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Thematic · Russia–Ukraine diesel war

Diesel futures are 16.4% below their close before Washington allowed Russian diesel imports

Washington eased sanctions on Russian diesel and asked Kyiv to spare Russia's refineries. Moscow kept striking Ukraine's grid, and Kyiv resumed refinery strikes on 15 October.Is the refinery war still tightening diesel, and who runs out of runway first?

Said 14 Oct 2026Data to 16 Nov 2026 (futures, contracts) · stocks to 6 Nov 2026 · pump to 9 Nov 2026 · updated 17 Nov 2026
Diesel futures since the licence−16.4%16 Nov 2026 close against 8 Oct · Brent futures −11.4%
US retail diesel$6.1279 Nov 2026 · record $6.529 on 21 Sep · EIA survey
US distillate stocks103.3 mbweek to 6 Nov 2026 · the lowest for the week since records began in 1982 · below the 2021–25 range
Distillate exports, 4-week average1.31 mb/dto 6 Nov 2026 · 25% of US output
Ceasefire agreement by 31 Dec11.5%15 Nov 2026 close · 17.5% at the 14 Oct close · Polymarket · nearing 10%
Kyiv's refinery-strike pauseEndedRyazan refinery struck on 15 Oct 2026test crossed

Diesel futures are 16.4% below their close before Washington allowed Russian diesel imports

Is the refinery war still tightening diesel, and who runs out of runway first?
  • The refinery, not the licence, caps Russian diesel, and Kyiv's strike pause is the variable: tested (said 14 Oct 2026).→ Exhibit 2
  • Diesel futures closed 16.4% below their 8 Oct level on 16 Nov, while Brent futures fell 11.4%.→ Exhibit 6
  • US distillate stocks fell to 103.3 mb in the week to 6 Nov, the lowest for the week since records began in 1982.→ Exhibit 7
  • Kyiv struck the Ryazan refinery on 15 Oct after pausing refinery strikes, and Russia had struck Ukraine's grid throughout the pause.→ Exhibit 12
  • Traders price a ceasefire agreement by 31 Dec at 11.5%, down from 17.5% at the 14 Oct close.→ Exhibit 14
What would change this view
What would change this viewTriggerTodayDecided by
Kyiv breaks the trucea Ukrainian strike on a Russian refinery or terminal after 11 OctKyiv struck the Ryazan refinery on 15 Oct after its pause; Zelensky: “The block is out. We're done.”crossedthe Ukrainian General Staff's strike claims; Ryazan, 15 Oct 2026
The market leaves its slow hazarda ceasefire agreement by 31 Dec priced above 35% or below 10%11.5% (15 Nov 2026); 17.5% at the 14 Oct 2026 closethe venue's daily close; the contract resolves on 31 Dec 2026
Washington acts on the Graham ActGraham Act duties imposed, or a waiver signedWaived: Executive Order 14436 of 16 Oct sets out the section 112 and 113 duties and waives them under section 115, two days before the deadline. No Graham Act duty applies.crossedthe Graham Act deadline, about 18 Oct 2026
Russia decides its export bana decree lifting the export ban beyond 0.5 Mt, or extending itExtended: on 31 Oct Russia's government extended the ban on diesel exports by producers to 31 Jan 2027, with exemptions for some suppliers. The ban was not lifted beyond 0.5 Mt.crossedRussia's export-ban review, 31 Oct 2026
The reasoning behind each point
  • Verdict
    The refinery, not the licence, caps Russian diesel, and Kyiv's strike pause is the variable: tested (said 14 Oct 2026).

    The claim was written on 14 Oct 2026 and is quoted in full in the thesis card. The verdict is “tested”: a test of the falsifier table has crossed. The scorecard sets what the log said against what has happened since.

  • Licence
    Diesel futures closed 16.4% below their 8 Oct level on 16 Nov, while Brent futures fell 11.4%.

    ULSD futures fell 3.0% on the day the licence was issued and has not recovered. The crack between diesel and Brent narrowed from $100.8 to $79.0 a barrel.

  • Stocks
    US distillate stocks fell to 103.3 mb in the week to 6 Nov, the lowest for the week since records began in 1982.

    The 2021–25 range for the same week runs from 106.6 to 123.7 mb. Days of supply, stocks over four weeks of US use, are 26.2, against a range of 26.4 to 30.6.

  • Truce
    Kyiv struck the Ryazan refinery on 15 Oct after pausing refinery strikes, and Russia had struck Ukraine's grid throughout the pause.

    The energy ceasefire of 11 Oct was a US declaration that neither government confirmed. Russia hit six energy sites on 11–12 Oct and all three Kyiv heat-and-power plants on the night of 13–14 Oct.

  • Odds
    Traders price a ceasefire agreement by 31 Dec at 11.5%, down from 17.5% at the 14 Oct close.

    The baseline quoted 20.5% on 14 Oct, an intraday price. The 30 Jun 2027 contract stands at 53.5%, so the market prices a ceasefire for 2027 rather than this year.

Next: Oil and diesel reserves — the diesel stocks it is draining

Source: EIA; Yahoo Finance; Polymarket; the dated log; Macro Review calculations · data to 16 Nov 2026themes.russia_ukraine-read

Exhibit 2 · Each path and test of the diesel-war call, with its verdict

Each named test and path set: what the dated record said on 14 Oct 2026, what has happened since, and the verdict
WhatSaidHappenedVerdict
PathsFive paths for the energy warSaid · 14 Oct 20265 paths named, no odds: One-sided truce · Mutual energy truce · The refinery war resumes · Sanctions tighten · General ceasefireHappenednot yet decided — the window from the 11 October energy ceasefire to the 3 November vote and afterVerdictopen
PathsA Russia–Ukraine ceasefire agreement by 31 December — the prediction marketSaid · 24 Oct 2026Agreement by 31 December 20.5% · No agreement by 31 December 79.5% (quoted)Happenednot yet decided — the Polymarket contract resolving on 31 December 2026, 11:59 pm Eastern timeVerdictopen
TestKyiv breaks the truceSaid · 14 Oct 2026a Ukrainian strike on a Russian refinery or terminal after 11 OctHappened · 15 Oct 2026Kyiv struck the Ryazan refinery on 15 Oct after its pause; Zelensky: “The block is out. We're done.”Verdictcrossed
TestThe market leaves its slow hazardSaid · 14 Oct 2026a ceasefire agreement by 31 Dec priced above 35% or below 10%Happened · 15 Nov 202611.5% (15 Nov 2026); 17.5% at the 14 Oct 2026 closeVerdictclosing
TestWashington acts on the Graham ActSaid · 14 Oct 2026Graham Act duties imposed, or a waiver signedHappened · 16 Oct 2026Waived: Executive Order 14436 of 16 Oct sets out the section 112 and 113 duties and waives them under section 115, two days before the deadline. No Graham Act duty applies.Verdictcrossed
TestRussia decides its export banSaid · 14 Oct 2026a decree lifting the export ban beyond 0.5 Mt, or extending itHappened · 31 Oct 2026Extended: on 31 Oct Russia's government extended the ban on diesel exports by producers to 31 Jan 2027, with exemptions for some suppliers. The ban was not lifted beyond 0.5 Mt.Verdictcrossed

The view is tested: the word follows a rule set out in the Appendix, from the log and the tests above, never by hand.

