90% (17 contracts; flags that do not) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Every contract's latest close is a completed UTC day before the read on 16 Nov 2026 (contracts on or after it) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Each date the baseline quoted on 14 Oct is a contract of the agreement event (4 dates; not found: none; 31 Oct 2026 has since closed, resolved No by the venue; the 14 Oct 2026 baseline predates the raw archive (D-2026-10-24-TH2)) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The logged market price of 17 Oct 2026: its source names the read of its own date (data/raw/polymarket_geo/2026-10-17; rows that differ) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The logged market price of 17 Oct 2026 equals the venue's close of 16 Oct 2026 (UTC) in the read of its own date, data/raw/polymarket_geo/2026-10-17 (13.5%; points) | 13.5 | 13.5 | 0.05 | pass |
| The logged market price of 17 Oct 2026 is the last completed UTC day of its own read (16 Oct 2026; read 17 Oct 2026; days between) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The logged market price of 24 Oct 2026: its source names the read of its own date (data/raw/polymarket_geo/2026-10-24; rows that differ) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The logged market price of 24 Oct 2026 equals the venue's close of 23 Oct 2026 (UTC) in the read of its own date, data/raw/polymarket_geo/2026-10-24 (20.5%; points) | 20.5 | 20.5 | 0.05 | pass |
| The logged market price of 24 Oct 2026 is the last completed UTC day of its own read (23 Oct 2026; read 24 Oct 2026; days between) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The logged 14 Oct revision is the baseline's quoted price for 31 Dec (market_quotes; points; the 14 Oct 2026 baseline predates the raw archive (D-2026-10-24-TH2)) | 20.5 | 20.5 | 0 | pass |
| The odds tile's value equals the 31 Dec agreement series' latest close (points) | 11.5 | 11.5 | 0 | pass |
| EIA Table 1 (week to 6 Nov 2026) equals the history workbooks for distillate stocks and distillate product supplied — current, prior and year-ago weeks (6 values; mismatches) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Table 1: the week's distillate stock change equals current less prior week (mb) | 4.071 | 4.071 | 0.002 | pass |
| The workbooks run to Table 1's week (weeks between the latest workbook week and Table 1's) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Table 1 is for the latest completed report week (days from week end to fetch date, at most 13) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The 'lowest for the week' year is the same found two ways — by grouping ISO weeks and year by year (none and none; differ) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The 2021–25 range for the week (45) equals the minimum and maximum of the five same-week values (max |Δ|, mb) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Days of supply (6 Nov 2026) equal the week's stocks over the 4-week mean of product supplied (days) | 26.178 | 26.178 | 0 | pass |
| The prototype's rule run on this build's own files gives the page's figures (11 figures; max abs difference) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The prototype's figures are read from the raw files of its own date, 17 Oct 2026: their EIA week is the 9 Oct 2026 its labels name (9 Oct 2026 in data/raw/eia/2026-10-17; days apart) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The prototype's futures moves end on the 16 Oct 2026 session its labels name, in data/raw/yahoo_geo/2026-10-17 (futures ending on another session) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Reproduced: Retail diesel's record, 21 Sep 2026 ($/gal) — 6.529 as printed in the baseline (§1 key takeaways (EIA); tolerance 0.0005; the 14 Oct 2026 baseline predates the raw archive (D-2026-10-24-TH2)) | 6.529 | 6.529 | 0.001 | pass |
| Reproduced: Retail diesel, 5 Oct 2026 ($/gal) — 6.199 as printed in the baseline (§1 what changed (EIA); tolerance 0.0005; the 14 Oct 2026 baseline predates the raw archive (D-2026-10-24-TH2)) | 6.199 | 6.199 | 0.001 | pass |
| Reproduced: Diesel less gasoline at retail, 5 Oct 2026 ($/gal) — 1.85 as printed in the baseline (§5a other gauges (derived); tolerance 0.0051; the 14 Oct 2026 baseline predates the raw archive (D-2026-10-24-TH2)) | 1.85 | 1.845 | 0.005 | pass |
| Reproduced: Diesel less gasoline at retail, 21 Sep 2026 ($/gal) — 2.05 as printed in the baseline (§5a other gauges (derived); tolerance 0.0051; the 14 Oct 2026 baseline predates the raw archive (D-2026-10-24-TH2)) | 2.05 | 2.051 | 0.005 | pass |
| Reproduced: US distillate stocks, week to 2 Oct 2026 (mb) — 105.1 mb as printed in the baseline (§5a why diesel is tight (EIA WPSR); tolerance 0.051; the 14 Oct 2026 baseline predates the raw archive (D-2026-10-24-TH2)) | 105.1 | 105.138 | 0.051 | pass |
| Reproduced: US distillate stocks below a year earlier, week to 2 Oct 2026 (mb) — 16.4 mb as printed in the baseline (§5a why diesel is tight (EIA WPSR); tolerance 0.051; the 14 Oct 2026 baseline predates the raw archive (D-2026-10-24-TH2)) | 16.4 | 16.421 | 0.051 | pass |