About this exhibit
A scorecard of the logged path sets (the energy-war paths; the Polymarket ceasefire contract) and the view's tests, each with what the dated log said, what has happened and the verdict
What was said on 14 Oct 2026, and what has happened since
The sets of paths and the tests of the view: what the dated log said, what has happened, and the verdict
Source: the theme's dated log (said 14 Oct 2026); EIA; Polymarket · data to 16 Nov 2026themes.russia_ukraine-16

Exhibit 3 · The diesel-war call as written

The one-line call and the author's claim as logged on 14 Oct 2026, kept as written, with its named status and source documents

The refinery, not the licence, caps Russian diesel, and Kyiv's strike pause is the variable — tested

As written on 14 Oct 2026

The refinery, not the licence, caps Russian diesel: Kyiv's strike pause is the variable that moves it. Energy targets are a monitored repeated game inside a two-level game with a US diesel clock. Ukraine's runway is the shortest, Russia's fiscal clock is slow, and America's flips on 3 November.

General License 135 (9 Oct) sets no volume and runs to 7 April 2027; Russia freed 500 kt from its diesel export ban on 10 Oct. The energy ceasefire of 11 Oct was a US declaration that neither government confirmed: Kyiv paused refinery strikes under US pressure while Russia kept striking Ukraine's grid. Diesel futures gave back the licence's dip within two sessions. The tests are events on the record and the market's ceasefire term structure, never the diesel price alone.

StatusactiveSaid14 Oct 2026
  • the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c what was published, announced and implemented; §5a diesel · 14 Oct 2026
  • the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6c the monitored repeated game; §6e calendar; §6f market-implied odds · 14 Oct 2026
  • the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §8.3 the Russia–Ukraine page; §8.5 tests RU-1 to RU-8; §9 source conflicts · 14 Oct 2026
  • the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary (RU-1 crossed on 15 Oct); §1 pages · 17 Oct 2026
  • the site's specification for this page · §3 Russia–Ukraine: the diesel war · 17 Oct 2026
About this exhibit
A text card: the one-line call, the author's claim as written, its supporting detail, status and the documents it was argued in
The view and the claim as written
The author's claim on 14 Oct 2026, kept as written
Source: the author's baseline and prototype notes (5 documents, listed below)themes.russia_ukraine-17

Crude and European gas rose more than diesel after the licence

Did the licence move diesel?

Exhibit 1 · Diesel futures' premium over Brent futures, with key events shaded

Dollars a barrel: ULSD futures × 42 less Brent futures, to 16 Nov 2026; shaded: the licence, the truce and Ryazan
About this exhibit
The diesel crack (NY Harbor ULSD futures converted to a barrel, less Brent futures), dollars a barrel, daily, with the licence, the truce and the Ryazan strike shaded
The crack between diesel and Brent futures
Dollars a barrel: ULSD futures × 42 less Brent futures, to 16 Nov 2026; shaded: the licence, the truce and Ryazan
Each futures line is Yahoo Finance's continuous front month, which moves to the next contract when the front one expires: NY Harbor ULSD on the last business day of the month before delivery, Brent on the last business day of the second month before it. The two legs therefore roll on different days and usually price different delivery months; the crack is not adjusted for the roll.
Source: Yahoo Finance front-month futures closes; the crack calculated on this site. (data to 16 Nov 2026)themes.russia_ukraine-1

Exhibit 4 · Weekly retail diesel and gasoline prices against diesel's record

Dollars a gallon, weekly survey, to 9 Nov 2026; diesel bold, regular gasoline for reference; the line marks diesel's $6.529 record of 21 Sep 2026
About this exhibit
Retail diesel and regular gasoline, dollars a gallon, EIA's weekly survey, with a line at diesel's record
Retail diesel against its record
Dollars a gallon, EIA's weekly survey, to 9 Nov 2026; the line marks the record of 21 Sept 2026
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, weekly retail prices of No. 2 diesel and regular gasoline. (data to 9 Nov 2026)themes.russia_ukraine-2

Exhibit 6 · Changes in energy futures and equity funds after the licence

Change from the 8 Oct 2026 close to the 16 Nov 2026 close, %; futures and funds coloured apart
About this exhibit
Bars of the change from the last close before the licence to the latest close in energy futures (NY Harbor ULSD, Brent, WTI, Dutch TTF gas) and equity funds (euro area, Germany, Poland, European defence, US aerospace and defence)
What moved after the licence
Change from the 8 Oct 2026 close to the 16 Nov 2026 close, %; futures and funds in two colours
Futures are front-month closes, unadjusted; funds are adjusted closes, so a distribution does not show as a fall. The table adds each level and the change since 27 Feb 2026, the last session before the Strait of Hormuz closed.
Source: Yahoo Finance; Macro Review calculations · data to 16 Nov 2026themes.russia_ukraine-4

Exhibit 5 · The diesel licence as published, as announced and as implemented

The diesel arrangement by named source: what OFAC published, what was announced and what Russia did, as logged on 14 Oct 2026
WhatPublished · OFAC General License 135, 9 Oct (signed 2:43 pm EDT)Announced · Trump, Truth SocialImplemented · Russia, to 14 Oct
ProductDiesel of Russian origin, including importation into the United StatesDieselDiesel
VolumeNone statedOver 300 kt immediately, 500 kt in November, 1 Mt after, about 3 Mt later, depending on refinery conditionExport ban lifted for 500 kt on 10 Oct; about 3 Mt a month possible only after December (Novak)
TermTo 12:01 am EDT, 7 Apr 2027; no loading-date cut-offSix monthsRussia's own export-ban extension expires on 31 Oct
Carve-outsNo debits to US-bank accounts of Russia's central bank, wealth fund or finance ministry––
Not coveredSanctioned vessels, bunkering, the price cap and the 2022 Russian oil import ban; EU and UK bans unaffected–No cargo, buyer, vessel or port identified
Legal basisOFAC licensing under the Russia sanctions regulations, not a Graham Act waiverA big dealPeskov (13 Oct): mutually beneficial and unrelated to Ukraine

The physical limit. Russian refinery capacity, not the licence, sets the limit (IEA, 14 Oct). Russian diesel and gasoil exports were just under 0.6 Mt in September, a ten-year low (Atlantic Council, 13 Oct).

About this exhibit
A table of the diesel arrangement: what OFAC published in General License 135, what Trump announced, and what Russia implemented, by product, volume, term, carve-outs, exclusions and legal basis
The licence sets no volume and leaves the limit to Russia's refineries
The diesel arrangement in three columns: what OFAC published, what was announced, and what Russia did
One tonne of diesel is about 7.45 barrels. Russian refinery capacity, not the licence, sets the limit (IEA, 14 Oct). Russian diesel and gasoil exports were just under 0.6 Mt in September, a ten-year low (Atlantic Council, 13 Oct). (the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2, exhibit 1 (IEA OMR, 14 Oct; Atlantic Council, 13 Oct) · 17 Oct 2026)
Source: the baseline (14 Oct 2026), from OFAC General License 135, Truth Social and TASS via the pressthemes.russia_ukraine-3

US distillate stocks are the lowest for the week in records since 1982

How tight is the US diesel barrel, and how much of it leaves?