| Reproduced: US distillate exports, week to 2 Oct 2026 (mb/d) — 1.764 mb/d as printed in the baseline (§5a why diesel is tight (EIA); tolerance 0.0005; the 14 Oct 2026 baseline predates the raw archive (D-2026-10-24-TH2)) | 1.764 | 1.764 | 0.001 | pass |
| Reproduced: US distillate stocks, week to 9 Oct 2026 (mb) — 102.6 mb as printed in the prototype (§0 summary (EIA); tolerance 0.051, from the raw files of 17 Oct 2026) | 102.6 | 102.611 | 0.051 | pass |
| Reproduced: US distillate stocks against the 2021–25 same-week average, week to 9 Oct 2026 (%) — -11% as printed in the prototype (§0 summary; tolerance 0.51, from the raw files of 17 Oct 2026) | -11 | -11.138 | 0.51 | pass |
| Reproduced: First year of EIA's weekly distillate record, the 'since' of the lowest-for-the-week claim — 1982year as printed in the prototype (§0 summary ('lowest for the week since … 1982'); tolerance 0, from the raw files of 17 Oct 2026) | 1982 | 1982 | 0 | pass |
| Reproduced: Refinery utilisation, week to 9 Oct 2026 (%) — 93.5% as printed in the prototype (§0 summary (EIA); tolerance 0.051, from the raw files of 17 Oct 2026) | 93.5 | 93.5 | 0.051 | pass |
| Reproduced: Distillate exports, 4-week average to 9 Oct 2026 (mb/d) — 1.5 mb/d as printed in the prototype (§0 summary (EIA); tolerance 0.051, from the raw files of 17 Oct 2026) | 1.5 | 1.499 | 0.051 | pass |
| Reproduced: Exports' share of US distillate output, 4-week averages to 9 Oct 2026 (%) — 29% as printed in the prototype (§0 summary; tolerance 0.51, from the raw files of 17 Oct 2026) | 29 | 29.054 | 0.51 | pass |
| Reproduced: Exports' share of US distillate use, 4-week averages to 9 Oct 2026 (%) — 38% as printed in the prototype (§0 summary; tolerance 0.51, from the raw files of 17 Oct 2026) | 38 | 37.726 | 0.51 | pass |
| Reproduced: NY Harbor ULSD futures, 8 Oct to 16 Oct 2026 (%) — 0.3% as printed in the prototype (§0 summary (Yahoo Finance); tolerance 0.051, from the raw files of 17 Oct 2026) | 0.3 | 0.332 | 0.051 | pass |
| Reproduced: Brent futures, 8 Oct to 16 Oct 2026 (%) — 5.4% as printed in the prototype (§0 summary (Yahoo Finance); tolerance 0.051, from the raw files of 17 Oct 2026) | 5.4 | 5.351 | 0.051 | pass |
| Reproduced: WTI futures, 8 Oct to 16 Oct 2026 (%) — 10.8% as printed in the prototype (§0 summary (Yahoo Finance); tolerance 0.051, from the raw files of 17 Oct 2026) | 10.8 | 10.843 | 0.051 | pass |
| Reproduced: TTF gas futures, 8 Oct to 16 Oct 2026 (%) — 11.0% as printed in the prototype (§0 summary (Yahoo Finance); tolerance 0.051, from the raw files of 17 Oct 2026) | 11 | 11.031 | 0.051 | pass |
| Reproduced: NYMEX ULSD futures on the day of the licence, 9 Oct 2026 (%) — -3.0% as printed in the baseline (§3c market reaction, 8–13 October (TradingView settlements); tolerance 0.051; the 14 Oct 2026 baseline predates the raw archive (D-2026-10-24-TH2)) | -3 | -2.959 | 0.051 | pass |
| Reproduced: NYMEX ULSD futures over the two sessions after the licence, 8 to 12 Oct 2026 (%) — -3.3% as printed in the baseline (§5a the GL 135 effect (TradingView settlements); tolerance 0.051; the 14 Oct 2026 baseline predates the raw archive (D-2026-10-24-TH2)) | -3.3 | -3.271 | 0.051 | pass |
| Reproduced: NYMEX ULSD futures on 13 Oct 2026, as the truce failed (%) — 4.5% as printed in the baseline (§5a the GL 135 effect (DJ via TradingView); tolerance 0.051; the 14 Oct 2026 baseline predates the raw archive (D-2026-10-24-TH2)) | 4.5 | 4.472 | 0.051 | pass |
| Yahoo's front-month closes equal the settlements the baseline quotes for the licence window, ULSD and Brent on 5 days, 6–13 Oct (§5a, TradingView; tolerance half a printed unit; the 14 Oct 2026 baseline predates the raw archive (D-2026-10-24-TH2); values that differ) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Reproduced: The ULSD crack against Brent futures, 13 Oct 2026 ($/bbl) — 101.6 as printed in the baseline (§5a prices and cracks (derived); tolerance 0.051; the 14 Oct 2026 baseline predates the raw archive (D-2026-10-24-TH2)) | 101.6 | 101.555 | 0.051 | pass |
| Every event test the log records as crossed names a dated timeline row and a source (3 events; without: none) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The path marked under way is a branch of the logged set, fired by the test its definition names (violations) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The licence table fills every cell of its 6 rows and cites its source (rows missing a cell) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Every row of the strike log carries a date, a side, a statement and its source (13 rows; rows without) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The strike log is in date order (rows out of order) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The truce's date (11 Oct 2026) is a row of the log's timeline (rows missing) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The futures chart's marks are rows of the log's timeline (marks missing) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The deck's date, Kyiv's resumed strikes of 15 October, is a row of the log's timeline and the date the log records for the crossed test (rows missing) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Every date the tiles, takeaways, titles and headline print is a data date, a log row or the fetch day (13 