Exhibit 7 · US distillate stocks against the same week's 2021–25 range

Million barrels, Friday weeks, to 6 Nov 2026; shaded: the lowest to the highest of the same week in 2021–25, dashed: their average
About this exhibit
US distillate stocks, million barrels, Friday weeks, against the lowest-to-highest range (shaded) and the average (dashed) of the same week in 2021–25
US distillate stocks against the 2021–25 range for the week
Million barrels, Friday weeks, to 6 Nov 2026; shaded: the lowest to the highest of the same week in 2021–25, dashed: their average
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, weekly ending stocks of distillate fuel oil and product supplied. (data to 6 Nov 2026)themes.russia_ukraine-5

Exhibit 8 · Days of US distillate supply against the same week's 2021–25 range

Days of supply, the ratio of stocks to the 4-week average of US use, to 6 Nov 2026; shaded: the same week's range in 2021–25
About this exhibit
Days of US distillate supply (stocks over the four-week average of US use), weekly, against the 2021–25 range for the same week
Days of diesel supply against the 2021–25 range
Days: stocks over the 4-week average of US use, to 6 Nov 2026; shaded: the same week's range in 2021–25
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, weekly ending stocks of distillate fuel oil and product supplied. (data to 6 Nov 2026)themes.russia_ukraine-6

Exhibit 9 · Latest week's US distillate output, use and trade

Million barrels a day, week to 6 Nov 2026: that week, its 4-week average and the same average a year earlier
FlowWeek4-weekYear ago
Distillate production, refiners and blenders5.095.164.72
Distillate product supplied (US use)3.413.953.79
Distillate exports1.201.311.26
Distillate imports0.100.120.11

Over 4 weeks exports take 25% of US output and equal 33% of US use. Refineries ran at 95.2% of capacity in the week to 6 Nov 2026.

About this exhibit
A table of US distillate production, US use, exports and imports, million barrels a day, for the latest week, its four-week average and the same average a year earlier
The distillate balance, week to 6 Nov 2026
Million barrels a day: the week, its 4-week average and the same average a year earlier
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Weekly Petroleum Status Report · data to 6 Nov 2026themes.russia_ukraine-22

Exhibit 10 · Four-week averages of US distillate output and use, exports and imports

Million barrels a day, 4-week averages, to 6 Nov 2026
About this exhibit
Four lines, million barrels a day, four-week averages: refiners' distillate output, US use, exports and imports
What US refiners make, what the US uses and what leaves
Million barrels a day, 4-week averages, to 6 Nov 2026
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, weekly distillate production, product supplied, exports and imports; refinery utilisation. (data to 6 Nov 2026)themes.russia_ukraine-7

Exhibit 11 · Russia's refineries, exports and budget, as quoted

Paid and press data on the other side of the barrel, shown as quoted with date and source; not a data feed
WhatAs quotedSource
Russian refinery runssubscription dataThe IEA puts Russian June throughput at 3.8 mb/d against about 6.5 mb/d installed, the lowest in over 20 years, with diesel output down nearly 30%; EA Analytics has September processing at 3.98 mb/d (via Barchart, 13 Oct).the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c Ukraine's refinery campaign (IEA, 17 Sep) · 14 Oct 2026
Refining capacity disabled, as claimedpublished dataUkraine's defence ministry over 51% (4–5 Oct); its General Staff 45% (21 Sep); CFR up to 40%; the Dallas Fed as much as 60% over the summer. These measure damaged capacity, not lost throughput, and are not independently checked.the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §9 conflict 21 · 14 Oct 2026
Russian diesel exportssubscription dataDiesel and gasoil exports just under 0.6 Mt in September, a ten-year low (Atlantic Council, 13 Oct); of the six main diesel-export refineries one is out of service and two run at a quarter of capacity (Maritime Executive via Atlantic Council). The deal could add $4.7bn of export income by year-end at current prices; the federal deficit is $62bn so far this year (Atlantic Council).the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2, exhibit 5 (Atlantic Council, 13 Oct) · 17 Oct 2026
The licence's scalepublished dataAt 7.45 barrels a tonne, 300 kt is about 2.24 mb, some 0.6 days of US distillate use; the announced 4.8 Mt is about 36 mb, or 200 kb/d to 7 April. Russia's 2025 diesel exports of 28.6 Mt were about 584 kb/d.the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c scale (derived at 7.45 bbl/t; TE via TradingView, 12 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026
The world gasoil balancepublished dataMiddle East and Russian gasoil net exports were 820 kb/d in September, down 1.3 mb/d and more than 60% on the year. The IEA: easing Russia's export restrictions “is unlikely to materially alter the global gasoil market balance”.the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a diesel (IEA OMR, 14 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026
ICE gasoil futuressubscription dataA record settle of $1,568.25/t on 15 Sep, $1,329.50 on 6 Oct, $1,483.00 on 9 Oct and $1,451.50 on 13 Oct; the front-month spread halved from $90/t (15 Sep) to $44.25/t (14 Oct).the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a prices and cracks; other gauges (TradingView settlements) · 14 Oct 2026
Urals and Russia's export revenuepublished dataAugust export revenue $13.9bn with Urals about $66 a barrel FOB, a discount of about 27% to Dated Brent; KSE's 2026 base case is $193bn.the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c Russian fiscal and FX clock (KSE, 5 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026
Russia's budgetpublished dataBOFIT expects a 2026 deficit of RUB 8.6trn (4% of GDP); liquid wealth-fund assets about RUB 4trn at end-August; the central bank holds at 14%; USD/RUB 83.66 at the 13 Oct close.the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c Russian fiscal and FX clock (BOFIT 41/2026, 9 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026
Markets on the deal, 8–13 Octsubscription dataNYMEX ULSD −3.0% on 9 Oct and ICE gasoil −5.0% on 12 Oct, both reversed on 13 Oct; IMOEX +3.9% on 9 Oct and the rouble +1.6%; Rheinmetall +2.0% and Leonardo +2.6%, so investors did not price a peace.the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c market reaction, 8–13 October (TradingView settlements) · 14 Oct 2026
What analysts said of the licencesubscription dataRitterbusch: “probably limited”, a slower pace of US distillate exports at most. ING: “strength has returned”. Goldman: Russian supply is “unlikely to significantly ease” fuel prices.the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a the GL 135 effect (DJ via TradingView, 12–13 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026
EIA's diesel pathpublished dataEIA's October outlook has retail diesel at $5.81 in 4Q26, $4.92 in 1Q27 and $4.18 in 4Q27, on product flows that normalise.the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a other gauges (EIA STEO Table 2) · 14 Oct 2026
Source: the outlets named in each row, as the dated log quotes themthemes.russia_ukraine-8

Kyiv's pause ended on 15 Oct, and Russia struck the grid throughout it

Who kept the , and who broke it?

Exhibit 12 · Energy strikes and political moves by side

Energy strikes and political moves by named side, 8 Jul 2026 to 16 Oct 2026, as the record reports them
DateSideWhat happenedSource
8 Jul 2026RussiaRussia bans diesel exports after Ukrainian strikes on its refineriesthe Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §9 conflict 4 (IEA; ISW) · 14 Oct 2026
9 Oct 2026United StatesTrump announces a diesel deal with Putin; OFAC issues General License 135, to 7 Apr 2027the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (OFAC; ISW, 9 Oct) · 17 Oct 2026
9 Oct 2026UkraineUkraine strikes a Yandex data centre in Kaluga and oil sites overnightthe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (ISW, 9 Oct) · 17 Oct 2026
10 Oct 2026RussiaRussia permits 500,000 t of diesel exports, effective immediatelythe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (TASS via Kyiv Independent) · 17 Oct 2026
11 Oct 2026United StatesTrump announces an energy ceasefire; neither government confirms itthe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (ISW, 11 Oct; NPR via CFR) · 17 Oct 2026
11 Oct 2026RussiaRussia strikes six Ukrainian energy facilities on 11–12 Oct; 33 injuredthe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (Guardian via CFR, 12 Oct) · 17 Oct 2026
12 Oct 2026UkraineKyiv pauses refinery strikes at Washington's request and offers a 60-day ceasefire, which the Kremlin rejectsthe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (Politico via Atlantic Council) · 17 Oct 2026
13 Oct 2026United StatesTwelve senators call the deal a gift to our adversary and ask for the licence to be rescindedthe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (Senate letter, 13 Oct) · 17 Oct 2026
14 Oct 2026RussiaMissile and drone strike on Kyiv on the night of 13–14 Oct: all three of its heat-and-power plants hit, 600,000 without powerthe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (Kyiv Independent; Meduza) · 17 Oct 2026
15 Oct 2026UkraineZelensky: “The block is out. We're done.” Ukraine strikes the Ryazan refinerythe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (FT via Meduza; AP) · 17 Oct 2026
15 Oct 2026RussiaThe Kremlin says Ukraine's strikes never stopped and contradict US peace effortsthe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (Meduza; ROIC) · 17 Oct 2026
15 Oct 2026AlliesIEA board: about 100 mb of the March action still to deliver, over 20 mb of it diesel, as soon as possiblethe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (IEA, via Political.org) · 17 Oct 2026
16 Oct 2026United StatesA bill to block the diesel deal is introduced in Congressthe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (Kyiv Independent, 16 Oct) · 17 Oct 2026
About this exhibit
A dated table of energy strikes and political moves by side (Russia, Ukraine, United States, allies), with sources
Russia struck Ukraine's grid on each day of the truce
Energy strikes and political moves by side, 8 Jul 2026 to 16 Oct 2026, as the record reports them
Source: the outlets named in each row, as the dated log quotes themthemes.russia_ukraine-9

Exhibit 13 · The tests of the diesel-war call that have a current reading

State from the latest data or the dated record; the tests that wait on a date or an event are in Detail
StatusTestLatest readingThreshold or dateIf crossedTest source
crossedKyiv breaks the truce: a Ukrainian strike on a Russian refinery or terminal after 11 OctoberKyiv struck the Ryazan refinery on 15 Oct after its pause; Zelensky: “The block is out. We're done.”the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary; tab 2 strike log (FT via Meduza; AP) · 17 Oct 2026the eventThe one-sided truce has ended: Kyiv's punishment is back, and the refinery war resumes.the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §8.5 RU-1 (observable: Ukrainian General Staff strike claims) · 14 Oct 2026
crossedThe Graham Act: section 112 or 113 duties imposed, or a section 115 waiverWaived: Executive Order 14436 of 16 Oct sets out the section 112 and 113 duties and waives them under section 115, two days before the deadline. No Graham Act duty applies.The White House, Executive Order 14436, 'Implementing the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026', 16 Oct 2026 (whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/10/implementing-the-lindsey-o-graham-sanctioning-russia-and-iran-act-of-2026/) · preamble and section 4: the duties set out and waived under section 115 · 17 Nov 2026Waived: Executive Order 14436 of 16 Oct sets out the section 112 and 113 duties and waives them under section 115, two days before the deadline. No Graham Act duty applies.Duties imposed open the sanctions-escalation path; a waiver compounds the easing.the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §8.5 RU-4; §6e (about 18 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026
crossedRussia's decree at the 31 October export-ban expiry: the ban lifted beyond 0.5 Mt, or extendedExtended: on 31 Oct Russia's government extended the ban on diesel exports by producers to 31 Jan 2027, with exemptions for some suppliers. The ban was not lifted beyond 0.5 Mt.Government of the Russian Federation, statement of 31 Oct 2026 on the extension of the temporary ban on fuel exports by producers (as reported by Izvestia, Xinhua and Bloomberg, 31 Oct 2026; the decree itself not yet published that day) · the ban on diesel, marine fuel and gas oil exports by producers extended to 31 Jan 2027, with exemptions for some suppliers · 17 Nov 2026Extended: on 31 Oct Russia's government extended the ban on diesel exports by producers to 31 Jan 2027, with exemptions for some suppliers. The ban was not lifted beyond 0.5 Mt.Tests the IEA's reading that capacity, not policy, binds Russian diesel.the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §8.5 RU-5; §6e (31 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026
closingA ceasefire agreement by 31 December priced above 35% or below 10% (Polymarket)11.5% (15 Nov 2026); 17.5% at the 14 Oct 2026 close> 35.0% or < 10.0%The market's slow, roughly constant monthly hazard has broken: above, a ceasefire is being priced for this year; below, it is not.the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §8.5 RU-7; §6f the slow-hazard reading · 14 Oct 2026
About this exhibit
A table of the tests that have a current reading, with threshold, meaning if crossed and source
The tests with a reading
Status from the latest data or the dated record: 3 crossed · 1 closing · 0 not crossed · 1 pending · 3 not tracked here
Source: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (tests); Polymarket and the dated record (readings) · data to 16 Nov 2026themes.russia_ukraine-10

Traders price a ceasefire agreement by 31 December at 11.5%

What do the ceasefire contracts price, and how deep are they?

Exhibit 14 · Ceasefire-agreement prices by contract date, at the baseline and latest closes

Market price (%) of a ceasefire agreement by each date, at the 13 Oct 2026 and 15 Nov 2026 closes; hollow points traded under $100,000
About this exhibit
The term structure of Polymarket ceasefire-agreement prices by contract date, %, at two daily closes, thin contracts hollow, with the baseline's quotes as diamonds
The ceasefire term structure at two daily closes
Market price of a ceasefire agreement by each date, %, at two daily closes; hollow points traded under $100k
The contract settles on a general ceasefire agreed by both sides; an energy-only truce does not qualify, and its rule is printed with the contracts below. The diamonds are the prices the baseline quoted on 14 Oct 2026, read during the day; the lines are the venue's closes of whole UTC days, so the two differ.
Source: Polymarket, “Russia x Ukraine ceasefire agreement by...?”; the baseline (14 Oct 2026) · data to 15 Nov 2026themes.russia_ukraine-11

Exhibit 16 · Daily prices of the tracked ceasefire contracts, against the test band

Market price, %, last trade of each UTC day, to 15 Nov 2026; the lines at 35% and 10% are the test's
About this exhibit
Daily prices of the tracked ceasefire contracts (agreement by three dates; a ten-day ceasefire by the end of the year), last trade of each UTC day, with the test's upper and lower lines
The ceasefire contracts through time
Market price, %, last trade of each UTC day, to 15 Nov 2026; the lines at 35% and 10% are the test's
Source: Polymarket, last price of each completed UTC day. (data to 15 Nov 2026)themes.russia_ukraine-13