dates; stray: none) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| What each path would move: a branch Scenarios does not project, or a theme branch not on its set, carries no number here (numbers on such rows) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| What each path would move: every projected row copies the ten-year, the S&P 500 and the mortgage move of the one Scenarios branch it names (rows missing one) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Verdict: the passage the verdict restates is in the logged claim (thesis.claim; passages not found) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Verdict: the head is one takeaway under the grammar (≤ 25 words, ≤ 2 figures beside a date; faults: none) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scorecard: no judgement odds are printed — a set without a market-implied or model basis for every branch says its branches or its base case in words (rows printing a percentage) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Headline: one conclusion of at most 14 words, not a question, with one or two figures ('Diesel futures are 16.4% below their close before Washington allowed Russian diesel imports'; faults: none) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Thesis.status is one of active, closing, resolved (now 'active'; violations) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Active theme: no resolved block is carried before the status is resolved (fields present) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Active theme: no closing_tracker is named before the status is closing (violations) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scenario set 'energy_paths': the issue gives no probabilities, none are shown, and the set cites its source (violations) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scenario set 'ceasefire_dec': probabilities cover every branch and sum to 100 at each of 3 dated revisions (revisions that do not) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scenario set 'ceasefire_dec': every revision carries a date, a reason and a source document with its date (revisions missing one) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scenario set 'ceasefire_dec': revisions are in date order (out of order) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Scenario set 'ceasefire_dec': every branch states its basis (market-implied, model or evidence log) (branches without) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| All 9 triggers cite the issue document, section and date their threshold comes from (triggers without) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Every data trigger has a numeric threshold (triggers without) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| All 21 timeline events carry a date, a statement and a source (events without) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| All 0 exhibit references map to a published panel, a panel declared pending, or none (unmapped) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| The Range and scenarios page: the source page is published with all its checks passing (dated 17 Nov 2026, 80 checks) | 1 | 1 | 0 | pass |
| The Range and scenarios page: the site still serves the page this one copied (dated 17 Nov 2026) | 1 | 1 | 0 | pass |
| The Transmission page: the source page is published with all its checks passing (dated 17 Nov 2026, 67 checks) | 1 | 1 | 0 | pass |
| The Transmission page: the site still serves the page this one copied (dated 17 Nov 2026) | 1 | 1 | 0 | pass |
| The Range and scenarios page: every copied single value equals the source page (2 values; mismatches) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Every read point names the exhibit it is read from (`ex`; 5 points; without one: none) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Every read point's exhibit code names a card of this page (themes.russia_ukraine-…; naming another page: none) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
| Decisions: every desk decision this page's specification names is in the decisions file (D-2026-10-24-TH1, D-2026-10-24-TH2; ids missing) | 0 | 0 | 0 | pass |
- U.S. Energy Information Administration, Weekly Petroleum Status Report, Table 1 (U.S. petroleum balance sheet) — Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
- U.S. Energy Information Administration, petroleum weekly history: distillate stocks, production, product supplied, exports and imports, refinery utilisation; retail diesel and regular gasoline — Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
- Yahoo Finance chart API: NY Harbor ULSD, Brent, WTI and Dutch TTF front-month futures (closes); EZU, EWG, EPOL, EUAD and ITA (adjusted closes) — Source: Yahoo Finance
- Polymarket, Gamma and CLOB APIs: the Russia x Ukraine ceasefire-agreement and ceasefire events, every open date contract with its daily price history — Source: Polymarket
- Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (14 Oct 2026) and the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype (17 Oct 2026): the dated log's tests, events, the strike log and quotations of Kpler, LSEG, Argus, ICE, IEA, KSE, BOFIT and the press — The site's own research, Macro Review