Exhibit 15 · Every open ceasefire contract's price and quote, volume traded and depth

Each open contract of both ceasefire events: last daily close, %, the quote and the depth, read on 15 Nov 2026
ContractByCloseBid–askTradedDepthFlags
Ceasefire agreement30 Nov 20263.8%3.8–3.9%$305k$29k long shot
Ceasefire agreement31 Dec 202611.5%11.0–12.0%$3.50m$93k
Ceasefire agreement31 Jan 202719.5%20.0–21.0%$253k$67k
Ceasefire agreement28 Feb 202726.5%24.0–26.0%$53k$40kthin
Ceasefire agreement31 Mar 202735.5%35.0–36.0%$388k$89k
Ceasefire agreement30 Apr 202742.5%42.0–43.0%$86k$29kthin
Ceasefire agreement31 May 202750.5%51.0–52.0%$141k$60k
Ceasefire agreement30 Jun 202753.5%53.0–55.0%$186k$83k
Ceasefire agreement31 Jul 202757.5%57.0–58.0%$9k$46kthin
Ceasefire agreement31 Aug 202759.5%59.0–61.0%$18k$42kthin
Ceasefire agreement30 Sept 202762.5%62.0–63.0%$8k$43kthin
Ceasefire agreement31 Oct 202765.5%65.0–66.0%$78k$54kthin
Ceasefire agreement30 Nov 202765.5%65.0–66.0%$12k$52kthin
Ceasefire agreement31 Dec 202769.5%69.0–70.0%$63k$108kthin
Ten-day ceasefire in effect31 Dec 20266.9%6.7–6.8%$2.03m$107k long shot
Ten-day ceasefire in effect31 Mar 202722.5%22.0–23.0%$358k$88k
Ten-day ceasefire in effect31 Dec 202748.5%47.0–48.0%$171k$101k
The rule of “Russia x Ukraine ceasefire agreement by...?”, as the venue states it

This market will resolve to “Yes” if there is a ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.

A ceasefire agreement refers to any mutually-agreed suspension of direct military engagement between Russia and Ukraine, which is either officially announced by both countries or confirmed by a consensus of credible reporting to have been mutually agreed by both countries.

A broader peace deal, normalization agreement, political framework, truce, or humanitarian pause will qualify if it includes a mutually agreed suspension of direct military engagement, to be effective on a specified date. Agreements that outline future negotiations or de-escalation measures without an explicit, dated commitment to stop fighting will not qualify.

Any form of informal understanding, backchannel communication, de-escalation without an announced agreement, or unilateral pause in hostilities will not be considered a ceasefire agreement.

Only agreements which constitute a general pause in the conflict will qualify. Agreements which only apply to specific conflict categories (e.g. restrictions on certain target categories or certain locations) will not qualify.

If a qualifying agreement is officially reached before this market’s end date, this market will resolve to “Yes,” regardless of whether the ceasefire agreement officially takes effect after that date.

The primary resolution sources for this market will be official information from the governments of Russia and Ukraine and a consensus of credible reporting.

The rule of “Russia x Ukraine Ceasefire by...?”, as the venue states it

This market will resolve to "Yes" if a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine goes into effect by 11:59 PM Eastern European Time (EET) on the specified date and remains continuously in effect for at least 10 calendar days. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".

A ceasefire refers to any mutually agreed suspension of direct military engagement between Russia and Ukraine, which is officially announced by both countries or confirmed by a consensus of credible reporting to have been mutually agreed by both countries, and which constitutes a general suspension of direct kinetic military engagement across the primary theater of the overall conflict. A broader peace deal, normalization agreement, political framework, truce, or humanitarian pause (including holiday ceasefires) will count provided they otherwise qualify under this market’s rules.

Any form of informal understanding, backchannel communication, de-escalation without an announced agreement, or unilateral pause in hostilities will not be considered a ceasefire. Agreements which only apply to specific conflict categories (e.g. restrictions on certain target categories or certain locations) will not qualify.

Any calendar day (EET) during which the ceasefire is in effect (including the first day of the ceasefire) will count towards the 10-day total. The required 10 day period will end at 11:59 PM EET on the 10th day (inclusive). If a qualifying ceasefire goes into effect prior to this market’s end date, this market will remain open until the ceasefire is no longer in effect, or until the 10 calendar days have been reached.

A ceasefire is considered no longer in effect when a consensus of credible reporting indicates the general suspension of hostilities has substantively ended across the primary theater. Temporary or technical lapses or expiration of a formal ceasefire term, isolated incidents, localized violations, or accusations alone will not invalidate the ceasefire provided the general suspension of hostilities across the primary theater continues. Where official government statements conflict with a consensus of credible field reporting, the reporting will take precedence over the government statements.

The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible sources.

Examples of qualifying Ceasefires:

April 8, 2026 US–Iran ceasefire: The United States and Iran publicly announced and implemented a mutually agreed ceasefire framework intended to broadly halt direct military hostilities between the two countries. Despite subsequent maritime confrontations, alleged violations, isolated retaliatory strikes, and disputes regarding compliance, the broader ceasefire framework continued to function and widescale fighting across the primary theater did not resume.

November 27, 2024 Israel–Hezbollah ceasefire: Israel and Hezbollah implemented a broadly operative ceasefire framework brokered through international mediators that substantially reduced hostilities across southern Lebanon and northern Israel, including the effective halt of Israel’s major ground offensive into Lebanon and a significant reduction in Hezbollah rocket fire. Although the ceasefire was not formally announced through a single joint declaration by both parties and public statements differed in framing and characterization, a consensus of credible reporting confirmed the arrangement had been mutually agreed and implemented in practice. Despite continued isolated strikes, alleged violations, and disputes regarding compliance, credible reporting broadly treated the ceasefire as remaining operational and widescale fighting across the primary theater of the conflict did not resume.

Examples of non qualifying Ceasefires:

November 24, 2023 Israel–Hamas humanitarian pause: Although it was a mutually agreed and publicly announced broad suspension of hostilities across Gaza, the ceasefire framework remained in effect for only approximately 7 days before wide-scale fighting resumed, failing the required 10-calendar-day duration requirement. Ceasefire violations prior to November 30, would not have invalidated the ceasefire.

July 22, 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative: Although Russia and Ukraine entered into internationally brokered agreements governing grain exports and reducing risks to commercial shipping in the Black Sea, the arrangement did not constitute a general suspension of direct military engagement across the primary theater of the war. Hostilities continued across Ukraine throughout the duration of the agreement and the arrangement applied only to specific categories of activity and geographic areas.

May 2023 Sudan ceasefires (SAF–RSF): Although the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) publicly agreed to multiple internationally brokered ceasefires, a consensus of credible reporting indicated that the general suspension of hostilities across the primary theater never substantively took effect and large-scale fighting broadly continued throughout the ceasefire periods. While some temporary reductions in violence and localized humanitarian access reportedly occurred in certain areas, artillery fire, airstrikes, urban combat, troop movements, and offensive operations continued across major parts of Sudan almost immediately after implementation. Credible reporting broadly treated the ceasefires as having failed or collapsed in practice despite technically remaining in force on paper.

About this exhibit
A table of every open ceasefire contract (agreement and ten-day ceasefire) by date: last daily close, bid–ask, money traded, depth and thin or long-shot flags, with each event's rule
The ceasefire contracts, their prices and their depth
Every open date contract of the two events: the last daily close, the quote and the depth when the history was read
A contract is flagged thin under $100k traded and a long shot under 10% or over 90%, where prices are least reliable. The bid and ask are the order book when the history was read; the close is the last whole UTC day.
Source: Polymarket · data to 15 Nov 2026themes.russia_ukraine-12

One path's trigger has fired: the refinery war resumes

Which path is under way, and what decides the next?

Exhibit 17 · Five paths for the energy war

The window from the 11 October energy ceasefire to the 3 November vote and after
About
What happened · Under way since 15 Oct 2026: Kyiv struck the Ryazan refinery on 15 Oct after its pause; Zelensky: “The block is out. We're done.”
  1. One-sided truceUkraine pauses refinery strikes and Russia keeps striking the grid. A short dip in diesel; Russian export income rises.
  2. Mutual energy truceBoth sides stop striking energy targets. Diesel cracks ease as Russian refinery runs recover, and the licence's volumes become real.
  3. The refinery war resumes what happenedStrikes on refineries and power plants by both sides each week. Russian diesel exports stay near their low and Europe's diesel premium persists.
  4. Sanctions tightenWashington reverses the easing. Russian barrels are discounted further and shadow-fleet freight rises.
  5. General ceasefireA general stop to the fighting; an energy-only truce does not qualify. European defence shares fall, the rouble and central European assets rally, and diesel eases.

Each path is defined on an observable; no odds are logged for any of them. Only the general ceasefire has a traded contract, shown in the next set.

Source: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6c game tree and branches on observables · 14 Oct 2026themes.russia_ukraine-14

Exhibit 18 · A Russia–Ukraine ceasefire agreement by 31 December — the prediction market

The Polymarket contract resolving on 31 December 2026, 11:59 pm Eastern time
About
Agreement by 31 December market-implied
A mutually agreed suspension of direct military engagement, announced by both countries or confirmed by credible reporting, by 31 December 2026; an energy-only truce does not count.
20.5%▲ +7 since 17 Oct 2026
No agreement by 31 December market-implied
The complement of the traded price.
79.5%▼ −7 since 17 Oct 2026

Quoted 24 Oct 2026: a traded price, not a forecast.

Source: Polymarket event russia-x-ukraine-ceasefire-agreement-by, market 2243897 (December 31), CLOB daily history read 24 Oct 2026 09:01 UTC · the market's last price of 23 Oct 2026, UTC day · 24 Oct 2026themes.russia_ukraine-15

Exhibit 19 · The site's scenario model prices none of the energy paths

Model-conditional: no path named in the 14 Oct 2026 log is projected, so no asset effect is printed; macro effects sit on Thematic impact

Nothing is projected here. One-sided truce, Mutual energy truce, The refinery war resumes, Sanctions tighten and General ceasefire: no model on the site prices a diesel-supply path.

What each path would do to core PCE, unemployment and real GDP is read on Thematic impact, under Outlook.

About this exhibit
A text card: none of the logged energy-war paths is projected on the site's scenario model, so no asset effect is printed; the paths' effects on core PCE, unemployment and GDP are on Thematic impact
No energy path is projected on the Scenarios set
Model-conditional: no branch of this page is projected on the Scenarios set, so no asset effect is printed for any of them.
Source: the Scenarios and Transmission pages; Macro Review calculations · data to 16 Nov 2026 and Oct 2026themes.russia_ukraine-23

The tests waiting on a date, the dated record and the reconciliation

The tests that wait on a date or an event, the dated events, and the baseline's figures beside this page's

Exhibit 20 · The tests that wait on a date or an event

Status from the latest data or the dated record: 3 crossed · 1 closing · 0 not crossed · 1 pending · 3 not tracked here
StatusTestLatest readingThreshold or dateIf crossedTest source
not tracked hereThe truce becomes mutual: seven consecutive days with no Russian strike on Ukrainian energyRussia struck Ukrainian energy sites on 11, 12 and 13–14 Oct (the dated log)the eventRussia reciprocates: a mutual energy truce, and Russian refinery runs can recover.the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §8.5 RU-2 (observable: ISW, Ukrenergo) · 14 Oct 2026
not tracked hereWashington withdraws the licence: OFAC revokes or amends General License 135in force to 7 Apr 2027; a bill to block the deal was introduced on 16 Octthe eventThe view that the licence survives to its sunset is wrong; sanctions tighten.the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §8.5 RU-3 · 14 Oct 2026
pendingDiesel reaches the US: EIA's monthly distillate imports from Russia above zeroEIA's monthly imports by country are not read on this page; none from Russia since March 2022 (as quoted)–The view that the 2022 import ban blocks the US leg is wrong.the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §8.5 RU-6 · 14 Oct 2026
not tracked hereCongress: the House discharge petition on the licence reaches 218 signaturesthe petition's count is not read on this pagethe eventThe view that reversal risk is low before the vote is wrong.the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §8.5 RU-8 · 14 Oct 2026
Source: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline (tests); Polymarket and the dated record (readings) · data to 16 Nov 2026themes.russia_ukraine-19

Exhibit 21 · Dated events and scheduled decisions of the diesel war, with sources

Events from 8 Jul 2026 to 7 Apr 2027 with named sources; scheduled dates are marked
  • 8 Jul 2026
    Russia bans diesel exports after Ukrainian strikes on its refineries (the date the IEA and ISW give; another source has 31 January).

    the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §9 conflict 4 · 14 Oct 2026

  • 18 Sept 2026
    The Graham Act is signed: duties of up to 500% on Russian goods (section 112), up to 100% on the top buyers of Russian crude or gas (113), a presidential waiver (115).

    the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c sanctions architecture; §1 table · 14 Oct 2026

  • 5 Oct 2026
    Washington defers the federal diesel tax to 31 December.

    the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §2 claims table (diesel-tax deferral, 5 Oct); §6e (31 Dec) · 14 Oct 2026

  • 9 Oct 2026
    OFAC issues General License 135: Russian diesel, no volume stated, to 7 April 2027.

    the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c GL 135 · 14 Oct 2026

  • 10 Oct 2026
    Russia lifts its diesel export ban for 500 kt.

    the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c GL 135, implemented column · 14 Oct 2026

  • 11 Oct 2026
    Trump declares an energy ceasefire; Kyiv halts refinery strikes, and Russia hits Kharkiv's CHP-5 within hours.

    the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c the 11 October energy ceasefire · 14 Oct 2026

  • 12 Oct 2026
    The EU adds 1,569 sanctions listings; Germany says it remains committed to sanctions.

    the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c sanctions architecture · 14 Oct 2026

  • 13 Oct 2026
    Twelve senators of both parties ask for General License 135 to be rescinded.

    the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c sanctions architecture (Axios, 13 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026

  • 14 Oct 2026
    Russia hits all three Kyiv heat-and-power plants on the night of 13–14 October; 600,000 people lose power. The page's view is opened on the baseline.

    the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c the 11 October energy ceasefire · 14 Oct 2026

  • 15 Oct 2026
    Kyiv strikes the Ryazan refinery after its pause: the first test of the view is crossed.

    the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary; tab 2 strike log (FT via Meduza; AP) · 17 Oct 2026

  • 15 Oct 2026
    The IEA board says about 100 mb of the March collective action remains to deliver, over 20 mb of it diesel.

    the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §4 finding 2 · 17 Oct 2026

  • 16 Oct 2026
    A bill to block the diesel deal is introduced in Congress.

    the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · tab 2 strike log (Kyiv Independent, 16 Oct) · 17 Oct 2026

  • 16 Oct 2026
    Executive Order 14436 sets out the Graham Act's duties and waives them under section 115, two days before the deadline.

    The White House, Executive Order 14436, 'Implementing the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026', 16 Oct 2026 (whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/10/implementing-the-lindsey-o-graham-sanctioning-russia-and-iran-act-of-2026/) · preamble and section 4: the duties set out and waived under section 115 · 17 Nov 2026

  • 18 Oct 2026
    The Graham Act's section 112 deadline: impose the duties or waive them.

    the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6e calendar (Axios, 13 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026

  • 24 Oct 2026
    A possible Witkoff–Kushner trip to Moscow, by about this date (unverified).

    the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6e calendar (Moscow Times, 10 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026

  • 31 Oct 2026
    Russia's diesel export-ban extension expires; the 31 October ceasefire contracts resolve.

    the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6e calendar · 14 Oct 2026

  • 31 Oct 2026
    Russia extends its ban on diesel exports by producers to 31 January 2027, with exemptions for some suppliers.

    Government of the Russian Federation, statement of 31 Oct 2026 on the extension of the temporary ban on fuel exports by producers (as reported by Izvestia, Xinhua and Bloomberg, 31 Oct 2026; the decree itself not yet published that day) · the ban on diesel, marine fuel and gas oil exports by producers extended to 31 Jan 2027, with exemptions for some suppliers · 17 Nov 2026

  • 3 Nov 2026
    US midterm elections: America's diesel clock flips, and Congress gains a vehicle.

    the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6c runways; §6e calendar · 14 Oct 2026

  • 6 Nov 2026
    Russia's finance ministry ends its foreign-currency purchase window, a fiscal gauge.

    the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6e calendar (ISW, 6 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026

  • 31 Dec 2026
    The year-end ceasefire contracts resolve; the federal diesel-tax deferral ends. scheduled

    the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6e calendar · 14 Oct 2026

  • 7 Apr 2027
    General License 135 expires. scheduled

    the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6e calendar (OFAC) · 14 Oct 2026

About this exhibit
A dated list of the diesel war's events and scheduled decisions, with sources, scheduled dates marked
The dated events behind the view
Events with their source; scheduled dates are marked
Source: the baseline and the prototype, citing the outlets named in each rowthemes.russia_ukraine-18

Exhibit 22 · Figures from the October research notes, checked against live data

Figures from the October research notes beside the site's reading of the same data, to 16 Nov 2026; a difference is named, never edited away
FigureAs printedThis pageStatusNote and source
Retail diesel's record, 21 Sep 2026 ($/gal)6.5296.529reproducedthe Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §1 key takeaways (EIA) · 14 Oct 2026
Retail diesel, 5 Oct 2026 ($/gal)6.1996.199reproducedthe Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §1 what changed (EIA) · 14 Oct 2026
Diesel less gasoline at retail, 5 Oct 2026 ($/gal)1.851.85reproducedthe Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a other gauges (derived) · 14 Oct 2026
Diesel less gasoline at retail, 21 Sep 2026 ($/gal)2.052.05reproducedthe Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a other gauges (derived) · 14 Oct 2026
US distillate stocks, week to 2 Oct 2026 (mb)105.1 mb105.1 mbreproducedthe Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a why diesel is tight (EIA WPSR) · 14 Oct 2026
US distillate stocks below a year earlier, week to 2 Oct 2026 (mb)16.4 mb16.4 mbreproducedthe Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a why diesel is tight (EIA WPSR) · 14 Oct 2026
US distillate exports, week to 2 Oct 2026 (mb/d)1.764 mb/d1.764 mb/dreproducedthe Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a why diesel is tight (EIA) · 14 Oct 2026
US distillate stocks against the five-year average, week to 2 Oct 2026 (%)−12.0%−11.3%differsEIA's own five-year average; on this page's same-ISO-week average of 2021–25 the gap is the figure shown. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a why diesel is tight (EIA WPSR summary) · 14 Oct 2026
US distillate stocks, week to 9 Oct 2026 (mb)102.6 mb102.6 mbreproducedthe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary (EIA) · 17 Oct 2026
US distillate stocks against the 2021–25 same-week average, week to 9 Oct 2026 (%)−11%−11%reproducedthe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary · 17 Oct 2026
First year of EIA's weekly distillate record, the 'since' of the lowest-for-the-week claim19821982reproducedthe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary ('lowest for the week since … 1982') · 17 Oct 2026
Refinery utilisation, week to 9 Oct 2026 (%)93.5%93.5%reproducedthe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary (EIA) · 17 Oct 2026
Distillate exports, 4-week average to 9 Oct 2026 (mb/d)1.5 mb/d1.5 mb/dreproducedthe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary (EIA) · 17 Oct 2026
Exports' share of US distillate output, 4-week averages to 9 Oct 2026 (%)29%29%reproducedthe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary · 17 Oct 2026
Exports' share of US distillate use, 4-week averages to 9 Oct 2026 (%)38%38%reproducedthe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary · 17 Oct 2026
NY Harbor ULSD futures, 8 Oct to 16 Oct 2026 (%)0.3%0.3%reproducedthe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary (Yahoo Finance) · 17 Oct 2026
Brent futures, 8 Oct to 16 Oct 2026 (%)5.4%5.4%reproducedthe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary (Yahoo Finance) · 17 Oct 2026
WTI futures, 8 Oct to 16 Oct 2026 (%)10.8%10.8%reproducedthe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary (Yahoo Finance) · 17 Oct 2026
TTF gas futures, 8 Oct to 16 Oct 2026 (%)11.0%11.0%reproducedthe Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary (Yahoo Finance) · 17 Oct 2026
NYMEX ULSD futures on the day of the licence, 9 Oct 2026 (%)−3.0%−3.0%reproducedthe Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c market reaction, 8–13 October (TradingView settlements) · 14 Oct 2026
NYMEX ULSD futures over the two sessions after the licence, 8 to 12 Oct 2026 (%)−3.3%−3.3%reproducedthe Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a the GL 135 effect (TradingView settlements) · 14 Oct 2026
NYMEX ULSD futures on 13 Oct 2026, as the truce failed (%)4.5%4.5%reproducedthe Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a the GL 135 effect (DJ via TradingView) · 14 Oct 2026
ULSD and Brent futures settlements, 6 Oct 20264.5694.569reproducedBrent 100.58 as printed, 100.58 here. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a prices and cracks (TradingView) · 14 Oct 2026
ULSD and Brent futures settlements, 8 Oct 20264.8834.883reproducedBrent 104.28 as printed, 104.28 here. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a prices and cracks (TradingView) · 14 Oct 2026
ULSD and Brent futures settlements, 9 Oct 20264.7384.738reproducedBrent 104.72 as printed, 104.72 here. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a prices and cracks (TradingView) · 14 Oct 2026
ULSD and Brent futures settlements, 12 Oct 20264.7234.723reproducedBrent 106.65 as printed, 106.65 here. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a prices and cracks (TradingView) · 14 Oct 2026
ULSD and Brent futures settlements, 13 Oct 20264.9344.934reproducedBrent 105.69 as printed, 105.69 here. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a prices and cracks (TradingView) · 14 Oct 2026
ULSD futures settlement, 15 Sep 2026 ($/gal)5.0105.262differsBrent's 108.75 matches; the ULSD figure the baseline printed is not the front month's close on Yahoo, so its crack (101.7) is not this page's. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a prices and cracks (TradingView) · 14 Oct 2026
ULSD futures settlement, 23 Feb 2026 ($/gal)2.5192.678differsBrent's 71.76 of 20 Feb matches; the ULSD figure does not, so the pre-war crack (34.7) is not this page's. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a prices and cracks (TradingView; the pre-war row) · 14 Oct 2026
The ULSD crack against Brent futures, 13 Oct 2026 ($/bbl)101.6101.6reproducedthe Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §5a prices and cracks (derived) · 14 Oct 2026
Ceasefire agreement by 31 Oct 2026, as priced on 14 Oct 2026 (%)6.5%–differsthe baseline read an intraday price; this page reads the venue's close of the UTC day. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6f market-implied odds (Gamma API, time of day not recorded) · 14 Oct 2026
Ceasefire agreement by 31 Dec 2026, as priced on 14 Oct 2026 (%)20.5%17.5%differsthe baseline read an intraday price; this page reads the venue's close of the UTC day. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6f market-implied odds (Gamma API, time of day not recorded) · 14 Oct 2026
Ceasefire agreement by 31 Mar 2027, as priced on 14 Oct 2026 (%)38.5%31.5%differsthe baseline read an intraday price; this page reads the venue's close of the UTC day. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6f market-implied odds (Gamma API, time of day not recorded) · 14 Oct 2026
Ceasefire agreement by 30 Jun 2027, as priced on 14 Oct 2026 (%)52.5%49.5%differsthe baseline read an intraday price; this page reads the venue's close of the UTC day. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §6f market-implied odds (Gamma API, time of day not recorded) · 14 Oct 2026
Ceasefire agreement by 31 Dec 2026, as priced on 17 Oct (%)11.5%13.5%differsthe prototype read the venue later on 17 Oct; at this page's read of that day, 15:49 UTC, the bid and ask were 12.0% and 13.0% with a last trade of 12.0%, and the close of 16 Oct 2026 is 13.5%. the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype · §0 summary · 17 Oct 2026
The day Kyiv paused refinery strikes––sources differ11 Oct in the baseline; 12 Oct in the prototype's strike log (Politico via Atlantic Council). The page names neither length for the pause. the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline · §3c implemented on one side only (Kyiv Independent, 13 Oct) · 14 Oct 2026
About this exhibit
A table setting each figure the baseline note and the prototype printed against this page's reading, marked reproduced, differs or sources differ
Reconciliation to the baseline
The baseline's and the prototype's figures beside this page's, each against its source; a difference is named, never edited away
Source: the Middle East and Russia–Ukraine baseline; the Gulf, diesel and reserves prototype; this pagethemes.russia_ukraine-20

The Appendix

The model, the data, the checks and the sources87 checks, all pass
About this page

The page reads EIA's weekly distillate balance and retail survey, Yahoo Finance's front-month futures and fund closes, and Polymarket's ceasefire contracts, and calculates the crack, the range for the week, days of supply and the changes since the licence. Paid data on Russia's refineries, exports and the gasoil market appear only as dated quotations with their sources.

Exhibit 23 · Definitions

  • Page
    What the page reads.

    The page reads EIA's weekly distillate balance and retail survey, Yahoo Finance's front-month futures and fund closes, and Polymarket's ceasefire contracts, and calculates the crack, the range for the week, days of supply and the changes since the licence. Paid data on Russia's refineries, exports and the gasoil market appear only as dated quotations with their sources.

  • Calendar
    Four calendars.

    Stocks and flows are Friday-ending report weeks; retail prices are Monday survey dates; futures and funds are completed sessions on their exchanges' calendars; the contracts are the last price of each completed UTC day. A week EIA did not publish stays empty.

  • Crack
    Diesel against Brent, per barrel.

    The crack is calculated on this site from two displayed levels: NY Harbor ULSD futures in dollars a gallon times 42, less Brent futures in dollars a barrel, on every session both front months closed. Each futures line is Yahoo Finance's continuous front month, which moves to the next contract when the front one expires: NY Harbor ULSD on the last business day of the month before delivery, Brent on the last business day of the second month before it. The two legs therefore roll on different days and usually price different delivery months; the crack is not adjusted for the roll. Against Dated Brent, which trades above futures in this shock, the crack would be lower.

  • Range
    The range for the week.

    The 2021–25 range for the week is the lowest and highest value in the same ISO week of each of the five years; a week that some year lacks is left empty. 'Lowest for the week since' compares the latest week with the same ISO week of every earlier year in EIA's record, which begins in 1982. Days of supply are the week's stocks over the 4-week average of product supplied.

  • Contracts
    The ceasefire prices.

    A contract's price is the last trade of each completed UTC day on Polymarket's price history; the day in progress when the history was read is left out. A contract with under $100k traded is flagged thin, and a price under 10% or over 90% a long shot, where the favourite–longshot bias is largest. The agreement contract settles on a general ceasefire agreed by both sides; an energy-only truce does not qualify.

  • Status
    How a test is scored.

    crossed — the threshold holds on the latest observation, or the dated log records the event with its source; closing — not crossed, and the gap to the threshold has halved since the day the view was opened (14 October 2026); not crossed — otherwise; pending — dated in the future, or read from a series this page does not take; not tracked here — an event the record does not yet show. Colours flag attention, not good or bad news.

  • Verdict
    How the verdict word is set.

    The verdict word is set by rule on every update: resolved — the log records the thesis as resolved; tested — a trigger of the falsifier table has crossed and the log has not yet closed the theme; under pressure — the log marks the theme closing, or a falsifier trigger is closing; holding — otherwise. The words of the verdict restate a passage of the logged claim, which this update checks is in the log.

  • Odds
    Traded prices only.

    Odds come only from traded prices: the market-implied set carries the venue's price on each dated revision, with its source, and the log never revises a row. The five paths are defined on observables and carry no odds; none are the author's.

  • Copies
    Nothing copied.

    This page copies no other page of the site: every live number is calculated here from the publishers' files named under Data.

  • Terms
    The words of the view.

    · · · · .

  • Licences
    What is not displayed.

    Brent and WTI spot prices are not displayed: EIA attributes its spot series to Refinitiv (LSEG). The futures shown are Yahoo Finance's front-month closes. ICE gasoil, Urals, Russian refinery runs and export volumes are subscription or press data; they appear only as dated quotations.

Source: Macro Review; EIA, Yahoo Finance and Polymarket attributions as citedthemes.russia_ukraine-21

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